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EDITORIAL 
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Reforming the European economy to ensure that it generates sustainable growth and creates jobs remains 
a key challenge. At present, many Member States face substantial consolidation needs while at the same 
time have to support ailing economic activity and employment. Tax policies contribute to the 
consolidation of public finances. They also have an important influence on the growth and job potential of 
the EU economy, while promoting social inclusiveness. Given their dual functions, tax policy issues have 
been comprehensively covered in the 2012 cycle of economic policy coordination, commonly referred to 
as the 'European Semester'.  
The 2012 edition of the report ‘Tax reforms in EU Member States’ intends to contribute to the tax policy 
debate in the EU. Following the successful 2011 edition, the report consists of two parts: i) a short 
analysis of tax revenue data and an overview of recent tax reforms in Member States, and ii) a discussion 
of selected up-to-date tax policy topics in the form of two analytical chapters.   
The first analytical chapter focuses on the economic implications and policy challenges of the EU VAT 
system, of which it provides an overview of the history and possible future. It analyses welfare gains and 
economic benefits from simplifying VAT procedures and reviews options to reduce VAT fraud and 
evasion. This chapter is particularly topical in light of two recent Commission Communications on ‘the 
future of VAT’ and on ‘concrete ways to reinforce the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion including in 
relation to third countries’. 
The second analytical chapter deals with economic challenges that EU Member States are facing in the 
field of taxation and tax policy in times of slow growth and high fiscal consolidation needs. Applying an 
indicator-based approach, the report identifies horizontal challenges related to (i) fiscal consolidation on 
the revenue side and growth-friendly tax structures, (ii) broadness of tax bases in both direct and indirect 
taxation, with a particular focus on corporate tax expenditure, (iii) the need to improve tax governance 
and (iv) specific tax issues, namely housing taxation, environmental taxation and some redistributive 
aspects of taxation.   
We trust that the analysis in this year's report will again contribute to the tax policy debate in the 
European Union. In particular, the cross-country consistent identification of tax challenges for all EU 
Member States, based on indicators, may serve as technical background for the analysis of necessary tax 
policy measures. In line with last years' practice, the tax challenges identified in this report require further 
scrutiny in the framework of the 'European Semester'. 
 
 
Marco Buti       Heinz Zourek 
Director-General       Director-General 
Economic and Financial Affairs     Taxation and Customs Union 
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The first effects of the global financial and economic crisis on revenue were felt in 2008. Due to the 
strong contraction of GDP and expansionary cuts in labour taxes and capital taxation, the overall 
tax-to-GDP ratio reached its lowest value since the beginning of the decade in 2009. Consolidation-
oriented tax increases and a modest recovery of the economy stabilised tax revenue in 2010. Given the 
deterioration of public finances and strong turbulence in sovereign debt markets, fiscal policies in 2011 
and 2012 were generally driven by the need to restore the sustainability of public finances. As far as tax 
policy is concerned, for most Member States the need for more revenue to support the overall 
consolidation effort was compounded by other difficulties stemming from the need to support recovery 
and restore sustained growth over the medium and long term. Tax revenue in the EU increased in 2011 
and this upward trend is expected to continue until 2013 at least. 
In the period 2011–12, many Member States increased personal income tax, mainly by increasing 
statutory rates. This was often done on a temporary basis in the form of general surcharges or solidarity 
contributions for high-income earners. Measures to reduce tax on labour aimed mainly to increase work 
incentives for specific groups. Social security contributions were also increased in many countries, by 
increasing the standard rate and the rates applicable to specific groups. Several Member States reduced 
their headline tax rate on corporate income, while in a few others marginal tax rates were increased by 
means of surcharges or levies applicable only to the largest companies. Changes in corporate tax bases 
were slightly more common. They consisted mostly of generous tax relief on investment in physical 
capital or R&D, whilst restricting the deductibility of other items (e.g. operating losses). In about half of 
the Member States standard and reduced VAT rates were increased. Targeted increases in the VAT rates 
applicable to specific categories of goods and/or services were quite common. Excise duties were 
increased in most Member States, mostly by changing the statutory rates for environment and energy 
products and for alcohol and tobacco. These reforms resulted in a slight change in the composition of 
total tax revenues for 2011 and 2012 compared to 2010, with the share of indirect taxes forecast to rise by 
almost one percentage point of GDP. 
Despite these reforms, structural features of European tax systems remain entrenched. For example, 
differences in the tax-to-GDP ratio across the EU are still quite pronounced, with the cross-country range 
standing at twenty points and a higher overall tax-to-GDP ratio in the euro area than in the EU. Following 
a period of cross-country convergence, marked by tax reductions in countries with high taxes, tax-to-GDP 
ratios diverged again between 2008 and 2010. This was due to the different degree to which the recession 
affected Member States and the difference in policy reactions to the crisis. There are differences between 
EU Member States both in terms of the overall tax burden and in terms of its composition. While most 
‘old’ Member States raise roughly equal amounts of revenue from direct taxes, indirect taxes and social 
security contributions, the share of direct taxes in total revenue is lower for Member States that joined the 
EU in or after 2004. This is mostly because they have adopted flat-rate systems. 
Some key economic issues related to the legal and institutional features of VAT in the EU, as well as new 
analytical evidence, are presented, broadly based on a recent study by the Institute for Fiscal Studies. This 
study served as input into the Commission’s Communication on the future of VAT issued in December 
2011. The first important policy conclusion is that the long-standing plan of moving to VAT taxation at 
origin, where the goods are produced instead of consumed, is no longer feasible. It may not even be 
economically desirable, on account of the loss of flexibility it entails, the risk of trade diversion and 
distortion in the single market and its incompatibility with heterogeneous VAT systems. This disparity is 
seen in terms not only of standard rates but also of reduced rates and exemptions (on different goods and 
with very different rates). The confirmation of the destination principle reinforces the need to tackle VAT 
fraud, in particular VAT carousels fraud. This requires better coordination between Member States and 
reflects the general objective of combating tax fraud in the Annual Growth Survey 2012. Simplifying 
VAT procedures would also bring economic benefits. Recent research shows that trade and GDP would 
increase in the EU if the number and complexity of VAT procedures were reduced. The second important 
policy conclusion concerns the use of reduced VAT rates and exemptions. These largely account for why 
different VAT regimes may have an impact on trade, despite the use of the less distortionary destination 
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system. The use of reduced VAT rates and exemptions mostly reflects policy choices made in the past. 
These were often linked to distributional objectives. They are, however, debatable from an economic 
viewpoint, because consumption taxes are poor instruments for redistribution. While the part reduced 
VAT rates play in boosting employment or the consumption of merit goods is not supported by empirical 
evidence, reduced rates and exemptions generally have a significant budgetary cost and increase the 
complexity of the system. The latter increases administrative and compliance costs. The third important 
conclusion is that new evidence suggests that the differences in VAT regimes, exemptions and reduced 
rates generate high costs in terms of the distortion and fragmentation of the internal market. These costs 
are probably higher than previously believed. This confirms the potential welfare gains from increasing 
the efficiency of VAT systems by limiting exemptions and phasing out most reduced rates, subject to a 
careful cost-benefit analysis, and making use of alternative policy instruments, as recommended in the 
Annual Growth Survey 2012. 
This report also analyses economic challenges that EU Member States are facing in terms of taxation and 
tax policy in these times of slow growth and great fiscal consolidation needs. This analysis may be 
relevant for the 2013 European Semester, underpinning sound national tax policies to support growth and 
fiscal sustainability and avoid macroeconomic imbalances. This analysis is consistent across Member 
States and based on indicator-based evidence. It should be completed with country-specific evidence 
before drawing firm policy conclusions. 
The analysis found that several EU Member States could, albeit to a different extent, consider using 
revenue measures in addition to expenditure measures to consolidate their public finances and make them 
more sustainable. Around a third of Member States appear to have both need and room for a tax shift. 
They could benefit from shifting labour taxes to taxes considered less detrimental to growth (consumption 
taxes, recurrent property taxes, environmental taxes). With a view to broadening tax bases, many Member 
States need to review and possibly reduce tax expenditure in direct taxation, especially in corporate 
income tax. The debt bias in corporate tax is an issue for almost a third of Member States. Despite recent 
measures to improve VAT efficiency, there is still a compliance gap in this area in many Member States, 
often combined with the large use of exemptions and reduced rates (i.e. VAT ‘policy’ gap). 
A number of Member States face the challenge of improving tax governance. This relates to a large 
shadow economy and/or high levels of potential VAT fraud and evasion in some countries, or the 
efficiency of tax administration in others. Better tax administration is a challenge in a third of Member 
States due to various factors. They are high administrative costs per net revenue collected, not using 
third-party information to prefill tax returns, the little use made of e-filing and the heavy administrative 
burden of tax systems for medium-sized companies. 
Housing taxation in EU Member States is often based too much on transaction taxes relative to recurrent 
taxes on immovable property. Due to such a situation, in particular a third of Member States should 
consider a shift within property taxes. Moreover, several Member States face the challenges to reduce the 
debt bias in housing taxation. 
Finally, there are several tax-related challenges related to environmental policy. Firstly, it is important to 
ensure that the policy instruments in place, including taxes, are sufficient to achieve the agreed 
environmental objectives. If more policy measures are needed, environmental taxes should play a role. 
Secondly, energy taxes and other environmental taxes should be designed so that they provide appropriate 
incentives to reduce emissions over time. Various measures could be implemented at national level to 
improve the tax system, in particular by i) adjusting tax rates on fossil fuels according to their carbon and 
energy content, ii) indexing environmental taxes, iii) reconsidering reduced VAT rates on energy, iv) 
reducing tax subsidies for company cars and v) introducing CO2-related vehicle taxation. Overall, there 
appears to be scope for improving the design of their environmental taxes in a third of Member States. 
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While this report mainly focuses on the potential to improve the efficiency of national tax systems, the 
redistributive effects of the tax system can be equally important. Redistribution can occur in several ways, 
including through taxation, notably the progressive taxation of labour income. It can also take the form of 
income-replacing transfers, targeted benefits, public consumption spending and the provision of public 
goods. Redistribution through the tax-benefit system is the prerogative of Member States, which have 
different perceptions of social equity and different collective preferences for balancing efficiency and 
equality. However, a Member State that has substantial challenges with efficiency in the tax-benefit 
system (e.g. a large amount of tax expenditure) and does not do well in terms of mitigating income 
inequalities, may be able to improve efficiency without compromising redistribution policies or increase 
redistribution without hampering efficiency. Member States also need to take the sustainability of public 
finances into account when deciding on their redistributive policy. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
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Initial mandate and overall purpose  
In 2009, the first edition of the report entitled 
‘Monitoring revenue trends and tax reforms in EU 
Member States’ was published.  In the 2011 
edition, the title was shortened to ‘Tax reforms in 
EU Member States’ for ease of communication 
and to better reflect the content of the report.  
The report is prepared jointly by DG ECFIN and 
DG TAXUD of the European Commission under 
its own initiative. It includes comments provided 
by Member States in the context of the Economic 
Policy Committee attached to the ECOFIN 
Council and DG TAXUD's working group 
'Structures of Taxation Systems'. It builds on a 
substantial body of work done by the Commission 
services, including numerous assessments of the 
budgetary implications of tax reforms, analyses of 
their effects on employment, growth and equity 
and of their contribution to meeting environmental 
policy objectives. (
1
) Given its focus on policy-
relevant aspects of taxation and on recent tax 
reforms having direct bearing on fiscal 
sustainability, growth and jobs, this report 
complements the annual report entitled ‘Taxation 
Trends in the European Union’ prepared by DG 
TAXUD and Eurostat. That report is more 
descriptive and statistical and gives a 
comprehensive overview of the level and structure 
of revenue systems in the EU. (
2
) 
This report has several purposes. First, it identifies 
how tax revenues in EU Member States have been 
evolving, as a result of past reforms and other 
factors, such as the business cycle or the slowdown 
in potential growth. Second, it takes stock of tax 
reforms that have been implemented in the 
Member States. Third, it reviews various policy 
issues relevant for future reforms, which are 
presently considered in the policy debate, such as 
broadening the tax base of certain taxes and thus 
increasing revenue or reducing harmful high tax 
rates. Other topical issues are shifting taxation 
away from labour towards revenue sources both 
more innovative and less detrimental to growth 
and improving the efficiency of tax collection and 
tackling tax evasion.  
                                                          
(1) See, e.g. European Commission (2008a, 2010a, 2010b). 
(2) European Commission (2012a).  
As a first attempt to identify relevant tax policy 
challenges, e.g. by using indicator-based 
screenings, the report also represents an analytical 
input to the economic integrated surveillance 
carried out in the context of the European 
Semester, which is presented in the next section 
and in Box 1.1. This report may in particular feed 
into or analytically underpin the 2013 European 
Semester, starting with the formulation of the 
cross-cutting issues reported in the 2013 Annual 
Growth Survey. Member States should take these 
issues into account when designing future reforms 
of their national tax systems.  
The report is also intended to stimulate a 
structured, multi-faceted tax dialogue between the 
Commission and Member States. This has been 
stressed as particularly important in Annex IV of 
the 2012 Annual Growth Survey on 'Growth-
friendly tax policies in Member States and better 
tax coordination in the EU' This will stimulate the 
exchange of best practice on tax reforms among 
Member States and foster debates on the role of 
efficient tax policies for growth, employment and 
social equity. Lastly, the report aims to contribute 
to more effective communication with the civil 
society on this topic.  
Greater relevance of tax policies under the 
European Semester 
Taxation is particularly important in the current 
economic context in which Member States need to 
speed up consolidation. Many Member States have 
to consider revenue-raising measures, while at the 
same time trying to maintain still fragile European 
economic growth.  
To tackle these glaring challenges, a new 
framework of integrated economic policy 
coordination, the European Semester, was set up in 
the EU. This process looks at economic policies, 
including tax reforms, at Member State level with 
a view to supporting economic growth and fiscal 
sustainability (see Box 1.1 for a more detailed 
description of the European Semester and related 
processes). It also enables the exchange of best 
practices and the definition of some common 
challenges, e.g. in the area of tax policies, which 
may benefit all Member States. It provides helpful 
guidance on how to take common steps towards  
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more sustainable, growth-and job-friendly tax 
systems, while meeting the need for substantial 
fiscal consolidation, removing distortions that 
contribute to macroeconomic imbalances and 
keeping their (re)distributional abilities. 
At country level, the European Semester agenda is 
distinct but complementary to the need for 
strengthened tax coordination, especially when 
cross-border issues are involved. On the one hand, 
well-coordinated taxation will help to improve the 
efficiency of the Internal Market, given that some 
remaining obstacles stem from the uncoordinated 
tax policies of Member States. On the other hand, 
tax coordination can also support the 
implementation of national growth-friendly tax 
policy strategies, for example when it leads to the 
elimination of harmful tax practices and 
strengthens national tax governance.  
Main trends in tax revenue and tax policy that 
emerge from the European Semester 
The Country Specific Recommendations endorsed 
by the European Council on 28/29 June 2012, 
adopted by the ECOFIN Council on 10 July and 
closing the second European Semester highlight 
the importance of further tax reforms that give 
priority to growth-friendly sources of taxation 
while maintaining or raising total tax revenues to 
help the consolidation process.  
A review of the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes shows that the revenue-to-GDP ratio 
is expected to increase in nearly all Member States 
of the euro area in 2012. It is expected to remain 
stable in the rest of the euro area. The picture is 
more mixed for the non-euro area, where higher 
and lower revenue ratios are expected in 2012. All 
tax categories, indirect taxation, direct taxation, 
and social security contributions are expected to 
increase as a percentage of GDP in the EU in the 
coming years.  
With regard to tax policy as outlined in the 
Stability and Convergence Programmes, Member 
States tend to increase taxes considered less 
detrimental to growth, i.e. consumption taxes, 
including environmental taxes, and property taxes. 
VAT revenue is increased by raising tax rates and 
broadening the tax base. Increased excise duties 
and other indirect taxes, including environmental 
 
taxes, are also used frequently to raise additional 
revenue. If a lot of consolidation is needed, tax 
increases tend to be applied also on labour and 
capital incomes, although Member States usually 
do not increase the corporate income tax in line 
with a growth-friendly tax policy and possibly to 
avoid an adverse impact on a mobile tax base. 
Distributional concerns appear to often play a role 
in tax measures, as new measures often target 
high-value properties or high-income earners. 
Many Member States are trying to improve tax 
governance, in particular by fighting tax evasion 
more efficiently and improving tax administration. 
Outline of the report 
The report is structured as follows.   
Chapter 2 summarises the major developments in 
tax revenues and revenue composition (by type of 
tax and economic function). It focuses on 
developments before and since the beginning of 
the economic and financial crisis.  
Chapter 3 gives an overview of recent tax reforms 
implemented in Member States, driven in many 
cases by short-term consolidation needs. Whilst 
relevant for the European Semester, this keeps the 
promise made in the 2012 Annual Growth Survey 
to give information 'on the main features of 
national tax reforms'. On the basis of individual 
country information, it identifies common trends 
across countries, identifying the types of reforms 
implemented since the financial crisis began. 
Chapter 4 focuses on how the VAT system works, 
reviewing reform needs and options. In most 
Member States, consumption taxes, notably VAT, 
have greatly contributed to consolidation on the 
revenue side. At the same time, the importance of 
a well-designed VAT system, with a view to 
generating revenues in the most efficient way and 
minimising compliance costs for businesses, has 
been recognised in the Communication on the 
future of VAT. This section recalls the main 
economic aspects of VAT, and reports on the main 
results of the evaluation of the VAT system.  
Chapter 5 looks at tax policy challenges in EU 
Member States. To foster a better understanding of 
Member States' tax systems, it updates last year's 
analysis of challenges linked to the contribution of  
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(Continued on the next page) 
Box 1.1: Importance of taxation in main policy processes
The European Semester (I): horizontal recommendation including Annual Growth Survey 
The Annual Growth Survey for 2012 launched the 2012 European Semester of economic governance. It is 
the basis for a common understanding about the priorities for action at national and EU level for the next 
twelve months. It should feed into national economic and budgetary decisions putting the EU country-
specific recommendations and the commitments made under the Euro Plus Pact (EPP) into practice. 
To take better account of the need to integrate tax policy, this year’s Annual Growth Survey contains a new 
annex on growth-friendly tax policies in Member States and better tax coordination in the EU. It is also 
relevant to the EPP. It underlines that to improve the contribution of revenue to fiscal consolidation, tax 
systems should be better designed and structured to make them more effective, efficient and fair, taking into 
account that Member States may need to increase taxes. Tax reforms are already under way in many 
Member States. They should take account of the following: 
 There is scope for broadening the tax base of certain taxes, thus increasing revenue or reducing 
distortively high tax rates. For example, deductions and exemptions from the standard tax base often 
create economic distortions and make the tax system less efficient. This is particularly the case with 
VAT exemptions and reduced rates but it also applies to corporate and personal income tax. Phasing out 
some hidden tax subsidies could help to widen the tax base. In particular, environmentally harmful 
subsidies should be eliminated. 
 Greater efforts should be made to shift taxation away from labour towards taxation that is less 
detrimental to growth. For example, increasing consumption, environmental, wealth (including high 
value property) taxation can help alleviate the tax burden on labour. This makes it more attractive to hire 
people. Particular attention should be paid to the needs of the most vulnerable groups in any tax shifts. 
 In several Member States, making tax collection more efficient and tackling tax evasion can increase 
government revenue. Applying tax rules in all areas of taxation more effectively will help in this respect. 
Measures to encourage moves from informal or undeclared work to regular employment should be 
reinforced. 
 New sources of national revenue such as the auctioning of CO2 emission allowances and spectrum 
auctioning will start to become available. They could be used to support expenditure in growth-friendly 
areas, including green growth, given the commitment to devote a substantial share of these new 
resources to combating climate change. 
 To maximise the impact of their tax reforms, Member States should coordinate their efforts through 
enhanced dialogue at EU level. Progress should be made on the proposals announced by the 
Commission in its last Annual Growth Survey for a common consolidated corporate tax base, for a 
financial transaction tax and for energy taxation – which are now on the table of the European legislator. 
The macro-annex of the Annual Growth Survey also said that while expenditure-based consolidation is more 
likely to succeed, the structure and design of taxation should be developed to better spur growth. In this 
respect, tax reforms can serve two purposes. Firstly, they can support the consolidation of public finances in 
those Member States where there is room for tax revenue increases and they can be used as a complement to 
expenditure control. Secondly, they can support growth by changing the structure of taxation or better 
designing individual types of tax, such as taxes designed to improve the incentives to work, produce or 
invest or to improve resource efficiency. 
The European Semester (II): assessment of national reform strategies by the Commission and the 
Council 
The European Semester is closed in June each year with the endorsement of the Country Specific 
Recommendations (CSRs) by the Council. The national policy strategy of each Member State is set out in its 
Stability and Convergence Programme (SCP) and in its National Reform Programme (NRP). The SCP sets 
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taxation to fiscal consolidation and more growth-
friendly tax structures as well as the design of 
individual taxes and tax administration. All 
Member States are covered, unlike last year, when 
only Member States in the euro area were covered. 
Moreover, the chapter deepens the analysis on 
housing taxation and tax governance further. It  
  
also provides a first analysis of challenges related 
to additional areas of taxation, including tax 
expenditure in corporate taxation, environmental 
taxation and the redistributive effects of taxation. 
The chapter concludes with a synoptic overview of 
EU Member States that may need to consider tax 
policy measures in the different areas analysed.  
 
 
Box (continued) 
 
 
 
 
out measures to ensure sound public finances, while the NRP sets out the measures planned to boost growth 
and jobs and address potential macroeconomic imbalances. The Commission assesses the EPP commitments 
of the participating Member States to the extent that they are included in the NRPs. It provides a detailed 
assessment of the implementation by Member States of the CSRs and the EPP commitments in the country-
by-country analysis it presents to the June European Council each year and proposes changes or 
amendments to CSRs based on that analysis. 
The Commission’s assessment of EU Member States’ SCPs and NRPs suggests that tax structures should be 
adapted to support growth, while tax increases may complement the control of government expenditure to 
help meet the sizeable consolidation challenges in some Member States. Growth-friendly tax policies should 
aim to broaden tax bases and raise indirect taxation if necessary, while not increasing direct taxation. The 
SCPs and NRPs show that Member States who have problems with debt sustainability intend to increase 
taxes in addition to curbing public spending. Although in general all taxes were increased, including SSC 
and personal income tax, the emphasis was on indirect taxes, resulting in a relative shift towards indirect 
taxation. This often takes the form of narrowing the scope of reduced VAT rates and increasing excise 
duties, including energy taxes. New special provisions have been introduced generally to support R&D, 
green innovation or SMEs. Reducing tax loopholes also seems to be a priority in order to broaden tax bases 
and lower tax rates, thus supporting growth and fiscal sustainability. New tax expenditure should be 
rigorously reviewed and assessed ex ante and ex post. 
Euro Plus Pact 
The Euro Plus Pact has been agreed by the Heads of State and Government of the euro area countries and of 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom decided not to take part, partly to retain their tax independence. The EPP is embedded in 
the institutional set-up of the EU and consistent with the European Semester. It adds a political impetus to 
the Europe 2020 growth strategy and steps taken to reinforce economic governance in EMU. 
It stipulates that labour tax reforms will be instrumental in increasing employment and highlights the 
importance of pragmatic tax coordination in the form of structured discussions on tax issues, the exchange 
of good practice and the adoption of the Commission’s proposal for a common consolidated corporate tax 
base. In this context, Member States undertake ‘to engage in structured discussions on tax policy issues, 
notably to ensure the exchange of best practices, avoidance of harmful practices and proposals to fight 
against fraud and tax evasion’. 
2. LEVEL, STRUCTURE AND TRENDS OF TAX REVENUE IN THE 
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This chapter presents the trends in tax revenue and 
the latest available detailed data for the 27 EU 
Member States. It provides an overview of tax 
revenue levels across the EU (Section 2.1) and 
information about their composition (Section     
2.2). (
3
)  
2.1. LEVEL AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
OVERALL TAX BURDEN 
Revenue stabilised in 2010 but picked up in 
2011 
For the first time after several years of declining 
tax revenue and after it reached the lowest value 
since the beginning of the decade in 2009, the 
overall tax-to-GDP (
4
) ratio stabilised in 2010. 
Compared to 2009 it remained unchanged in the 
EU-27 at 38.4%, decreasing only marginally in the 
EA-17 (see Graph 2.1). Despite the significant 
drop in revenue since the global economic and 
financial crisis began, in international terms the 
European Union as a whole is still regarded as an 
area with high taxes. (
5
) As for trends after 2010, 
the Commission's spring 2012 forecast reports that 
general government tax revenue in the EU-27 
increased in 2011 and projects that it will continue 
to do so until 2013, when it is forecast to reach 
almost 40% of GDP. (
6
) This is because tax policy 
in 2010–12 was strongly affected by the response 
to the crisis and weakened public finances across 
most EU Member States. While 2010 was a 
transitional year with no clear trend for raising or 
lowering taxes (
7
), tax policy measures in 2011 and 
2012 were predominantly focused on increasing 
revenue,as detailed in Chapter 3 of this report. 
                                                          
(3) Unless otherwise stated the source for the data up to 2010 
in this chapter is European Commission (2012a). 
Information from DG ECFIN's annual macro-economic 
database and the Commission's spring 2012 forecast were 
used to extrapolate some of the time series for the years 
2011-2013. 
(4) Unless otherwise stated, averages quoted in the report are 
GDP-weighted. 
(5) See OECD.Stat. 
(6) See European Commission (2012b). General government 
tax revenue for 2011-2013 includes voluntary social 
security contributions. It does not include indirect taxes 
levied by national governments on behalf of the EU 
institutions. 
(7) See European Commission (2011b).  
Graph 2.1: Development of overall tax ratio, % of GDP,      
1995-2013 
 
Source: Commission services. 
Big differences in tax levels across the EU 
Despite the high average level of taxation in the 
EU, tax levels across the Member States vary a lot. 
In 2010, the overall tax-to-GDP ratio ranged from 
27.1% in Lithuania to 47.6% in Denmark (see 
Graph 2.2).  
Graph 2.2: Overall tax-to-GDP ratio (incl. SSC) in the EU, 
2000/2010, in % 
 
Source: Commission services. 
Tax levels are in general higher in the EU-15 than 
in the NMS-12; the first nine positions in terms of 
overall tax ratio are indeed occupied by EU-15 
countries. The exceptions are Ireland (
8
), Greece, 
Portugal and Spain whose tax-to-GDP ratios are 
amongst the lowest in the EU. Consequently, since 
most countries in the euro area are EU-15 
countries, its overall tax-to-GDP ratio is slightly 
higher than that of the EU-27. 
                                                          
(8) Tax ratios are usually calculated using GDP as a base. 
Using GNP as a base would lead to Ireland being much 
closer to the average.  
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Convergence of tax-to-GDP ratios since 2000 
interrupted during the crisis 
Big differences between national tax levels are not 
new. In 2000, the gap between the tax-to-GDP 
ratio in the Member State with the highest tax and 
the Member State with the lowest tax was almost 
24 points. However, there were signs of 
convergence from 2000 until 2007, as shown by 
the falling ratio of the standard deviation and the 
mean (see Graph 2.3). The trend came to a halt in 
2007/2008 when tax-to-GDP ratios diverged. This 
could be due to the difference in the depth of the 
recession across the EU and to the various policy 
reactions to the crisis. 
Graph 2.3: Dispersion (coefficient of variation) of total taxes, 
1995-2010 
 
Source: Commission services. 
Note: The coefficient of variation is a normalised dispersion measure. It 
is calculated as the standard deviation divided by the mean (both un-
weighted). 
All countries, except Italy, whose tax-to-GDP ratio 
was above average in 2000, reduced it between 
2000 and 2010. Sweden and Finland, two of the 
countries with the highest tax-to-GDP ratio in 
2000 have cut the tax burden since then by more 
than 5 points (see Graph 2.3). The trend is less 
uniform for the group of countries whose tax-to-
GDP ratios were below average tax ratios in 2000. 
Only four of them had higher revenues in 2010 
than in 2000.  
2.2. TAX COMPOSITION 
Diverging tax composition in the EU  
There are differences across the EU not only in the 
overall tax level, but also in its composition. While 
most EU-15 Member States raise roughly the same 
amount of revenue from direct taxes, indirect 
taxes, and social security contributions, NMS-12 
countries, except Malta, usually have fewer direct 
taxes in the total (see Graph 2.4). The lowest 
shares of direct taxes are recorded in Lithuania 
(only 17.4%), Bulgaria (18.8%), Slovakia (19.1%) 
and Estonia (19.9%). All of these countries have 
adopted flat rate systems, which usually greatly 
reduce direct tax rates.  
Graph 2.4: Tax composition, 2010 
 
Source: Commission services. 
At the other extreme, the Nordic countries and the 
United Kingdom have relatively high shares of 
direct taxes in total tax revenues. In Denmark and, 
to a lesser extent in Sweden and the United 
Kingdom the share of social security contributions 
(SSCs) is low. The extremely low share in 
Denmark is due to the fact that most welfare 
spending is financed out of general taxation. This 
requires high direct tax levels. Indeed the share of 
direct taxation in total tax revenues in Denmark is 
by far the highest in the EU. With a high share of 
SSCs and a relatively low share of direct taxes, the 
German and French tax systems are the opposite of 
Denmark’s. 
Revenue raised from the three major tax bases - 
consumption, labour and capital- also varies 
greatly (see Graph 2.5). On average, taxes on 
labour income amount to almost 50% of overall 
revenue, followed by consumption at roughly one 
third and capital at around one fifth. However, 
NMS-12 countries tend to have a high share of 
consumption taxes. Apart from the fact that in 
general a large share of GDP in the NMS-12 is 
final domestic consumption, the lower taxation of 
labour in these countries tends to increase the share 
of consumption taxation. Also, the economy of 
these countries is generally more energy-intensive 
and mineral oil taxes are an important part of 
consumption taxes. Revenue from taxation of 
capital and business income varies even more. 
Some smaller revenue sources, such as the taxation 
of stocks of capital/wealth and the taxation of non-
employed labour (essentially pensions and social 
0
5
10
15
20
25
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EU EA
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK EU EA
Indirect taxes Direct taxes SSC
2. Level, structure and trends of tax revenue in the EU 
 
19 
security benefits) range from significant to 
negligible. The latter primarily reflects the choice 
made in the different Member States to provide 
social benefits and pensions on a gross or a net 
basis.  
Graph 2.5: Tax revenue by type of tax, 2010, % of GDP 
 
Source: Commission services. 
Consumption taxation 
One area strongly affected by the response to the 
economic and financial crisis has been 
consumption taxation. The implicit tax rate (ITR) 
on consumption increased sharply in 2010 (19.7% 
in the EU-27) interrupting the downward trend 
since 2007 and almost reaching pre-crisis level 
(see Graph 2.6).  
Graph 2.6: Implicit tax rates, EU-27, 1995-2010 
 
Note: ITR on capital: due to data availability the EU average does not 
include BG, LU, MT and RO. 
Source: Commission services. 
The increase was quite broad across the EU. It can 
be largely attributed to an increase in VAT rates. 
Stagnant since 2002, standard VAT rates have 
often increased since 2009. (
9
) The arithmetic EU-
                                                          
(9) Only in two cases did the VAT rate decrease. In the United 
Kingdom the rate was temporarily cut by two points in 
2009 to support consumption. In Ireland the rate was 
decreased by half a point in 2010 after a temporary 
increase in 2009. Both countries are currently applying 
higher rates. 
27 average having risen strongly by 1.5 points in 
only four years, stands at around 21% in 2012 (see 
Table A.7 in Annex 1). 
The decomposition of the ITR shows that the VAT 
component is the largest, accounting for more than 
half of the overall indicator's value (see Graph 
2.7).  
Graph 2.7: Decomposition of the implicit tax rate consumption, 
2010, in % 
 
Source: Commission services. 
However, non-VAT consumption taxes are not 
negligible; their share in the ITR ranges from 
26.6 % in Sweden to 41.4 % in the United 
Kingdom. On average, taxes on energy (typically 
excise duties on mineral oils), tobacco and alcohol 
make up around one quarter of the revenue from 
consumption taxes. Differences in the consumption 
of excisable goods are such that their revenue 
effects go well beyond the spread in tax rates: For 
example in percent of GDP Bulgaria raises about 
five times as much revenue as the Netherlands 
from excise duties on alcohol and tobacco. 
Labour taxation  
Despite a wide consensus on the desirability of 
lower taxes on labour, the high ITR on labour (
10
) 
confirms the widespread difficulty of achieving 
this aim. Although the ratio decreased by half a 
percentage point in 2009 and is below the peaks 
reached in the late 1990s, it remained stable in 
2010 at 36% (see Graph 2.6). More than half of the 
Member States' ratio increased, but the increase 
was higher than one point in only six of them (see 
Table A.3 in Annex 1). 
                                                          
(10) The ITR on labour (employed) is calculated as the ratio of 
taxes and social contributions on employed labour income 
to the total compensation of employees and payroll taxes. 
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Graph 2.8: Decomposition of the implicit tax rate on labour, 
2010, in % 
 
Source: Commission services. 
The tax burden on labour is essentially consists of 
personal income taxes and social security 
contributions. In most Member States, SSC 
account for a much greater share of labour taxes 
than personal income tax. On average, about two 
thirds of the overall ITR on labour consists of non-
wage labour costs paid by employees and 
employers (see Graph 2.8). Only in Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom is personal 
income tax a relatively large part of the total 
charges paid on labour income. In countries such 
as Poland, Greece and Slovakia less than 20% of 
the ITR on labour consists of personal income tax. 
Capital taxation  
The ITR on capital (
11
) has decreased considerably 
since 2007. However it stabilised in 2010 when it 
reached 28.8 %, only half a percentage point less 
than what it was in 2009 (see Graph 2.9). Cyclical 
effects and big cuts in corporate income tax (CIT) 
rates affected the ITR. However, it seems likely 
that tax-base broadening measures which 
frequently accompanied the rate cuts sustained the 
ITR.  
The indicator’s levels differ widely in the EU, 
ranging from 39 % in Denmark (based on 2009 
data) to a mere 9.1 % in Estonia (see Graph 2.9). A 
breakdown of the ITR shows that in most cases, 
the difference in the tax burden on capital is due to 
wide differences in the taxation of capital 
stocks/wealth, while the ITRs on capital and 
business income cluster around 20 % (see Graph 
                                                          
(11) The ITR on capital is the ratio between taxes on capital and 
aggregate capital and savings income. It includes taxes on 
the income earned from savings and investments by 
households and corporations and taxes on stocks of capital 
from savings and investment in previous periods. The 
denominator of the ITR is an approximation of the 
worldwide capital and business income of residents for 
domestic tax purposes. 
2.5. For a more detailed discussion see European 
Commission (2012a)). 
Graph 2.9: Implicit tax rate on capital, 2010, in % 
 
Note: No data for BG, LU, MT, RO and IS; data for DK, ES and UK 
refer to 2009. 
Source: Commission services. 
Environmental taxation 
Roughly one euro out of every 16 in revenue is 
raised from environmental taxes. After declining 
between 2003 and 2008, the EU-27 average picked 
up in 2009 and remained stable in 2010 at 2.4 % of 
GDP (see Graph 2.10). At 4.0 % of GDP in 2010, 
Denmark and the Netherlands had the highest level 
of ‘green’ taxes followed by Slovenia at 3.6 %.  
Graph 2.10: Environmental tax revenue, 2000-2010, % of GDP 
 
Source: Commission services. 
Environmental taxes are a sub-category of indirect 
taxes, in general consumption taxes. They also 
sometimes include taxes on capital stock. Energy 
taxes, mainly levied on transport fuels, 
predominate in most Member States. In some, 
however, the contribution of taxes on transport, 
other than on fuels, is also significant. For 
example, in Denmark, Ireland, Cyprus and Malta 
they account for between 36% and 44% of 
environmental taxes. In 2010, revenue from these  
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taxes amounted to 0.5 % of GDP in the EU-27, 
while taxes on pollution/resources raised only 
0.1 % of GDP (see Graph 2.11). 
Graph 2.11: Breakdown of environmental tax revenue, 2010,     
in % of GDP 
 
Source: Commission services. 
A high ratio of environmental tax revenue to total 
taxation or a high level in % of GDP do not 
necessarily mean that environmental protection is a 
high priority. Originally, taxes on energy (incl. 
fuel) and transport were often used to raise 
revenue, without environmental purposes. Tax 
revenues are a product of tax rates and the tax 
base. Hence the high level of the indicator can be 
the result not only of high level of tax rates, but 
also of a high tax base in relation to GDP. This is 
an indication of the inefficient use of resources in a 
country or of a very energy-intensive economy. 
The indicator can therefore give a misleading view 
of a country’s environmental policy goals if the tax 
base is not thoroughly assessed.  
In contrast, the indicator ‘ITR on energy’ is not 
affected by the size of the tax base. It therefore 
provides a more reliable measure of the effective 
level of environmental (or energy) taxation. 
However, this indicator also has some 
peculiarities. The ITR treats all kinds of energy 
consumption in the same way, regardless of their  
 
  
 
environmental impact. An energy unit produced 
from hydroelectric power has the same weight as 
one produced from coal. In many countries, 
however, renewable energy sources are taxed at a 
lower tax rate than exhaustible ones, or they are 
exempted to provide incentives to switch from 
fossil fuels to more environmentally-friendly 
sources of energy. Thus, paradoxically, a country 
with a large share of renewable energy may have a 
lower ITR on energy than a country that relies 
heavily on carbon-based energy sources.  
Graph 2.12: Energy tax revenue in relation to final energy 
consumption (real ITR on energy), Euro per tonne 
of oil equivalent, deflated with cumulative % change 
in final demand deflator, 2000-2009 
 
Source: Commission services. 
Data show that in real terms taxation on energy 
increased sharply in 2009, breaking the downward 
trend from 2002 to 2008 (see Graph 2.12). 
Moreover, the EU-27 base-weighted average in 
2009 was just above its highest level in 2002. The 
real ITR on energy increased in nearly all EU 
Member States, except in Luxemburg, Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Slovakia where it remained almost 
unchanged (see Table A.5 in Annex 1). The rise is 
probably due to the discretionary increase in the 
rates of excise duties on energy products and other 
environmental taxes across the EU over the last 
few years. 
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This chapter reviews tax reforms implemented in 
the 27 EU Member States in 2011 and in the first 
half of 2012. Section 3.1 reviews the general 
developments across the EU. Section 3.2 describes 
tax reforms in Member States in more detail, 
looking at each type of tax systematically. Section 
3.3 presents the conclusions and an assessment of 
the overall trends.  
Reforms are sometimes difficult to achieve 
because they create winners but also losers and 
have to overcome the bias to maintain the status 
quo. Political economy theories can help 
understand these stumbling blocks. For this reason, 
Box 3.1 at the end of the chapter provides a short 
analysis of political economy considerations and 
determinants of tax reforms.  
3.1. GENERAL TRENDS IN TAX REFORMS 
The financial and economic crisis that started in 
2008 has resulted in a significant deterioration of 
public finances across most EU Member States. 
Consequently, fiscal policies in 2011 and 2012 
have typically been driven by the need to bring 
public finances back on a sustainable path. As far 
as tax policy is concerned, in most Member States 
the need for tax revenue to make a larger 
contribution to the overall consolidation effort has 
been coupled with additional challenges stemming 
from the need to support the recovery and restore 
sustained growth over the medium and longer 
term.  
In July 2012, all but six Member States were 
subject to the excessive deficit procedure       
(EDP). (
12
) Most have to correct their excessive 
deficits in 2012 or 2013. Against this background, 
according to the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes and the National Reforms 
Programmes, most Member States expect to make 
a positive and significant contribution to fiscal 
consolidation by taking discretionary tax measures 
in 2012, in addition to cutting public spending.  
                                                          
(12) In June 2012, the Council adopted the Commission 
recommendations to abrogate the decision on the existence 
of an excessive deficit in Germany and Bulgaria (see 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pre
ssdata/en/ecofin/131128.pdf).  
3.1.1. Overall tax policy direction 
In 2011 and 2012 tax policy has continued to be 
strongly influenced by the consequences of the 
financial and economic crisis broken out at the end 
of 2008 and the subsequent debt crisis. 2010 saw 
no clear overall trend to increase or cut taxes, as 
some countries put in place expansionary measures 
and others focused already on public finance 
consolidation. Nonetheless, tax reforms in most 
EU Member States in 2011 and 2012 have more 
clearly responded to the need to consolidate public 
finances, including on the revenue side.  
This is reflected in the trend in the overall tax 
burden (incl. SSC). The EU-27 average remained 
stable in 2009 and 2010, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
and is estimated to have increased by around ½ 
percentage point in 2011. According to the 
Commission spring forecast, it is foreseen to 
increase by around ¾ percentage points in 2012. 
These developments mirror the increased 
contribution of tax policy changes in the yield 
from discretionary fiscal measures. In 2011, 
measures on the revenue side accounted for 
roughly one third of the total balance correction in 
the 27 Member States (2.2% of GDP). (
13
) In 2012, 
the impact of discretionary tax measures is forecast 
to amount to 0.9% of GDP, against 0.5% on the 
expenditure side.  
3.1.2. The overall structure of taxation 
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the general 
direction of tax changes implemented in the EU 
Member States in 2011 and the first half of 2012.  
Over that period, many Member States have 
increased taxes in order to speed up fiscal 
consolidation. Most Member States have increased 
personal income tax, mainly through hikes in 
statutory rates. These have often been 
implemented on a temporary basis, and have taken 
the form of general surcharges or solidarity 
contributions for high-income earners (Belgium, 
Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Spain). At the same time, measures reducing the 
tax burden have been mainly targeted at increasing 
work incentives for specific groups. Overall, the 
net effect is a more progressivity of the personal 
income tax schedule.  
                                                          
(13) See European Commission (2012b).  
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Social security contributions have also been 
increased in many countries, through hikes both in 
the standard rates (Greece, Latvia, Poland and the 
United Kingdom) and in the rates applicable to 
specific groups (Bulgaria, France, Hungary, 
Austria and Portugal). Only Germany has cut the 
general contribution rate to the pension insurance, 
albeit modestly.  
Roughly half of the Member States have raised 
VAT rates, both the standard rate (Portugal, the 
United Kingdom, Cyprus, Ireland, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Italy) and the reduced rate 
(Latvia, Poland, France, Bulgaria, Greece and the 
Czech Republic). (
14
) Targeted increases in the 
VAT rate for specific categories of goods and/or 
services have also been relatively frequent. These 
have been achieved by repealing exemptions (e.g., 
in Cyprus, Belgium, Denmark, Finland) and by 
narrowing the application of the reduced rates 
(e.g., in Greece, Latvia, Portugal and Finland).  
Excises duties have been increased in most 
Member States, mostly through changes in the 
statutory rates, both for environment and energy 
products and for alcohol and tobacco.  
Several Member States have reduced their headline 
tax rates on corporate income (United Kingdom, 
Finland, Slovenia, Greece and the Netherlands). At 
the same time, however, marginal tax rates have 
increased in France, Greece and Portugal by means 
of surcharges or levies applicable only to the 
largest companies. Changes in the bases have been 
slightly more frequent, mostly focused on more 
generous treatment of investment expenditure on 
physical capital or R&D, and on restrictions to the 
deductibility of other items, such as losses.  
All in all, 2011 and 2012 have seen a slight change 
in the composition of total revenue compared to 
2010. While 2009 saw a marked drop in the yield 
from direct taxes (from 33.3% to 31.4%) and only 
a small increase in that from indirect taxation 
(from 31.8% to 32.1%), more recently, increases in 
the indirect tax burden have been coupled with 
increased revenue from direct taxation in the EU as 
 
                                                          
(14) Spain raised its reduced and standard VAT rates, 
broadening at the same time the scope of application of the 
latter, in the context of the tax reform approved in July 
2012, i.e. after the cut-off date.  
a whole, although of moderate magnitude. In 
particular, in 2012, the share of indirect taxes over 
the total tax burden is forecast to rise by 1 
percentage point from 32.1% in 2009. At the same 
time, the share of direct taxes in the total tax 
revenue is set to increase from 31.5% in 2009 to 
32.1% in 2012. (
15
) 
The change in the structure of taxation is generally 
associated with strong economic effects, notably, 
in terms of the reduction of economic distortions. 
As an analytical illustration, Box 3.2 at the end of 
the chapter provides results of recent simulations 
for the efficiency loss of tax increases in the EU in 
the area of labour and energy taxation. This 
analysis uses the concept of 'marginal costs of 
public funds' (MCPF) and is conducted by the 
European Commission's Joint Research Centre 
(JRC-ITPS) using a CGE model. Generally the 
cost is found to be higher for labour tax increases 
than for energy tax increases. 
 
Table 3.1: Tax changes in 2011 and 2012 
 
Note: The table encompasses tax changes implemented in 2011 and the 
first half of 2012 including temporary but significant changes. Minor 
changes are not included. Tax measures are reported individually, and 
not consolidated on the basis of their budgetary impacts. Introduction of 
new taxes is listed as an increase in statutory rate. Changes in tax 
brackets (thresholds) are considered as base changes.  
Solidarity charges levied in: BE on financial income, CY on SSC, EL on 
high income, IT on high income, LU temporary, PT and ES all of which 
are classified as increases in statutory rate. PIT: In FI and NL labour 
income taxation has been decreased while capital income taxation has 
been increased.  
* temporary increase in 2011. ** measure introduced after the cut-off 
date. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
                                                          
(15) The composition of tax revenue can change not only 
because of exogenous tax reforms but also for endogenous 
factors, e.g. business cycle developments. 
 Statutory rates Base or special regimes
Increase
BE, DK,CY, FI, EL, ES, IE, IT, 
LU*, NL, PT
AT, BE, CZ*, DK, ES**, FI, FR, 
EL, HU, IE, PL, PT, SK, UK
Decrease FI, HU, LV, NL
CZ, DK, EE, FI, DE, ES, HU, IE, 
LV, MT, NL, SE, UK
Increase FR, PT CZ, AT, BE, DK, ES**, HU
Decrease UK, FI, EL, SI, NL, ES, HU, IT, LT, LU, UK
Increase
AT, BG, CY, FR, EL, HU, LV, 
PL, PT, UK
IE, SK
Decrease DE, IE CZ
Increase
PT, UK, CY, ES**, IE, HU, LV, 
PL, SK, IT, FR, BG, EL, CZ
AT, BE, BG, CY, DK, EL, ES**, 
FI,  LV, NL, PL, PT,
Decrease CY, EL, ES, IE, LT, PL
Increase
AT, BE, BG,  CY, CZ, DE, EL, 
ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, 
LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, 
SK, SI, UK
DK, EE, LV, PL
Decrease SI
Increase CY, EL, ES, IE, PT, UK  CY, IT, LT, LV
Decrease NL
Taxation of 
Property
Excise Duties
Personal 
Income Tax
Corporate 
Income Tax
Social Security 
Contributions
Value Added 
Tax
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3.2. MAIN TAX REFORMS IN MEMBER STATES 
This section presents the main measures taken on 
direct taxation (personal income tax and corporate 
income tax), and social security contributions. It 
then details the reforms in indirect tax (VAT and 
excise duties). Measures on housing taxation and 
to combat tax evasion are reviewed in turn. Further 
details on tax reforms in each of the 27 Member 
States are outlined in Table 3.3 at the end of this 
chapter. 
3.2.1. Direct taxation 
Personal Income Tax 
Around half of the Member States have 
implemented substantial, albeit in many cases 
temporary, changes to personal income tax in 2011 
and 2012. The need for budget consolidation has 
resulted in marked increases in personal income 
tax in many Member States, with tax cuts mainly 
targeting special groups.  
Most Member States have increased personal 
income tax (Belgium, Denmark, Cyprus, Finland, 
Greece, Ireland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, and the 
United Kingdom), often by increasing statutory tax 
rates. In contrast to 2010, many tax rate increases 
are temporary and often represent surcharges on 
high income, both from capital and labour. 
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Portugal and Spain introduced solidarity levies, all 
temporary measures, except in Belgium. Austria 
announced that it will bring in a temporary 
progressive solidarity contribution on high 
incomes in 2013 (and lower tax allowances for the 
self-employed). Similar measures are planned in 
the Czech Republic.  
As solidarity contributions are levied on high 
incomes or increase with the level of income, these 
countries' personal income tax systems have 
become more progressive. While Italy and 
Portugal levy surcharges on high incomes, at rates 
of 3% and 2.5% respectively (
16
), Greece, Cyprus 
and Spain have increased taxes for all income 
brackets, but progressively. For 2011 only, 
Portugal applied a surcharge of 3.5% to the income 
above the minimum wage. Luxembourg levied a 
0.8% crisis tax on all income except minimum 
                                                          
(16) The 3% levy in Italy is deductible from PIT base. 
wage salary in 2011, and Belgium brought in a 4% 
solidarity charge on financial income above a 
threshold. The Spanish progressive tax schedule on 
savings and capital gains in three brackets is a 
temporary measure for two years.  
For Member States that have shifted the tax burden 
away from personal income tax, most tax reforms 
have aimed to increase work incentives. The focus 
has been mostly on participation incentives for 
vulnerable groups and generally involved changes 
in the tax base. Austria and the Netherlands, 
however, have cut the tax/social security 
advantages for older workers. Only Finland and 
Germany’s tax base measures lowered the tax 
burden for the entire working population.   
Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Malta 
have introduced tax measures supporting parents. 
Germany facilitated tax deductibility for childcare 
costs, the Czech Republic and Hungary increased 
tax allowances for families with children and tax 
credits for families with three or more children, 
respectively, and Malta increased the tax brackets 
for parents with children under 18.  
Tax reliefs were also granted to low and medium 
income earners by increasing tax credits and basic 
allowances in Belgium, Finland and Hungary. The 
Netherlands decreased the tax rate in the lowest tax 
bracket in 2011. Other targeted tax base reliefs 
were given in Denmark, Sweden and Spain. 
Denmark introduced a temporary deduction for 
wage expenses for household services and 
refurbishment expiring at the end of 2012. Sweden 
raised basic income tax allowances for labour 
income of people older than 65 and Spain 
reintroduced the general 15% tax credit for buying 
or restoring a taxpayer's primary residence. 
Clearly, the Spanish tax measures are intended to 
increase consumption and investment, and the 
Swedish initiative aims to increase life spent in 
work (since retirement age can be voluntarily 
postponed from 65 to the age of 67).    
Some measures in Italy and Ireland aim to improve 
tax compliance and enhance human capital, 
respectively. In Italy, a lower proportional tax rate 
of between 19-21% was introduced on rental 
income from buildings for residential purposes, 
replacing the inclusion of 85% of rental income in 
the personal income tax base (with a marginal tax 
rate of around 30% on average). To attract key 
European Commission 
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individuals, Ireland grants qualifying individuals 
from abroad an exemption from income tax on 
30% of their annual salary between €75000 and 
€500000 if they are employed for a minimum of 
one year to a maximum of five years. 
The 2011 Hungarian tax reform brought the 
highest marginal tax rate down from 32% to a 16% 
flat rate. However, as the tax base rose to 127% of 
gross earnings (in 2010), the tax rate actually 
corresponds to 20.3%. In 2012, the 27% base-
increasing component was phased out for low to 
medium earnings below HUF 202000 (€653), 
roughly the average wage, leading to a system with 
two rates, 16% and 20.3%. Latvia lowered the 
general PIT rate from 26 to 25%, partly 
compensating for the increase in social security 
contributions. In Finland there has been a slight 
reduction in progressivity: the top marginal tax 
rate was cut by 0.25 pp in 2012. The United 
Kingdom announced that it would cut its highest 
PIT rate from 50% to 45% in 2013. 
The overall trend towards steeper progression in 
personal income tax could reflect the fact that 
personal income tax is the only tax that is well 
suited to redistribute consumption power among 
different income groups. The increase in other 
taxes in response to the need for consolidation 
tends to be flat or even regressive. 
The EU-27 (arithmetic) average top personal 
income tax rate increased slightly, by 0.2 pp, in the 
period 2010-2012 from 37.9% to 38.1% (see Table 
A.4 in Annex 1). This development has not been 
steady as the PIT top rate fell in 2011 by 0.3 pp to 
37.6%, and then returned to 38.1%, the highest 
level since the crisis began in 2008. While the 
decrease in 2011 was mainly the result of the 
reform in Hungary, where the rate was halved to 
20.3% in 2011, the 2012 increase is driven by the 
(temporary) tax increases in Cyprus and Spain. In 
comparison to 2010, six Member States – France, 
Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Portugal – 
increased top rates levied on personal income. The 
largest increase, by more than 28%, from 30 in 
2011 to 38.5 in 2012 was in Cyprus, due to the 
introduction of an additional tax bracket with a tax 
rate of 35% and a temporary surcharge. The top 
rate on personal income increased significantly in 
Spain from 43% in 2010 to 52% in 2012. In 2011 
 
the Spanish government introduced two additional 
tax rates on income above €120000 and €175000 
of 44% and 45% respectively. In 2012, a 
temporary supplementary progressive levy was 
brought in, raising the top personal income tax to 
52%. 
Concerning the taxation of capital income, recent 
measures have typically increased the tax burden 
on capital. In Austria, as from 1 April 2012 a 
withholding tax of 25%, independent of the 
holding period, applies to capital gains from 
financial assets. Measures taken in other countries 
mostly comprise increases in tax rates, namely in 
Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain. In Belgium, the withholding 
tax rate on interest and dividends increased from 
15% to 21%, and in Cyprus the rate increased 
permanently from 10% to 15% for interest and 
temporarily for 2 years from 17% to 20% for 
dividends. In France, the optional final levy on 
dividends and interest was increased from 18% to 
19% in 2011, and 21% and 24% respectively in 
2012, whereas the mandatory final levy was 
increased from 18% to 19% on capital gains. In 
Ireland taxes on capital and interest were aligned at 
30% in 2012. In Portugal, the tax rate applicable to 
capital gains on the sale of shares and other 
securities was increased from 21.5% in 2011 to 
25% in 2012. Portugal also adopted an increase in 
withholding tax from 21.5% to 25% on income 
from dividends, interest and other forms of 
remuneration on shareholders’ loans and share 
capital. 
Two countries, Finland and Spain rendered their 
capital taxation more progressive. In Finland, the 
tax rate on capital income increased from 28% to 
30% and for income exceeding €50000 to 32% 
from 2012. As of 2012, Spain taxes savings and 
capital gains separately under a progressive tax 
schedule with three brackets of 21% on the first 
€6000, 25% up to €24000, and 27% on income 
above that (in 2011, they were taxed at 19% on the 
first €6000, and 21% on income above) from    
2012-2013. 
Several countries introduced measures to broaden 
the tax base, often by reducing tax expenditures. In 
particular, this was done through measures related 
to housing taxation (although on personal capital 
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income). In the Netherlands, a new top bracket was  
introduced in the imputed income for owner-
occupied housing, increasing the imputed income 
for the share of the value in excess of €1 million 
from 0.55% in 2009 to 1.05% in 2011 As a result, 
it is slightly closer to the 4% imputed income that 
applies to other assets. In Finland, the tax 
deductibility of mortgage interest rate payments 
will be gradually cut to 85% in 2012, 80% in 2013 
and 75% in 2014. In Spain, the housing investment 
deduction in personal income tax, which was 
removed for incomes above €24 170, was 
reintroduced for all primary residences in 2012. 
Corporate Income Tax 
The long-term trend to cut the statutory rates 
across the EU has continued, albeit at a slower 
pace, as most Member States have left the headline 
rates unchanged in 2011-2012, with some 
exceptions.  
The United Kingdom cut the small profits 
corporate tax rate by 1 point to 20%, and the 
headline rate in two steps to 24%, 4 points below 
the 2010 level. Further reductions in the rate are 
planned to bring it to 23% in 2013 and 22% in 
2014. Finland also cut its corporate income tax rate 
from 26 to 24.5%. In Greece, the statutory rate was 
cut from 25% in 2009 to 24% in 2010 and 20% for 
income earned as of 2011. At the same time, as 
from 2009 and until 2014, Greece applies a 
temporary special contribution at progressive rates 
for enterprises with a net income above €100000. 
Slovenia cut the statutory rate from 20% to 18%, 
and plans to cut it further progressively to 15% in 
2015. In the Netherlands, the rate applicable to 
profit in excess of €200000 was cut by half a 
percentage point to 25%.  
France and Portugal introduced surcharges to the 
corporate income tax rate in 2012. France 
introduced a temporary 5% surcharge on 
companies with (group) gross income exceeding 
€250 million, while in Portugal the surcharge on 
the state corporate income tax (IRC) is levied at 
3% on income between €1.5 and 10 million and at 
5% above that. At the same time, the reduced CIT 
rate of 12.5% was abolished.  
Overall, the average top corporate income tax fell 
in the EU-27 in the period 2010-2012 by 0.2 pp 
from 23.7% in 2010 to 23.5% in 2012. In this 
period only two Member States – France and 
Portugal – increased the top CIT through 
surcharges while four countries – Greece, Finland, 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom cut the top 
rate (Table A.4 in Annex 1 provides an overview 
of the statutory top corporate income tax rates in 
2012 compared to previous years).  
Several Member States have made changes to their 
tax base. The United Kingdom and Slovenia 
introduced measures to incentivise corporate 
investment. Slovenia increased the allowance for 
investment in equipment and intangible assets to 
40% (previously 30%) and raised the relief for 
investment in research and development from 40 
to 100%. Similarly, in the United Kingdom the 
SME tax relief rate for investment was increased in 
stages to 225% as of April 2012. In addition, a 
special regime introducing a reduced 10% rate on 
corporate profits attributed to patents and other 
types of intellectual property (Patent Box) will be 
phased in over five years as from April 2013. At 
the same time, an 'Above the Line' (ATL) credit 
for R&D with a minimum rate of 9.1% before tax 
will be introduced. In March 2012, Spain 
introduced several base-broadening measures such 
as the deferral of tax benefits for goodwill arising 
from acquisitions and business restructuring 
operations, a permanent limit to the deductibility 
of interest expenses, lower limits to the deductions 
aimed at promoting certain activities (e.g. R&D), 
limits to the ‘free depreciation’ regime (introduced 
in 2010). 
Restrictions to the favourable tax treatment of 
losses have been introduced in Austria (limited to 
cross-border losses), Denmark and France, where 
upper limits were set to the amount that can be 
overall carried forward, or utilised annually, 
respectively. Similar limitations were introduced in 
Spain for larger companies in 2012, while in the 
previous year the carry-forward period had been 
extended from 15 to 18 years. 
Some countries have reduced the tax burden on 
corporate profits by enlarging the scope of special 
regimes. In Hungary, the threshold for the reduced 
10% rate was increased tenfold to HUF 500 
million (€1.8 million). Lithuania and Spain also 
increased the maximum annual threshold to qualify 
for the simplified taxation regime for small 
companies. 
European Commission 
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3.2.2. Social security contributions 
In contrast with 2010, when social security 
contributions remained virtually unchanged in 
most Member States - only Bulgaria and Hungary 
implemented cuts – significant changes were made 
in 2011 and even more in 2012. The changes 
mainly take the form of increases. Almost always, 
the increase was achieved by rate hikes, both for 
general and for targeted groups. The standard rate 
increased in Greece, Latvia, and the United 
Kingdom. Special items of the social security 
contributions, which effectively also increase the 
overall social security contribution rate, were 
raised in Bulgaria for pension contributions, in 
France for passive (investment) income, in 
Hungary for health insurance, and in Poland for 
disability contributions. Increases for special types 
of employees were brought in in Austria for 
farmers, the self-employed and old-age 
unemployed and in Portugal for civil servants. 
Cyprus and Slovakia brought in increases via 
amendments to the tax base. In Cyprus a 
contribution of 3% on gross earnings of current 
government employees to the government pension 
schemes was introduced, and in Slovakia, taxable 
non-monetary benefits provided to employees 
were also made subject to social security and 
health insurance contributions. In most of the 
Member States where social security contributions 
were increased, this increased the tax burden on 
labour as they were not compensated by decreases 
in the PIT, except in Latvia.  
The only exception was Germany, which reduced 
the contribution to pension insurance from 19.9% 
to 19.6% from 1 January 2012. France plans to 
increase SSC on passive income. Belgium brought 
in tax relief in the employer social security 
contribution for the first three employees hired by 
medium-sized enterprises in order to address the 
rigid labour market. 
3.2.3. Indirect taxation 
VAT 
In line with the trends over the previous biennium, 
between 2011 and 2012, many Member States 
increased the standard VAT rate. In Portugal, as of 
January 2011 the standard rate was increased by a 
 
two-step hike to 23%, 3 points above its level in 
June 2010. Following the temporary reduction to 
15% in 2009, the United Kingdom raised the 
standard rate from 17.5% to 20% in January 2011. 
In 2012 Cyprus and Ireland increased their 
standard rates by 2 percentage points to 17% and 
23%, respectively. The two-point hike in January 
2012 brought the standard rate to 27% in Hungary, 
the highest level in the EU, and 7 points above the 
level before the July 2009 increase. Increases by 1 
point were also made in Latvia, Poland, Slovakia 
and Italy in 2011. (
17
) In Italy an additional two-
point hike to 23% will take effect in October   
2012. (
18
) (
19
)  
This implies a progressive increase in the average 
standard VAT in EU-27 from 19.8% in 2009 to 
21% in 2012 (See Table A.7 in Annex 1). Over 
2010-2012, almost half the Member States raised 
the standard and/or reduced rate to raise revenue. 
Reduced rates were increased in several countries, 
such as Latvia, Poland, France (excluding some 
goods and services still taxed at the previous 
level), Bulgaria (where reduced rates apply only to 
tourist services) and Greece, with a parallel sizable 
increase in the standard rate made in 2010. In 
2012, the reduced rate in the Czech Republic was 
raised from 10 to 14%.  
Increases in the VAT base were achieved by 
repealing exemptions (for instance, in Cyprus, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland) and by reducing the 
scope of application of existing reduced rates 
(notably, in Greece Latvia and Portugal). 
Interestingly, in Finland, the application of the 
reduced rate to labour-intensive services was 
abolished.  
In Hungary and Denmark, the increase in the 
statutory VAT rate and base broadening measures 
were adopted in the context of broader reforms that 
aim to shift the fiscal burden away from labour and 
capital towards consumption. In the other Member 
States, the increases were brought in to increase 
overall tax revenue.  
                                                          
(17) Latvia brought the standard rate back to 21% from July 
2012. 
(18) This measure is approved unless the general Spending 
Review reform makes it unnecessary by generating 
expenditures saving. 
(19) In July 2012, Spain increased the standard rate by 3 pp to 
21% as of September 2012. 
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Several Member States have implemented targeted 
– and in some cases temporary – reductions in the 
tax burden to specific goods and services by 
moving them to the lowest rates (Belgium, Cyprus, 
Greece, Spain and Sweden). These changes were, 
in most of these Member States, justified not only 
on distributional grounds (reduced rates on 
necessities such as food or on merit goods thought 
to be under consumed), but also by concerns on the 
economic developments in specific sectors (e.g. 
construction). (
20
) 
Excise duties 
In 2011 and 2012, a number of excise duty rates 
were significantly increased in most Member 
States, with the only decrease in fuel excises 
implemented in Slovenia. In several of the new 
Member States, excise duties on transport fuels, 
electricity, tobacco and alcohol have been raised 
considerably, although in many instances from a 
low level close to the EU minimum before the 
hikes implemented in 2010.  
Excise duties on energy and other environmental 
taxes were increased in many Member States. 
Germany introduced a tax on nuclear fuel. Austria 
and Germany introduced a duty on airline tickets 
for planes leaving from domestic airports. Air 
passenger duty was also increased in the United 
Kingdom. In Finland, energy taxation has been 
restructured to take into account the energy content 
and CO2-emissions of energy products. Ireland 
introduced a tax on CO2-emissions and Slovakia 
introduced a tax on ETS quotas allocated free of 
charge. In line with the Energy Directive, Poland 
abolished the exemption on coal, lignite and coke. 
Latvia re-introduced excises on natural gas in 2011 
and widened the tax base by including certain 
lubricating oil groups in 2012. 
Several countries have implemented changes to the 
taxation of cars. Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands have increased the CO2-incentives in 
car registration tax. In 2011 Latvia changed the 
structure of the vehicle operation tax, at the same 
time increasing the tax burden on luxury, 
environmentally unfriendly and powerful cars. In 
Romania, a pollution tax was introduced on both 
                                                          
(20) Reduced VAT rates are generally not the most efficient 
way of redistributing income. 
new and second-hand vehicles produced locally or 
abroad on their first registration. 
Excise duties on tobacco and/or alcohol were 
increased in Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, France, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and 
the United Kingdom. Concerning other health-
related products, Finland introduced an excise duty 
on sweets and ice cream, while in France a specific 
contribution was introduced on suppliers of 
beverages (sodas) with added sugar or sweeteners. 
Latvia’s excise duty rate on sweetened non-
alcoholic drinks was increased by 30%. 
Table 3.2 summarises the tax changes in excise 
duties across Member States and breaks down the 
overview from Table 3.1 into two main excise duty 
categories.  
 
Table 3.2: Excise duty changes in 2011 and 2012 
 
Note: See note to Table 3.1.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
3.2.4. Taxation of property 
Only a few Member States implemented tax 
reforms in the domain of property taxation. In 
particular, increases in recurrent taxes were 
brought in in Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Portugal and Spain. Greece introduced a special 
real estate duty on residential property, calculated 
on the surface area of buildings, also taking into 
account its age and location. The duty is collected 
through the payment of electricity bills. In 
addition, the tax-free bracket of the progressive 
real estate tax introduced in 2010 was halved to 
€200000. Italy abolished the exemption on main 
residences granted by the property tax and raised 
cadastral values by 60%. This is expected to yield 
0.7% of GDP in extra revenue. Latvia doubled its 
progressive rates for residential buildings and  
 
Statutory rates
Base or special 
regimes
Increase
AT, BG, FI, DE, EL, 
ES, HU, IE, IT, LV, 
LT, MT, NL, PT, RO, 
SK, UK
DK, EE, LV, PL
Decrease SI
Increase
 AT, BE, CY, CZ, DE, 
EE, ES, FI, FR, HU, 
LV, LT, LU, NL, PL, 
PT, RO, SE, SK, SI, 
UK
Decrease
Energy & 
Environment
Tobacco, Alcohol 
and Sugar etc.
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broadened the base of the real estate tax by 
including auxiliary buildings, parking slots and 
houses and lands owned by religious organisations 
but not used for a religious purpose. Base-
broadening measures were also introduced in 
Lithuania, where the annual tax now applies to 
immovable property owned by individuals and not 
used for commercial purposes (previously exempt) 
at a 1% rate on values above LTL 1000000 
(€290000). Portugal increased the minimum and 
the maximum rates of the real estate tax on urban 
property by 0.1 pp. Spain introduced for 2012 and 
2013 a temporary surcharge in the Real Estate 
 
Tax (municipal tax) for immovable properties with 
an updated cadastral value over the average value 
in each municipality.  
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
amended their property transaction taxes. The 
Dutch cut the property transfer tax for owner-
occupied dwellings from 6% to 2%. The United 
Kingdom introduced a 7% rate of the Stamp Duty 
Land Tax (increased to 15% if the buyer is a non-
natural person) applicable to the purchase of 
residential property with a value above GBP 2 
million (€2.5 million). 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 3.1: Determinants of tax reforms
Tax systems are amended relatively frequently. While the recent reforms are clearly influenced by the 
general economic conditions, one interesting question is whether political or social factors also play a role in 
tax policy. 
The political economy of tax policy has investigated why tax systems are as they are and why they are going 
towards specific structures. For instance, reviewing the UK, Alt et al. (2011) highlight a decline in 
preferences for redistribution that materialised in cuts in statutory rates. They also identify hysteresis 
features in terms of favourable tax treatments (e.g. R&D tax credits, mortgage interest tax relief, married 
couple allowances, etc.),even if these measures do not tend to be lobbied for in the first place. The authors 
also note a low level of information in the electorate on the effects of tax and interaction between different 
types of tax. These features are echoed by Castanheira and Valenduc (2006). They find that many features of 
the Belgian tax system (e.g. reduced corporate tax rates, the favourable taxation of financial instruments or 
the financial sector, or the tax treatment of couples) benefit from the status quo due to political 
considerations. A third example is Profeta (2007), who argues that the 2007 reform of bequest taxes in Italy 
was driven by political considerations. 
A second strand of the economic literature focuses on the levels of various taxes, in particular those on 
corporations. By estimating tax reaction functions, the seminal work of Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano 
(2008) shows interdependence in the setting of corporate tax rates in Europe. However, the empirical 
approach does not allow one to distinguish between reasons relating to tax competition (defined as the wish 
to attract a mobile tax base) or other reasons. In fact, Slemrod (2004) finds that tax systems tend to converge 
because the features of economies tend to converge. Alternatively, according to the yardstick competition 
argument (Besley and Case, 1995), countries would actually mimic each other for political reasons. The 
influence of political and institutional factors seems to be particularly relevant as they appear to be strong 
determinants of corporate tax rates (Gérard and Ruiz, 2009). 
This feature is also strong in a third strand of the literature that tries to identify the determinants of tax 
reforms. In a recent article, Castanheira et al. (2012) take the political economy arguments to the data. They 
find that political competition (expressed for example as a large number of parties in the governing 
coalition) increase the likelihood of tax reforms, that targeted reforms tend to gradually overcome the status 
quo bias and that reforms may be easier to implement for governments that are perceived less as pro-reform. 
In their empirical test, economic variables, unlike political ones, have little predictive power — besides the 
finding that governments tend to reform more in good than in bad times. The time period covered in their 
study (2000–2007) may however not reflect the current policy stance. It is an open question whether crisis 
periods produce more, and better, reforms. 
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3.2.5. Tax administration and tax compliance 
Improving the efficiency of tax collection and 
tackling tax evasion can increase government 
revenue and ensure that the redistributive 
properties of the tax system functions. This is 
particularly relevant in times of fiscal 
consolidation, also with a view to enhancing the 
social acceptability of tax hikes by creating a 
perception of a fairer distribution of the adjustment 
burden. Measures to combat tax evasion and 
improve revenue collection were introduced in 
several Member States.  
At the end of 2011, the Czech Republic passed a 
bill aimed at introducing gradually a one-stop-shop 
for all taxes, duties, and social security and health 
insurance contributions (Integrated Revenue 
Agency). The first stage envisaged the creation of 
a Financial Office administered by the newly 
established General Financial Directorate, and 
action to reduce the layers of the tax 
administration. Other measures already 
implemented include the introduction of a stricter 
penalty system, and measures to combat VAT 
fraud and evasion.  
Between the end of 2011 and 2012, Latvia 
introduced new measures to fight VAT fraud in the 
fields of construction and scrap metal, and several 
legislative measures in 2012 under the Action Plan 
to Combat the Shadow Economy and Promote Fair 
Competition. Moreover, the Law on Individual 
Declaration of Property and Reporting of 
Undeclared Income, effective from March 2012, 
makes it possible to legalise previously undeclared 
taxable income and aims to improve oversight over 
an individual’s financial position, in particular the 
accuracy of expenses incurred and the payment of 
taxes and the legality of derived income. 
As part of their adjustment programmes, Greece 
and Portugal have planned a number of initiatives 
aimed at strengthening revenue administration and 
fighting tax evasion. Among those already 
implemented in Greece are: merging of smaller tax 
offices and consolidation of key functions, 
introduction of performance-based contracts for 
auditors, establishment of a large taxpayer unit. 
Portugal is proceeding with a merge of the Tax and 
Customs Authority, putting in place a large 
 
taxpayer office, improving the procedure for 
handling tax appeals in the judicial system and 
implementing a strategic plan to combat fraud and 
evasion.  
Italy implemented reforms addressing tax evasion, 
such as lowering of the threshold for electronic 
payments and the so–called ‘income-meter’ 
estimating individuals’ income based on the 
expenses. In January 2012, Slovakia launched the 
project UNITAS project, which aims to unify 
revenue collection (taxes and customs) into a 
single institution, the Financial Administration 
(FA). The reform ultimately aims to reduce 
administrative and compliance costs and tackle 
fraud and tax avoidance. Measures to combat tax 
evasion have also been implemented in Hungary. 
These include allowing unannounced audits and 
increasing penalties. 
Denmark has locked further fields on the tax return 
for editing by the taxpayer where the coverage and 
quality of third party information is high. 
3.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Reforms undertaken in 2011 and 2012 have clearly 
been influenced by the need for fiscal 
consolidation, more so than in 2010. Overall, this 
has led to an increase in personal income taxes in 
many Member States. Social security contributions 
have also been frequently increased, while 
reductions typically target specific groups. In the 
taxation of corporate income, rate changes have 
not been frequent: while headline rates have been 
cut in some countries, a few Member States have 
introduced surcharges on large companies. In the 
domain of indirect taxation, there has been a clear 
generalised trend towards increasing the tax 
burden, in the form both of higher rates 
(particularly for excise duties) and broader tax 
bases. Only a minority of countries has increased 
property tax to secure additional revenue in a 
growth-friendly manner. Action to combat tax 
evasion and enhance the functioning of the tax 
administration is being taken in an increasing 
number of Member States. Overall, 2011 and 2012 
have seen a slight change in the composition of 
total tax revenue, with an increase of the share of 
both indirect and direct taxes over total revenue, 
albeit only slightly for direct taxation. 
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Box 3.2: Assessing the efficiency losses of tax increase in the EU: the case of labour and 
energy taxation
Introduction 
The appropriateness of a given tax increase must be gauged on the efficiency loss associated with it, i.e. its 
deadweight loss (Feldstein, 1997). Minimising the economic distortions caused by tax measures, given the 
extra revenues generated, is particularly important at a time when both fiscal consolidation and long-term 
growth are pressing policy issues in most EU Member States. 
The efficiency loss associated with tax increases depends on the behavioural responses of economic agents 
which affect the tax bases. An appropriate metric for gauging such loss should compare the economic cost 
and the extra revenue for a given tax increase. One such metric is the so-called marginal cost of public funds 
(MCF), which is defined as the ratio between the change in consumer surplus and the extra tax revenue 
obtained from a given (marginal) tax rate increase. This indicator is widely used in the public economics 
literature for the evaluation of tax reforms and public spending programmes (Dahlby, 2008). The available 
evidence based on this measure suggests that the efficiency loss of tax hikes varies widely across tax 
categories and countries, increasing with the level of the total tax burden in the economy (Devarajan and 
Robinson, 2002; Dahlby and Ferede, 2011). In addition, structural rigidities in the labour market may 
magnify the distortionary effect of tax reforms via the behavioural response of economic agents (Nickell, 
1997). 
The results presented hereinafter are drawn from Saveyn et al. (2012), who measured the marginal cost of tax 
increases in the EU with the computable general equilibrium model GEM-E3. The model is calibrated using 
social accounting matrices derived from Eurostat national account data. Thus, the tax rates used in the 
simulations reflect the actual effective tax rates in each Member State, which could be seen as a good 
description of national tax systems. (1) The simulations focus on labour and energy taxes. The results support 
the well-established view that a revenue-neutral shift from labour to environmental taxes would increase 
consumer welfare (particularly by reducing GHG emissions) and favour job creation. Moreover, the success 
of such tax shifting policy crucially depends on the starting level of the tax burden, the actual tax structure 
and rigidities in the labour market, which ultimately affect behavioural responses.(2) 
The efficiency losses of tax increases in the EU: results for energy and labour taxes 
Using a CGE model it is possible to capture the overall effects of a given tax increase and interactions 
between agents and markets in the economy. The MCF can be calculated using the following formula: 
i
ki
ki
TR
W
MCF



,
,
                                                                                                                                      (1) 
where ΔWi,k is the welfare loss due to the increase of tax k in country i and is calculated as the change in 
consumer utility. (3) It could be seen as the reduction in consumption relative to a benchmark of no-policy 
change, with prices and incomes remaining fixed at their ‘no-policy-change’ benchmark level after the tax 
increase under consideration. This technically corresponds to the ‘equivalent variation’. The term ΔTRi in 
equation (1) represents the corresponding change in tax collection in country i (including all tax revenues). 
The MCF therefore provides a metric for the loss in welfare (the efficiency loss) per unit of tax revenue gain. 
If the MCF equals one, then the tax is merely a lump-sum transfer from households to government with no 
distortion. Typically, however, the MCF is greater than one, so that MCF =1+α, with α>0 representing the 
                                                          
(1)   For more details on the GEM-E3 model see European Commission (2011b) and www.GEM-E3.net. 
(2)  Other conditioning factors discussed in Saveyn et al. (2012) include the degree of substitutability between domestic 
and foreign goods (i.e. representing the degree of foreign competition) and the potential cross-country spillovers 
associated with tax increases. These additional results are not discussed here, however. 
(3)   The indirect utility function is used in order to give a monetary value. 
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cost of the distortion. This means that for every euro that goes into the government’s purse, the economy pays 
an efficiency cost of α euros. The higher the MCF, the larger the distortive cost vs the tax revenue gains. The 
results presented here provide estimations of the MCF for a marginal increase (0.05 pp) of the effective tax 
rate in 2005. In the case of labour, the tax increase affects total social security contribution. Personal income 
taxation remains unchanged. The energy tax considered is energy tax for households per petajoule of energy 
(which is the measure commonly used to express energy consumption by large customer groups, such as 
countries). It is important to note that the environmental benefits of lower CO2-emissions (which are 
modelled in GEM-E3) following higher energy taxes are not taken into account in the utility functions, so that 
the results are driven by the traditional price and income effects for the bundle of goods consumed by the 
representative consumer. Likewise, it is assumed that the additional tax revenues generated are allocated to 
the rest of the world (i.e. outside the EU), instead of being used to finance policy objectives such as an 
increase in public expenditure, a subsidy or repayment of public debt. 
 
Table 1: The Marginal cost of public funds in the EU: labour and energy taxation 
Labour tax Energy tax
EU average 1.9 1.08
Standard deviation / average 17.38% 22.21%  
Note: EU averages are calculated using GDP level in 2005 as weight. 
Source: Saveyn et al. (2012). 
 
Table 1 provides the results of the value of the MCF for the EU (using the weighted average of individual 
country figures) for labour and energy taxes respectively. It shows that the efficiency loss related to a labour 
tax increase is 1.9. This means that for each euro of extra labour tax revenue raised, the efficiency loss for the 
economy as a whole is 90 cents. In this case the efficiency loss is therefore more or less the same as the extra 
tax revenue raised. Energy taxation appears to be much less distortionary. The efficiency loss associated with 
one extra euro of revenues obtained using this tax instrument amounts to 8 cents on average for the EU, i.e. 
roughly ten times lower than for labour tax. These first results would suggest that for a given target of extra 
tax revenue, an increase in the tax rate on energy is more desirable than an increase in labour taxation. This 
implies that, from a revenue neutral perspective, shifting the tax burden from labour to energy would 
minimise the resulting economic distortions, as already found in the literature (OECD, 2006; Aldy et al., 
2008). 
Looking more closely at country-specific results, the general message still holds: energy tax hikes potentially 
have a lower efficiency cost than labour tax increases. Figure 1 shows the cross-country dispersion of results 
for labour and energy taxes respectively (it should be noted that the two graphs have very different scales, 
which reflects the systematically higher value of the MCF for labour taxation). Graph 1 also shows that 
countries where the relevant tax burden is already high tend to have higher MCF, independently of the tax 
category considered, a result which is also in line with the literature on MCF, see Dahlby (2008). 
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Graph 1: The marginal cost of public funds vs tax burden in the EU: the cross-country dispersion 
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Source: Saveyn et al. (2012). 
A comparison of the level of distortion for energy and labour tax and their weights as a share of GDP shows 
that, generally speaking, lower MCF for energy taxes combined with a lower tax burden offers greater 
potential for further tax increases in order to minimise related distortionary effects (see Graph 2). It should 
also be borne in mind that the extra tax revenue obtained from a given increase might differ, depending on 
existing levels of taxation according to the traditional Laffer-curve argument. 
Graph 2: The marginal cost of public funds vs. tax burden for labour and energy taxes in the EU (% of GDP) 
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Source: Saveyn et al. (2012). 
Structural rigidities tend to magnify the efficiency losses of tax increases 
Beyond the existing level of tax burden, the impact of tax increases can also depend on the underlying 
economic structure, and on market rigidities in particular. The latter are especially relevant when considering 
labour markets in view of wide-ranging regulation and institutional arrangements (Pissarides, 1998). The 
degree of labour market flexibility reflects the extent to which a change in prices resulting from a tax increase 
affects the wage setting. In the model used here, the labour market is modelled as in Shapiro/Stiglitz (1984), 
where workers benefit from a wage premium which firms are obliged to pay to induce employees not to shirk. 
As a result, effective labour supply is determined by efficiency wages. The balancing of labour demand with 
the effective, rather than the potential, labour supply implies that the equilibrium rate of unemployment is 
determined as the difference between potential and effective labour. These assumptions are validated 
empirically by the observed negative correlation between wages and unemployment levels, see Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1994). 
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In principle a high degree of labour market flexibility (i.e. low wage premium) should lead workers to 
experience a lower level of welfare loss as a result of a change of a specific tax rate. A low degree of 
flexibility would instead result in higher welfare loss as wages adjust less to the lower labour demand. The 
results presented are therefore intended more to illustrate the change in the value of the MCF on average 
across EU countries rather than to show whether the country-specific degrees of ‘flexibility’ are correctly 
reflected in the model. Table 2 below provides the EU average estimates of the MCF for the two tax 
categories considered here and for the cases of relatively high and low labour market flexibility (vs. a 
benchmark case where the degree of flexibility in the labour market lies between these two opposite 
scenarios). 
 
The results show that the degree of labour market rigidities can have a non-trivial impact on the marginal cost 
of public funds. The MCF increases by 33.7 % (from 1.90 to 2.54) and 4.7 % (from 1.08 to 1.13) for labour 
and energy tax respectively when labour markets are less flexible, and decrease by 13.7 % and 3.7 % 
respectively when labour market flexibility is high. Although these results should be interpreted with caution,  
given the highly stylised assumption regarding the magnitude of the change in the degree of labour market 
rigidities, they are indicative of the direction of the changes in the efficiency losses related to a given tax 
increase when labour market rigidities are altered. This result illustrates the potential complementarity 
between structural reforms aimed at lowering market rigidities and fiscal objectives. 
 
 
Table 2: The Marginal cost of public funds and labour market flexibility in the EU 
Labour tax Energy tax
Low flexibility of labour market 2.54 1.13
High flexibility of labour market 1.64 1.04
Benchmark case 1.9 1.08  
Source: Saveyn et al. (2012). 
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Table 3.3: Overview of tax reforms in Member States 
 
 
(Continued on the next page) 
Austria 
Personal income tax increase. From 2011, capital income tax rates and rates for private trusts were harmonised at 25% and the holding 
period, after which realised speculative capital gains were tax exempt, was abolished. Capital gains on shares, bonds and deposits are now 
subject to a final 25% withholding tax [0.08% of GDP]. The single earner's allowance is only granted if child support has been received. 
The stability law from April 2012 contains several revenue-raising measures. They include a temporary progressive solidarity contribution 
for high income earners (from approximately € 186 000) on their holiday and Christmas pay (in force from 1 January 2013), and reducing 
the state premium on building saving and (third pillar) pension saving (in force from April 2012). To reflect PIT changes tax free earnings 
(Gewinnfreibetrag) have also been reduced.  
VAT increase. From September 2012, there are restrictions to deductibility and reclaiming of input VAT for premises. 
Corporate income tax increase. From 2013 the deductibility for losses made in foreign subsidiaries is restricted in group taxation. 
 Excise duty increase. In 2011, the excise duty on petrol was increased by € 40 /1000 litres and on diesel by € 50 /1000 litres (€ 20/tonne 
of CO2) [0.16% of GDP]. Other environmental tax measures include a flight tax and a higher car registration tax depending on the CO2 
emissions of the vehicles. Excise duties on tobacco were significantly increased in three stages, in January and June 2011 and in January 
2012. From 1 January 2013 mineral oil tax reimbursement for agriculture and public transport is abolished. 
Social security contribution increase. From May 2012, social security contribution rates for farmers and the self-employed were 
increased. The ceiling for the SSC base will again be increased in 2013. Unemployment contributions will be levied on formerly exempt 
older workers (from 59 onwards) until they reach the legal minimum retirement age. Employers terminating an employment contract will 
be subject to a processing fee. 
Other tax increases. A bank levy based on the balance sheet total (excluding own capital and secured deposits) was introduced in 2011.  it 
ranges from 0% for banks with balance sheets of up to € 1 billion to 0,055% up to € 20 billion and 0.085% above that [0.1% of GDP]. 
Derivatives trading will be taxed on 0.013% of its volume. Under the stability law, capital gains from rezoning of land property will be 
taxed and the 10-year holding period, after which realised gains from real estate sales are tax exempt, is abolished. An additional stability 
surcharge on banks and an advance tax payment on certain company pensions have been introduced in 2012. 
  
Belgium 
 
Personal income tax increase. With effect from 1 January 2012, the withholding tax on interest and dividends rose from 15% to 21%. An  
additional levy of 4% was introduced on the share of qualifying financial income exceeding € 20020 [0.2% of GDP]. PIT tax expenditure 
cuts include the abolishment of federal subsidies for environmentally-friendly cars and most of energy saving investments, which might 
only partly be replaced by regional subsidies. The base for taxation of company cars (catalogue value) was broadened for the user of the 
car. Moreover, company car taxation takes into account car-specific CO2 emission levels. From January 2012, the taxable benefit in kind 
for non-quoted stock options was increased from 15% to 18%. 
Corporate income tax increase. In line with the 2012 budget the cap for the notional interest deduction is reduced to 3% from tax year 
2013 [0.4% of GDP]. The new base for company car taxation (catalogue value) also affects the company (with a new component in the tax 
base). Stricter thin capitalisation rules, lowering the maximum threshold for the tax deductibility of interest expenses, were introduced. 
The possibility of carrying forward the excess notional interest deduction will be abolished from tax year 2013.  
VAT increase. From 1 January 2012 the VAT on digital television was increased from 12% to 21%. Notary and bailiff fees were made 
subject to the standard VAT rate [0.5% of GDP].  
Excise duty increase. From January 2012, excises on tobacco were increased [0.04% of GDP].  
Other tax increase. From 1 January 2012, stock exchange stamp duty rose by 30% and another increase is scheduled from mid-2012. 
  
Bulgaria 
 
Social security contribution increase. The state pension contribution rate was increased from 16% to 17.8% in 2011.  
VAT increase. From April 2011 the reduced VAT rate on travel services was increased from 7% to 9%.  
Excise duty increase. From 1 January 2012 the excise duties on diesel, natural gas (used for transport purposes) and kerosene were 
increased. In June 2012, an excise duty on natural heating gas used by the businesses was introduced. [0.1% of GDP] 
 
Cyprus 
Personal income tax increases. In August 2011, an additional tax bracket with a top rate of 35% for personal income over € 60000 was 
introduced, with effect from 1 January 2011. The tax rate on deemed and accrued dividend distribution was increased from 17% to 20% 
for a period of two years [0.1% of GDP]. The defence contribution on interest payments on deposits in local banks was also increased 
from 10% to 15%. In August 2011 a temporary special contribution to strengthen public finances was introduced. It is levied on gross 
wages at progressive rates for 24 months, starting on 1 September 2011 for public sector employees. This special contribution was 
extended to private sector employees and pensioners. The rates for public and private sector employees were set at 2.5% for income 
between € 2 501 to € 3 500, 3% for income between € 3 501 and € 4 500 and 3.5% for income above that. 
Social security contribution increase. A permanent contribution of 3% of the gross earnings of current government employees towards 
government pension schemes was introduced. The contribution to the widows and orphans fund was increased by 1.25 pp to 2% of gross 
earnings [0.3% of GDP]. 
VAT increase. From 10 January 2011, 5% VAT on food and medicines, that were previously exempt, was introduced [0.4% GDP]. In line 
with the austerity package adopted in December 2011 the standard VAT rate was increased from 15% to 17% from 1 March 2012 [0.7% 
of GDP].  
VAT decrease. From 1 November 2011 the reduced 5% VAT rate applies to the construction or purchase of first residences by eligible 
individuals.  
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Excise duty increase. Excise duties on tobacco were increased by 20% for cigarettes and by 30% for loose tobacco in 2011 [0.2% of 
GDP]. 
Other tax increases. In line with the austerity package of August 2011, an annual levy of € 350 on registered companies was introduced. 
A bank levy was introduced only for two years in 2011. It is 0.095% of the deposits held in banks on 31 December 2010 and 2011, 
payable in four instalments in 2011 and 2012, with a maximum of 20% of the total taxable profits of the financial institution [0.4% of 
GDP]. Real estate tax rates were increased. They now range from 0% to 0.8%, depending on the property value (previously 0% to 0.4%) 
[0.1% of GDP]. 
 
Czech Republic 
 Personal income tax changes. The basic personal income tax credit was reduced for 2011 on account of the unexpected floods 
expenditure [0.1% of GDP]. In 2012, the tax allowance for families with children was increased [0.1% of GDP]. A comprehensive direct 
tax reform was adopted on 27 December 2011. It is planned to implement it in 2014. It introduces a personal income tax of 19% of the 
gross salary (instead of 15% of the 'supergross' salary) and replaces social and health insurance employers have to pay with a 32.5% 
payroll tax (currently 34% of the contribution base). The maximum amount of mortgage interest payments deductible for a main residence 
have been reduced from CZK 300000 to CZK 80000 per year. A temporary consolidation package approved by the government in April 
2012 to respond to current consolidation needs due to the crisis contains tax measures that should remain in force only from 2013 to 2015. 
The main ones include removing the basic tax allowance for employees, introducing a temporary 7 pp additional PIT surcharge for high-
income earners, limiting tax deductibles for the self-employed and a temporarily increasing in the PIT rate from 19% to 20%. 
Corporate income tax increase. From January 2012, a new tax on lottery companies was introduced [0.1% of GDP]. Until then lottery 
companies had not had to pay corporate income tax. General CIT is now applicable to these companies and the revenue from the tax will 
be divided between the state budget and municipalities.     
Social security contribution decrease. Contribution ceilings were reduced from six times to four times the average wage in 2011 [0.1% of 
GDP]. 
Social security contribution increase. under the reform mentioned above, social security and health insurance contributions paid by 
employees and self-employed people will be taxed at 6.5% in each case. Currently, the rate for health insurance is 4.5%, while the rate for 
social security contributions is 6.5%. 
VAT increase. From 1 January 2012 the reduced VAT rate was increased from 10% to 14% [0.7% of GDP]. This rate will be in force for 
the fiscal year 2012. Under the temporary consolidation package, from 2013, a 1 pp increase will bring the standard rate to 21% and the 
reduced rate to 15%. The previous plan to set the two VAT rates at 17.5% was postponed to 2016. 
Excise duty increase. Excise duties on tobacco were increased from 1 January 2012. Under the consolidation package, it is planned to 
introduce a carbon tax and a wine tax, to further increase excises on tobacco and to reduce the number of exemptions from excise duties 
on certain commodities.  
Other tax issues: At the end of 2011 a bill created a one-stop-shop for all taxes, duties, and social security and health insurance 
contributions. This Integrated Revenue Agency for public revenue is being set up gradually. At first, a Czech Financial Office 
administered by the newly established General Financial Directorate was set up with effect from January 2011. From 2012, Regional Tax 
Directorates will be abolished, so that tax administration will consist of two layers (the Financial Directorate and local tax offices). From 
2013,  social and health insurance services, and from 2014 customs administration, which currently administers the collection of excises, 
will be integrated. The creation of the one-stop-shop for all taxes is accompanied by recent tax administration measures, such as a 
disciplinary fine of up to CZK 50000 for not fulfilling certain procedural duties and a fine for not filing a tax return on time. Measures 
against VAT fraud and evasion have also been adopted. They relate to optional provisions of the VAT Directive on suppliers' and 
customers' joint liability for VAT payments.   
 
Denmark 
Personal income tax decreases. From 1 June 2011, Denmark introduced a temporary deduction for wage expenses for household services 
and refurbishment. It will expire by the end of 2012.  
Personal income tax increases. From 2011, there is a 6% tax on payments from pension schemes exceeding DKK 362 800 (€ 48 370) 
(part of the 2010 Spring Package). A Fiscal Consolidation Agreement was reached in May 2010. It includes measures such as the 
suspension from 2011 to 2013 of automatic adjustments to various tax thresholds (including personal allowances), and  the postponement 
from 2011 to 2014 of the planned increase in the threshold for the top income tax rate. The tax deductibility of trade union membership 
fees is limited to DKK 3 000 (€ 403) from 2011. Child allowances are gradually being reduced by 5% from 2011 to 2013. In the 2012 
budget, the limit for deductible contributions to individual pension insurance schemes with less than lifelong coverage was decreased from 
DKK 100000 to 55 000 with effect from income year 2012 [0.08% of GDP in 2012; 1/5th of that in the long run]. The tax exemption for 
employer-paid health insurance is abolished as of 2012 [0.03% of GDP]. 
Corporate income tax increase. From 2012, limitations to loss carry-forward were introduced. Losses can still be carried forward 
indefinitely, but may be set off against current year income only up to € 1 million without restriction. Amounts over € 1 million may be 
offset only by 60% of the remaining income (similar to the rules in Germany) [0.02% of GDP]. 
VAT increase. VAT exemptions were removed for travel agencies, property management and the supply of buildings and building land 
[0.07% of GDP in 2011].  
Excise duty increase. In February 2012 the government put forward a bill attempting to close a loophole in the car registration tax that 
gives leased cars preferential treatment and to reduce evasion by car dealers related to demonstration cars [0.05% of GDP]. 
Other tax increase. In 2012 the taxes/duties on unhealthy products such as sweets, soft and alcoholic drinks and cigarettes were increased. 
From 2011, financial activities tax (FAT) was increased from 9.13% to 10.5% (part of the 2010 Spring Package). FAT is a tax on wage 
and salary costs for businesses engaged in financial services. 
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Estonia 
Excise duty increase. In 2011 excises on tobacco were increased by 10% [0.1% of GDP] and in 2012 by 10% [0.1% of GDP]. The 
Estonian parliament increased the excise duty on alcohol by 5% from February 2012 [0.04% of GDP]. Tax benefits of using specially 
marked fuel in mining, building and forestry were abolished in 2012 [0.1% of GDP]. 
Personal income tax decrease. At the end of 2011, the Income Tax Act was amended abolishing the cap for the reimbursement of tax-free 
accommodation expenses from 1 January 2012. Previously, the reimbursement of accommodation expenses for business trips was exempt 
from tax up to € 77 for domestic trips and € 128 for foreign trips. 
 
Finland 
Personal income tax decrease. Tax on earned income was slightly reduced in 2012. This was due to a 3.3% inflation adjustment to state 
income tax scales and a slight increase in the labour income tax credit.  The basic income tax allowance was increased in municipal 
income taxation to ease the tax burden for low incomes. As a result, the top marginal tax rate fell by 0.25 pp  and the earned income tax 
credit and tax allowances in state and municipal taxation increased [0.3% of GDP]. 
Personal income tax increase. From 2012 the tax rate on capital income was increased from 28% to 30% and to 32% for income 
exceeding € 50000. Tax deductibility of mortgage interest rate payments is gradually decreased by 2014, so that the share of deductible 
interest payments will decrease from 100% to 85% in 2012, to 80% in 2013 and to 75% in 2014. The threshold for tax-exempt dividends 
of non-listed companies was reduced from € 90000 to € 60000 from 2012. From 2012, the maximum amount of the tax credit for the cost 
of domestic help decreased from € 3 000 to € 2 000 per person per year. The creditable amount of labour costs decreased from 60% to 
45%, including VAT that has been paid out, if the party that did the work was a tax-registered firm or an entrepreneur. The creditable 
amount of the total costs incurred for hiring a worker, including his wages and social costs, decreased from 30% to 15%. 
Corporate income tax decrease. The corporate income tax rate was decreased from 26% to 24.5% from 2012 [0.2% of GDP]. 
VAT increase. From 2012, the VAT rate on newspapers and magazine subscriptions was increased from 0% to 9% and the application of 
reduced VAT rates on labour-intensive services abolished. 
Excise duty increase. From January 2011 a tax on sweets and ice cream was introduced and the current tax on soft drinks was increased. 
The excise duty on heating fuels and electricity were increased and  energy taxation was restructured to take the energy content, CO2-
emissions and local emissions of energy products into account. From 2012 the excise duty rates on alcohol, tobacco, sweets, ice cream and 
soft drinks were increased. The tax rates on transport fuels will increase by 10% in 2012 and 2014, in addition to the  previously agreed 
increase in the diesel rate, implemented in 2012 [0.2% of GDP]. The rates of vehicle taxes (registration tax and annual circulation tax) and 
the CO2 dependence of tax rates were also increased.  
Other tax increase. From 2011 the waste tax was increased and the tax base was broadened to include private landfill sites. 
 
 
France 
Personal income tax increase. The 2011 Finance Law increased the top PIT rate from 40% to 41%. The allowance that reduces the 
amount of employment income subject to the generalized social contribution (CSG) and the social security deficit contribution (CRDS) 
was reduced from 3% to 1.75% from January 2012. From January 2012, the overall amount of tax incentives (niches fiscales) that a 
taxpayer may obtain during a fiscal year for individual income tax purposes was further capped for households (foyer fiscal) at € 18 000 
(2011: € 18 000; 2010: € 20000) plus 4% (2011: 6%; 2010: 8%) of net taxable income. Many tax credits, including the deductibility of 
mortgage interest payments, were abolished or reduced as part of a government plan to reduce the budget deficit. From January 2011, the 
optional levy on dividends and interests was increased from 18% to 19%, and the mandatory final levy on capital gains was increased 
from 18% to 19%. From January 2012, the optional final levy on dividends was increased from 19% to 21% , and the optional levy on 
interest was increased from 19% to 24%.The tax shield will be fully abolished in 2013. From 2012, a temporary progressive contribution 
on top incomes (more than 250000€ a year) was introduced. From August 2012, the exemption of personal income tax and the reduction 
in social contributions for overtime earnings was abolished. However, the reduction in employers’ social contributions for overtime was 
maintained for small companies (less than 20 employees). 
Corporate income tax increase. A temporary CIT surcharge of 5% on companies with (group) gross income over € 250 million was 
introduced in 2012. In 2011, the carry-back of losses was reduced from three years to one and the carry-forward of losses limited to 60% 
over € 1 million of taxable profits. The R&D reimbursable tax credit (credit d’impôt recherche) has been reduced. The worldwide tax 
consolidation regime was abolished. An additional contribution of 3% on distributed earnings was introduced in 2012. 
VAT increase. From 2012, a new reduced rate of 7% was introduced. It covers all products and services previously taxed at 5.5% 
(including restaurants), bar those for disabled people, food and gas and electricity subscriptions . these are still taxed at 5.5%.  
Excise duty increase. A specific contribution of € 7.16 per hectolitre was introduced for suppliers of beverages (sodas) with added sugar 
or sweeteners. The tax base for spirits was broadened and the tax schedule revised, leading to a 10% price increase. 
Social security contribution increase. From July 2012 the overall rate of social taxes (i.e. social levies, CSG and CRDS) applicable to 
passive income will be increased to 15.5% (from the current 13.5%). This is due to the increase in the social contribution from 3.4% to 
5.4% for certain types of income (prélèvement social sur les revenus du patrimoine et produits de placement). 
Other tax increases. France also announced the introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax with effect from August 2012. Its rate will be 
0.2% on the transaction of shares of publicly traded resident companies whose capital exceeds € 1 billion and 0.01% on high frequency 
and automated trading and on 'naked' credit default swaps for European sovereign debt. From January 2012, a temporary contribution on 
wealth was also introduced doubling current revenue from tax on wealth (the so called “impôt sur la fortune (ISF)”). In 2012, the 
allowance for descendants in the direct line that reduces taxation on inheritance and gifts was reduced from € 150000 to € 100000. The 
time allowed to lapse between two exempt gifts was increased from 10 years (6 years in 2010) to 15 years in 2012. 
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Germany 
Personal income tax decrease. Tax simplification measures that took effects on 1 January 2012 include better deductibility of child care 
costs and an increase in the employee allowance (Arbeitnehmer-Pauschbetrag) from €920 to €1,000 [0.022% of GDP].  
Social security contribution decrease. At the end of 2011, the German government decreased the pension insurance contribution from 
19.9% to 19.6% with effect from 1 January 2012. 
Excise duty increases.  A tax on nuclear fuel (Kernbrennstoffsteuergesetz) was introduced from 2011. The supplementary Budget Bill 
2011 introduced from 2011 a duty on all airline tickets booked after 1 September 2010 for flights departing from Germany. The rates 
depend on the flight distance (€ 8 for short-distance flights, € 25 for medium- distance flights and € 45 for long- distance flights). 
  
Greece 
Personal income tax increase. A new solidarity contribution was introduced for individuals in July 2011. It applies to income earned from 
2010 to 2014. The rates range from 1% for income above € 12 000 to 4% for income above € 100000. The rate for high-ranking state 
officers is 5%. The maximum PIT exemption was reduced from € 12 000 to € 8 000 in July 2011, and to € 5 000 in October 2011 
(applicable since January 2011). The number of tax brackets was also reduced from 9 to 8. Law 4024, enacted in October 2011, amended 
the provisions of the Income Tax Code on tax credits. Tax credits are still granted for medical expenses, home rent, annual educational 
expenses, the conversion or installation of environmentally friendly heating systems and other environmentally friendly interventions in 
buildings, for the annual mortgage interest on the taxpayer's principal home and for life insurance premiums. The ceiling was reduced 
from 20% to 10% of the cost, subject to certain thresholds depending on the type of cost. The new system also applies to social security 
contributions, previously fully deductible. 
Corporate income tax decrease. The tax law of March 2011 reduced the CIT rate to 20% for income earned in 2011 and abandoned the 
split system introduced in 2010 for retained and distributed profits.  
Corporate income tax increase. The extra contribution charged on large profitable corporations (at progressive rates, initially, of 5, 7 and 
10% and since 2010, for income earned in 2009, at progressive rates of 4, 6, 8 and 10%) was previously extended until 2014. From 2012, 
a 25% withholding tax is levied  on profits distributed by corporations, limited liability companies and cooperatives; for the year 2011 the 
withholding tax rate was 21%. 
VAT decrease. From 1 January 2011 the reduced rate on hotels, medicines and picture books for children was decreased from 13% to 
6.5%.  
VAT increase. From January 2011, reduced VAT rates were set at 13% (up from 11%) and 6.5% (up from 5.5%).  The VAT rate on non-
alcoholic drinks and restaurant services was increased from 13% to 23% from September 2011. The VAT exemption on the supply of 
water by public bodies was abolished on 22 August 2011.  
Excise duty increase. An excise duty was introduced on electricity in January 2011 and on natural gas in September 2011. 
Social security contribution increase. With effect from August 2011, social security contributions were increased by 0.5% both for 
employers and employees, paid to the unemployment fund of the Workforce Employment Organisation. This change brought the 
contribution rate to 16.5% for white-collar workers and to 19.5% for blue-collar workers.  
Other tax increases. In September 2011 a special real estate duty on residential property was introduced. It is calculated in terms of the 
surface area of buildings, taking into account also their age and location. It is collected through the payment of electricity bills. Since 
2011, the tax-free bracket of the progressive real estate tax introduced in 2010 is reduced from € 400000 to 200000. Until 2012 inclusive, 
real estate worth more than € 5 million is subject to tax at the rate of 2% (rather than the 1% rate applicable above € 800000). Several 
measures of the comprehensive reform plan to combat tax evasion were implemented, such as merging smaller tax offices and 
consolidating key functions, introducing performance-based contracts for auditors and establishing a 'large taxpayer' unit.  
  
Hungary 
Personal income tax decrease.  A flat personal income tax rate of 16% was introduced in January 2011 [1.8% of GDP]. It means that one 
tax rate applies to income from wages, rent and capital. In 2011, as in 2010, employers' SSC were still fully included in the tax base, so 
that the tax base amounts to 127% of the gross wage and the effective tax rate is 20.3%. Also in 2011, the amount of the employment tax 
credit, benefiting low to medium earners, was reduced by 20% and the income threshold for its application was increased. Substantial tax 
credits for families with children were also introduced. They are particularly favourable for families with three or more children (HUF 
10000 per child per month for one to two children, HUF 33000 per child per month for three or more, with no negative tax possible) 
[overall, 1.8% of GDP].With effect from 2012, the tax base of tax payers earning less than HUF 202 000 (€ 653) does not include the 
employers' social security contributions. The result is a two rate system with rates of 16% and 20.3%. The family tax credit introduced in 
2011 was maintained in 2012. 
Personal income tax increase. From 2012 the employment tax credit was fully phased out, leading to a net tax increase to low earners 
with no children.. 
Corporate income tax decrease. In 2011, the threshold for the lower 10% rate was increased tenfold to HUF 500 million (€ 1.8 million). 
Accordingly, in 2013 the reduced rate will be 10% and the regular rate 19%. The introduction of a higher 30% rate applicable only to 
energy and utilities companies was announced. The sectoral surcharges will be phased out (only halved for banks).  [0.7% of GDP]. 
Corporate income tax increase. In 2012, the simplified corporate income tax rate was increased to 37% (from 30%). The eligibility 
threshold was increased to HUF 30 million (€ 97 000) of annual turnover (from HUF 25 million).  
Social security contribution increase. In 2012 the health care contribution was increased to 7% (from 6%). This led to an increase in 
employees total SSC from 17.5% to 18.5% [0.45% of GDP]. 
VAT increase. From 1 January 2012 the standard VAT rate was increased from 25% to 27% [0.5% of GDP]. 
Excise duty increase. Alcohol, tobacco and fuel excise duties were increased in 2012.  
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Other tax increases. A "cultural tax" on pornographic material was introduced on 1 January 2012. A new tax on unhealthy packaged food 
came into force in September 2011. A levy on phone usage was introduced with effect from July 2012. It amounts to HUF 2 per minute of 
call or sms [0.1% of GDP]. The introduction of a financial transaction tax in 2013 was announced. Measures to fight tax evasion have 
been implemented. They include  allowing unannounced audits and increasing penalties.  
 
Ireland 
Personal income tax increase. Income tax measures contributed around € 1 billion to fiscal consolidation in 2011 mainly through the 
reduction of tax credits (€ 435 million) and changes in the rate band (€ 395 million). From 2012 the taxes on capital and interest earned are 
aligned at 30%, in particular tha capital acquisitions tax and the capital gains tax were increased were increased from 25% to 30%, and the 
deposit interest retention tax (DIRT) from 27% to 30%. . For certain windfall gains the windfall gains tax rate is 80%. 
Personal income tax decrease. Under the Finance Bill 2012, it is planned to increase the lower exemption threshold of the Universal 
Social Charge, exempting around 330000 people, and the mortage interest relief for first-time buyers during the property boom of 2004-
2008. The same Bill also plans to create tax incentives to attract key employees that are currently foreign-based. Under the Special 
Assignee Relief Programme (SARP) individuals from abroad who are eligible can receive an exemption from income tax on 30% of their 
annual salary between €75 000 and €500000 if they are assigned for a minimum of one year to a maximum of five years. Furthermore, a 
deduction for foreign earnings (FED) is granted for employees assigned from Ireland to work in certain emerging market countries in 
order to increase trade with those countries. In addition, it is also planned to amend the Research and Development Tax Credit, where the 
first € 100000 expenditure will be allowable on a volume basis. 
VAT increase. The standard VAT rate was increased from 21% to 23% from January 2012. 
VAT decrease. The Jobs Initiative temporarily introduced a new reduced VAT rate of 9% on tourism services until end-2013 [0.2% GDP].  
Excise duty increase. The mineral oil tax on petrol and auto-diesel was increased first by four cent and then by two cent in 2011 [0.07% 
of GDP].  
Social security contribution increase. Base-broadening measures for Pay Related Social Insurance (PRSI) contributed to fiscal adjustment 
in 2011, in particular removing ceiling on employee PRSI contributions [0.2% GDP]. 
Social security contribution decrease. As part of the Jobs Initiative, until end of 2013, the lower rate of PRSI was halved from 8% to 
4.25% on jobs that that pay up to €356 per week [0.1% GDP]. 
Other tax increases. A household charge of €100 was introduced in 2012, as an interim measure before implementation of the valuation-
based property tax [0.1% GDP]. The temporary measures of the Jobs Initiative are financed by a levy on the pension funds (yielding € 460 
million annually in 2011-2014). 
  
Italy 
Personal income tax decrease. Changes to the municipal fiscal system were made in 2011 (Law n. 42/2009). Among other things they 
involve: i) taxing rental income from buildings for residential purposes at a separate, flat rate from 19% to 21%, rather than including it in 
the personal income tax base (average rates around 30%), with around 20% of the revenue accruing to municipalities; and ii) removing the 
‘tax rate freeze’ on the increase in additional personal income tax (between 0.2% and 0.4%) to be levied by town councils [0.1% of GDP].  
Personal income tax increase. The regional PIT surcharge was increased by 0.3% and a temporary 3% solidarity contribution on high 
incomes was introduced. The 3% levy is deductible from the PIT base. 
Corporate income tax decrease. A new allowance for corporate equity (Aiuto alla Crescita Economica, ACE), similar to the Belgian 
notional interest deduction, was introduced. The ACE is retroactively applied to 2011. It covers capital increases of corporations and even 
unincorporated businesses. The IRAP, a business tax with a different base than the CIT, saw an increase in deductions for labour costs, 
notably for women and for employees under 35. Companies can also deduct from their CIT taxable income an amount equal to the part of 
IRAP paid with reference to tha tax base allocated to their share of labour costs [Overall, 0.15% of GDP].   
VAT increase. The standard VAT rate was increased by 1 pp on 17 September 2011 (from 20%) [0.3% of GDP]. An additional 2% rise 
planned for October 2012, unless a general spending review reform makes it unnecessary by generating expenditures saving. 
Excise duty increase. From 1 January 2012 fuel excises were increased by about 10 cent per litre [0.5% of GDP]. 
Other tax increases. A new tax on high-powered automobiles, private boats and aircraft was introduced in 2012. Property taxes were 
increased by abolishing the exemption on main residences and increasing cadastral values by 60%, although some reductions are granted 
depending on household composition; properties held abroad, too, were made subject to a 0.76% tax on their value [0.7% of GDP]. Stamp 
duties on cash, deposit and security accounts were increased and extended to all financial instruments. The withholding tax on both 
interest (except interest from government bonds) and dividends was set at 20% [0.1% of GDP]. Other reforms addressed tax evasion, e.g. 
lowering the threshold for electronic payments and the 'income-meter', that estimates the income of individuals based on expenses [0.1% 
of GDP in 2011; 0.5% in 2012]. 
  
Latvia 
Personal income tax decrease. In 2011 the general PIT rate was lowered from 26% to 25%. Non-taxable allowances and allowances for 
dependent persons were increased. 
Social security contribution increase. The SSC rate was increased by two percentage points from January 2011 to compensate for the 
lowering of the general PIT rate. 
VAT increase. With effect from January 2011, the standard VAT rate was increased from 21% to 22% and the reduced rate from 10% to 
12%. From 1 July 2012 the standard rate of VAT was reduced from 22% to 21%. The reduced rate on electricity was abolished in January, 
the one on natural gas in July, thereby increasing the rate from 10% to 22%. The reduced VAT rate for medical equipment was amended 
from 1 June 2011. A VAT on real estate auctions within insolvency process was amended in January 2011 (0.1% of GDP). The usage of 
reverse VAT was broadened by applying reverse VAT on scrap metal supplies and related services form 1 October 2011 and construction 
services form 1 January 2012. 
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Excise duty increase. From June 2011 excises on petrol and on ethyl alcohol were increased; the reduced excise tax rate on fuel with bio 
fuel admixture 5% of volume was abolished from 1 January 2011. From July 2011 excises on tobacco products were increased  and the 
allowance of excises on natural gas for producing electricity was abolished. The excise tax on sweetened non-alcoholic drinks was also 
increased by 30% from 1 January 2011. From July 2011,  allowances for excise duty for  diesel fuel used in agriculture were reduced. 
From 1 February 2012 excise tax base has been widened by including certain lubricating oil groups. From 1 July 2011 an excise tax on 
natural gas was re-introduced with a reduced rate. 
Other tax increases. In 2011 the structure of the vehicle use tax was changed, providing for three components to be taken into account by 
tax calculation -  vehicle gross weight, engine capacity and maximum engine power, thus increasing the tax on luxury, environmentally 
unfriendly and powerful cars (0.1% of GDP). In 2011 the progressive property taxation of residential buildings was doubled, now ranging 
from 0.2%-0.6% (0.1%  of GDP). From 2012 the tax on gambling, slot machines and gambling tables was increased by 15%. The annual 
financial stability duty rate was increased from 0.036% to 0.072%. In addition, the base of real estate tax was broadened to include 
auxiliary buildings, parking slots and houses and lands owned by religious organisations but not used for religious purpose [0.03% of 
GDP]. The natural recource tax was increased. Lottery and gambling tax rates were increased and reformed in July 2011 and Janurary 
2012. Several fees and licences and state duties have been review and increased. Several legislative measures under the Action Plan to 
Combat the Shadow Economy and Promote Fair Competition entered into force in 2012. Law on Individual Declaration of Property and 
Reporting of Undeclared Income was adopted with effect from June 2012. It introduces the possibility to legalise previously undeclared 
taxable income and aims to improve oversight over an individual’s financial position, in particular the accuracy of expenses incurred and 
the payment of taxes and the legality of income derived. [0.25% of GDP]. 
  
Lithuania 
Corporate income tax decrease. The threshold of the maximum annual income of small companies with up to 10 employees subject to a 
lower rate of 5% was increased from LTL 500000 (€ 145000) to LTL 1 000000 (€ 290000).  
VAT decrease. From 1 January 2012 the VAT registration threshold was increased from 100000 LTL (€ 29 000) to 155 000 LTL (€ 45 
000). The application of a 5% reduced VAT rate on medicines was extended until the end of 2012. The application of the 9% reduced rate 
for residential heating was also extended until 31 December 2012. The 9%  reduced rate on accommodation services introduced as a 
temporary measure in 2011was abolished from 1 January 2012 [0.02% of GDP]. 
Excise duty increase. The excise duty on gas oil used as motor fuel was increased by more than 10% from € 274.27 to € 302.07 per 1000 
litres with effect from 1 January 2011 [0.1% of GDP]. From 1 March 2012 the excise duty on cigarettes was increased from € 64 to € 
67.19 per 1000 cigarettes. It was increased from € 23.16 to € 24.32 per kilogram of cigars and cigarillos [0.02%]. 
Other tax increase. From 1 January 2012 Lithuania broadened the immovable property tax base to include the immovable property 
intended for dwelling purposes, gardens and garages etc owned by individuals. Until now these were exempt unless they were used for 
commercial purposes. The value of previously tax exempt immovable property of natural persons exceeding LTL one million (€ 290000) 
will be subject to a tax rate of 1% [0,02%]. 
Other changes: At the end of 2010 the government adopted 'Consolidated strategies of the state tax inspectorate of taxpayers' compliance 
with tax obligations and assurance of tax collection for the year 2011-2012. Cash registers have been installed in all indoor marketplaces 
and border control has been strengthened. 
  
Luxembourg 
Personal income tax decrease. The temporary crisis tax of 0.8% levied on total income except minimum wage salaries introduced for the 
year 2011 was abolished from January 2012.  
Personal income tax increase. From January 2011, the top income tax rate was increased from 38% to 39%. The surcharge for the 
employment fund (solidarity tax) was also increased from 2.5% to 4% for income up to € 150000 and to 6% for income above € 150000 
[0.20% of GDP].  
Corporate income tax decrease. The 2012 budget grants a tax credit to employers hiring workers from the unemployed pool until 2014. 
Corporate income tax increase. The 2012 budget introduces a new table with revaluation coefficients for the valuation of business assets 
and participations.  
Excise duty increase. From January 2012 the excise duty rates on manufactured tobacco was increased to 10% of the purchase price with 
a maximum of € 10 per kilogram.   
  
Malta 
Personal income tax decrease. From 2012, new income tax brackets apply to income earned by parents of children under 18 years. 
Income up to € 9 300 is tax-free. From € 9 301 to € 15 800 a tax rate of 15% applies. From € 15 801 to € 21 200 a rate of 25% applies and a rate 
of 35% applies to income above € 21 200. Parents who qualify for these tax rates should benefit from an annual tax saving of between €  75 
and € 420 per parent [0.2% of GDP]. To help women return to the labour market the current tax credit of up to € 5 000 was extended to 
include self-employed mothers. 
Excise duty increase. From 15 November 2011, excise duty rates on cigarettes was increased by 5.8% and excise duty on tobacco was 
increased by 8.5% [0.1% of GDP]. Excise duty on cement was increased by € 3 on every 1000 kg. Bunkering tax on fuel for ships outside 
Maltese territorial waters was set to €1.86 per metric ton or part thereof.  
Other tax increases. The registration tax on motor vehicles with Euro 1 to Euro 3 emissions (or worse) increased on 1 January 2012 [0.1% 
of GDP]. Measures have been introduced to improve the efficiency of the revenue collection, notably pecuniary incentives to reduce tax 
arrears. Several other initiatives are being implemented to combat tax evasion and avoidance, including reforms aimed at increasing the 
effectiveness of VAT tax audits [0.6% of GDP]. 
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The Netherlands 
Personal income tax decrease. The rate in the first two brackets consists of two elements: income tax and social security contributions. In 
January 2011, the combined tax and SSC rate in the first bracket of personal income tax and wages tax was reduced from 33.45% to 33%. 
From 2012, the tax deduction for R&D activities for self-employed was increased to € 12 310 for entrepreneurs and can be increased by 
another € 6 157 for starting entrepreneurs. Since 2012 there is a 40% tax deduction for R&D expenses. 
Personal income tax increase. From January 2012, the imputed income for the owner-occupied dwellings was increased from 1.05% to 
1.3% for the part of the value that exceeds € 1040000. From January 2012, the combined rate for the first bracket increased to 33.10%. 
From January 2012 two tax credits on labour participation by workers of 65 years and older were decreased. The amount of the cut varies 
depending on income and age.    
 Corporate income tax decrease. From January 2011, the corporate income tax rate is reduced to 25% from 25.5% for profits in excess of 
€ 200000 [0.07% GDP]. Since 2012 a new tax facility provides for 40% deduction for R&D expenses. 
VAT increase. From 1 July 2011, performing arts were transferred temporarily to the standard VAT rate of 19%.  
Excise duty increase. Excise duties on cigarettes and tobacco are increased from 1 March 2011. The yearly adjustment for tobacco and 
cigarettes took place in April 2012 increasing the minimum excise duty to € 157.28 per 1 000 cigarettes and to € 66.50 per 1000 grams for 
smoking tobacco. For mineral oils there is an increase of € 0.01 per litre (only for LPG per kilogram) from January 2012 to adjust for 
inflation. 
Other tax decreases. The property transfer tax for owner-occupied dwellings was temporarily reduced from 6% to 2% from 15 June 2011 
to July 2012. In July 2012, the reduction was made permanent. From July 2012 the CO2 limits of the car registration tax (BPM) is 
tightened each year to ensure stable tax revenue. At the same time the fixed surcharge for diesel cars is replaced by a surcharge depending 
on the amount of CO2 emission. The taxes on groundwater and waste materials were abolished in 2012.  
 
Poland 
Personal income tax increase. PIT thresholds were frozen at their 2009 level in 2011 and 2012 [0.1% of GDP].  
Social security contribution increase. From 1 February 2012, non-wage labour costs were increased by increasing the disability pension 
contribution paid by employers from 4.5% to 6.5% of gross wages. The total rate of disability pension contribution therefore increased 
from 6% to 8% of gross wages [0.3% of GDP].  
VAT increase. A series of measures came into force in 2011 [0.41% of GDP]. The VAT rates were temporarily increased for the years 
2011-13 by 1 pp, from 7% to 8% and from 22% to 23%. A new reduced rate of 5% was introduced for, amongst others, basic foodstuffs. 
VAT reimbursement for company cars and fuels was abolished in 2011 [0.08% of GDP]. From 2012 the VAT rates for certain products, 
including some medical devices, clothing and clothing accessories for infants and children's' footwear, were increased from 8% to 23%. 
The 23% rate also applies to the previously exempt services related to the conservation and restoration of registered historical monuments 
and archive materials and to the services delivered by public institutions.  
Excise duty increase. The government is gradually increasing the excise duties rates on tobacco products (8% for cigarettes, 13% for 
smoking tobacco, 4% for cigars) and for fuels (3% for jet engine fuels, 14% for diesel and intrinsic bio-components). In line with the 
Energy Directive, from 2012 the excise tax applies to coal, lignite and coke, so far exempted (due to the transition period). 
Other tax increases. On 18 April 2012, a new tax on extraction of certain minerals, targeted at copper and silver extraction, came into 
force. The applicable tax rate is determined based on the exchange rate of American dollar to Polish zloty and copper and silver prices on 
stock exchanges’ quotations  in London [0.1% of GDP].   
 
Portugal 
Personal income tax increase. From 2011, expense-related tax credits were reduced by imposing an overall ceiling for the two highest 
income tax brackets. To comply with the MoU targets, a new annual surtax on individual income was introduced on 3 August 2011. It is 
levied at a rate of 3.5% and applies only to income earned in 2011 that is above the minimum wage income. In 2012 and 2013 a surtax of 
2.5% applies to the highest income bracket. The tax rate applicable to capital gains on the sale of shares and other securities was increased 
from 21.5% in 2011 to 25% with effect from 1 January 2012. An increase from 21.5% to 25% in withholding taxes on income from 
dividends, interest and other forms of remuneration on shareholders' loans and on share capital derived by resident and non-resident 
individuals was adopted in 2011. 
Corporate income tax increase. From 1 January 2012 the reduced CIT rate of 12.5% was abolished. A State surtax of 3% is levied on 
corporate income between € 1.5 and € 10 million and a 5% rate is levied on taxable profits over € 10 million with effect from 1 January 
2012. The withholding tax on investment income earned by legal entities without a permanent establishment in Portugal was increased 
from 21.5% to 25%. 
Social security contribution increase. To align the rates with those of the general social security scheme, employees' contribution rates to 
the civil service social security scheme were increased by 1 pp from January 2011. 
VAT increase. The standard VAT rate was increased from 21 to 23% from January 2011. From October 2011, the VAT rate on electricity 
and natural gas was increased from the reduced rate of 6% to the standard rate of 23%. A set of categories of goods and services were 
moved from the reduced and intermediate VAT rates to higher ones in 2011. 
Excise duty increase. With effect from 1 January 2012 Portugal introduced an excise duty on electricity consumption by consumer, 
producers, traders and self-producer. The maximum rates of excise duties on petrol, spirit drinks, heating diesel and tobacco were also 
increased. 
Other tax increases. With effect from 1 January 2012 the minimum and the maximum rates of the real estate tax on urban property were 
increased by 0.1 percentage points.  
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Romania 
Excise duty increase. With effect from 1 July 2012, the excise duty on cigarettes was increased from € 51.49 per 1 000 cigarettes to € 
53.18 per 1 000 cigarettes. The total excise duty on cigarettes (i.e. sum of the specific excise duty and the ad-valorem excise duty), is 
increased from € 76.60 per 1 000 cigarettes to € 79.19 per 1 000 cigarettes for the period from 1 July 2012 until 30 June 2013. Excise 
duties on unleaded petrol and diesel were increased in January 2011. This was followed by a further increase of excise duties on diesel in 
January 2012. They currently stand at € 467 per tonne for petrol and € 374 per tonne for diesel. 
Other tax increases. Under the legislation that entered into force in mid-January 2012, a pollution tax applies to both new and second-
hand vehicles produced in Romania or abroad on their first registration in Romania.  
  
 
Slovakia 
Personal income increase. From 1 January 2011, basic personal allowances can only  be claimed on aggregate income from employment, 
business activities and independent professional activities. The amount of the basic personal allowance and the relevant ceilings are 
generally based on the amount of the living minimum applicable on 1 January of the tax year. This was € 185 in 2011 and it is € 189 for 
2012.  
Social security contribution increase. From 1 January 2011, non-monetary benefits given to an employee, regarded as taxable 
employment income, are also subject to social security and health insurance contributions 
Excise duty increase. With effect from January 2011, a tax on CO2 emission quotas was introduced on the emission allowances allocated 
free of charge to the taxpayer in the period 2011-12. The tax rate is 80%. The tax base made up of transferred emission quota (valued at 
market price for the calendar month preceding the transfer), and non-consumed emission quotas (valued at the average market price for the 
calendar year in question). The calculated amount of tax on emission quotas is not considered a tax deductible expense. From 2011, excise 
duties on tobacco products were increased.  
Other tax increases. With effect from 1 January 2012, Slovak banks and branches of foreign banks operating in the Slovak Republic, 
established under special legislation on banks, are subject to a bank levy. The levy is 0.1%. It is due on the 20th day of every calendar 
quarter. It is calculated on the basis of the bank’s liabilities at the end of the previous calendar quarter (adjusted by certain items defined 
by law) [0.1% of GDP]. The UNITAS project was launched in January 2012. It aims to merge revenue collection bodies (taxes and 
customs) into a single institution – Financial Administration (FA) – to reduce administrative and compliance costs and tackle fraud and tax 
avoidance. 
 
Slovenia 
 
Corporate income tax decrease. With the amendments to the Corporate Income Tax Law approved in April 2012 and applicable with 
effect from 1 January 2012, the statutory rate was reduced to 18% (from 20%) for the year 2012. Further decreases to 17% in 2013 16% in 
2014, and 15% in 2015 are envisaged. The allowance for investments in equipment and intangible assets was increased from 30% to 40% , 
and the cap of € 30000 was abolished. Tax relief for investment in research and development was increased from 40% to 100%. Sspecial 
regional tax relief for investment in research and development was therefore abolished [overall, 0.3% of GDP]. 
Excise duty decrease. After the 7% increase in 2010, excises on fuel were reduced by 15% in 2011.  
Excise duty increase. Excise duties on tobacco were increased in 2011 and 2012. Excise duties on alcohol were increased by around 10% 
in April 2012 [0.2% of GDP]. 
Other tax increases. Under the Bank Balance Sheet Tax Act adopted in July 2011 a new bank tax was introduced on 1 August 2011. The 
new tax is applicable to domestic banks, banks from EU Member State and banks from third countries that operate in Slovenia. The tax 
rate is set at 0.1% of the tax base. The tax base is the average amount of the total assets of the bank within the tax year. Under certain 
conditions, the amount of the tax may be reduced up to 0.167% of the loans provided to non-financial companies or private entrepreneurs.  
  
Spain 
Personal income tax increase. In January 2011, the government introduced two additional tax bands/rates for taxpayers over € 120000 
and € 175 000 raising the former top marginal personal income tax rate to 44% and 45%, respectively). From January 2012 the 
government introduced a temporary supplementary progressive levy (covering years 2012 and 2013) applied to each tax band of the 
general government tax base, which implies now the existence of seven brackets (24.75%, 30%, 40%, 47%, 49%, 51% and 52%). During 
2012 and 2013, savings and capital gains are taxed under a progressive tax schedule with three brackets of 21% on the first € 6 000, 25% 
up to € 24 000, and 27% on income above (in 2011, they were taxed at 19% on the first € 6 000, and 21% on income above). [Overall, 
0.4% of GDP]. (*) The withholding tax rate applied to some types of employment income and to income from professional activities is 
increased to 21% from 1 September 2012 to 31 December 2013. The mortgage interest deductibility for new mortgages taken for house 
purchases is abolished from 1 January 2013. 
Personal income tax decrease. From January 2012, (and with effect from 1 January 2011), the government re-introduced the 15% tax 
credit for the acquisition or restoration of the taxpayer's primary residence for all taxpayers, regardless on their tax base. 
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(Continued on the next page) 
Corporate income tax increase. In March 2012 measures were introduced intended to increase the effective taxation of corporate 
(including hidden) income, such as: the deferral of tax benefits for goodwill arising from acquisitions and business restructuring 
operations (for which the annual deductibility limit is one hundredth of the amount), a permanent limit to the deductibility of interest 
expenses (30% of the operating profits), reduction to 25% (from 35%) of the limits to the deductions aimed at promoting certain activities 
(e.g. R&D); permanent limits to the "free depreciation" regime (introduced in 2010) for large companies, while for small and medium 
business "free depreciation" is linked to job creation (for assets acquired before 31 March 2012 the incentive applies with certain 
limitations); a special 8% tax on qualifying foreign dividends and income derived from the transfer of foreign companies operating in tax 
havens or similar jurisdictions.  (*) Following the measures introduced with Royal Decree-Law 12/2012 of 30 March 2012, further 
important reforms have been introduced with Royal Decree – Law 20/2012 of 13 July 2012, such as: a new special tax of 10% applicable 
to dividends and capital gains that do not qualify for participation exemption; limits to the loss carry forward applicable in 2012 and 2013 
(50% - instead of 75% - for companies with net turnover between € 20 and 60 million; 25% - instead of 50% - above € 60 million). Rates 
for the payment on account are increased to 23% (from 21%) if net turnover is between € 10 and 20 million; to 26% (from 24%) if 
turnover is between € 20 and 60 million; to 29% (from 27%) if turnover is at least € 60 million. In the calculation of the payment on 
account 25% of the dividends and capital gains accrued should be included. The minimum payment on account rate for companies with 
turnover above € 20 million is set at 12% (previously 8%).   
Corporate income tax decrease. In Spain several measures took place for encouraging investment and employment from 1 January 2011. 
The annual turnover threshold to be included within the scope of the special regime for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
increases from € 8 million to € 10 million. Moreover, the taxable amount taxed at the reduced tax rate has been increased from € 120 202 
to € 300000. Companies that have less than 25 employees and a turnover below € 5 million are taxed on their annual profits below 
€ 300000 at 20%; annual profits above this threshold are taxed at 25%. As part of additional measures taken in the course of 2011, the loss 
carry forward period was increased from 15 to 18 years for all companies. At the same time, the amount of losses to be carried forward 
was limited for big companies for the tax years 2011-2013 (to 75% for companies with turnover between € 20 million and 60 million and 
50% for companies with higher turnover.  
VAT decrease. At the end of 2011, the application of the super-reduced 4% VAT to the acquisition of new dwellings was extended by one 
year.  
VAT increase. (*) From 1 September 2012 the standard and reduced VAT rates are increased to 21% and 10% (from 18% and 8%, 
respectively). In addition, the standard rate applies also to some goods and services (e.g. combined hotel and catering, entertainment, 
discotheque and night-club services, cinema and theatre tickets, supply and receipt of digital radio broadcasting and digital television 
services) previously taxed at the reduced rate.  
Excise duty increase.  From January 2012 the tax on diesel for professional use was increased, reducing the amount for partial refunds. (*) 
Tobacco excises are increased and their structure is modified by reducing the proportional rate and raising the specific one. The minimum 
tax rate for cigarettes has been fixed at € 119.1 per 1000 units. 
Other tax increase. From January 2012 a temporary surcharge (up to 2013) applies in the Real Estate Tax (municipal tax) for immovable 
properties with an updated cadastral value over the average value in each municipality. In September 2011, the net wealth tax (impuesto 
sobre el patrimonio) was temporarily restored for the years 2011 and 2012. The exemption for dwelling houses was nearly doubled to € 
300000 (previously € 150 253.03) and the tax-free amount (after application of specific tax exemptions) was substantially increased to € 
700000 (previously: € 108 182.18). A special programme was approved to encourage regularisation of the tax status concenring personal 
and corporate income.  
 Note: Measures indicated with (*) were taken after the cut-off date.  
 
 
Sweden 
Personal income tax decrease. From January 2011 the basic income tax allowance was increased for people over 65 [0.2% of GDP].  
VAT decrease. From 2012 the VAT on restaurant and catering services was reduced by 13 pp to 12% [0.2% of GDP]. 
Excise duty increase. In 2012 the excise duty on tobacco was increased and annual indexation was introduced, corresponding to a total tax 
increase of roughly 10%. 
  
 
United Kingdom 
Personal income tax increase. For the fiscal year 2012-13 the basic rate limit was lowered to GBP 34 370 (from GBP 35 000 in 2011-
2012). The personal tax allowance was increased to GBP 8 105. Since the 2010-11 tax year, this personal allowance is reduced for income 
over GBP 100000 - by GBP one for every GBP two of income over GBP 100000. This reduction applies irrespective of age. From April 
2011 the annual allowance for tax-privileged pension saving was reduced from GBP 255 000 to GBP 50000. From April 2013 the 
availability of the income tax age-related allowances will be restricted for current recipients and a cap on all unlimited income tax reliefs 
will be introduced through a ceiling of GBP 50000 or 25% per cent of income, whichever is higher. From January 2013 the child benefit 
will be withdrawn through an income tax charge applicable only to households with someone earning over GBP 50000 a year; the 
withdrawal will be gradual for households with someone earning between GBP 50000 and GBP 60000.  
Personal income tax decrease. From April 2013, the personal tax allowance will increase to GBP 9 205, and the additional rate of income 
tax (applicable above GBP 150000 since 2010) will decrease from 50% to 45% [-0.23% of GDP].  
Corporate income tax decrease. From April 2011 the headline and small profits rates were reduced from 28% to 26% and from 21% to 
20% From April 2012 the standard CIT rate was reduced further to 24% [0.03% of GDP]. The SME tax relief rate for investment was 
increased to 200% in April 2011, and further to 225% in April 2012. A special regime introducing a reduced 10% rate on corporate profits 
from patents and other types of intellectual property (Patent Box) will be phased in over five years from April 2013. An 'Above the Line' 
(ATL) credit for R&D with a minimum rate of 9.1% before tax will be introduced.  
VAT increase. From 2011 the standard VAT rate was increased from 17.5% to 20%. 
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Note:  Cut-off date is June 2012. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
Excise duty increase. The general duty rates on alcohol and tobacco were increased by 2% above inflation in March 2011. They were 
increased by a further 2% (alcohol) and 5% (tobacco) above inflation in March 2012. The fuel duty escalator was abolished and replaced 
by a fair fuel stabiliser. this means that fuel duty now increases in line with inflation when oil prices are high. When the price of oil falls 
below a certain level, fuel duty increases by inflation plus GBP 0.01 per litre.  
Social security contribution increase. In April 2011 the main and additional rates of National Insurance Contributions (NICs) were 
increased by one percentage point. 
Other tax increases. With effect from January 2012 the bank levy full rate was increased from 0.078% to 0.088% Another increase to 
0.105% is scheduled for January 2013. Since 22 March 2012, a new 7% rate of the stamp duty land tax (increased to 15% if the buyer is a 
non-natural person) applies to the purchase of residential property worth over GBP two million. The government set up an independent 
Office of Tax Simplification and in Budget 2012 it announced a consultation on a new general anti-abuse rule (GAAR) to tackle artificial 
and abusive tax avoidance.  
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Value-Added Tax has been at the core of the 
Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) on 
taxation resulting from the European Semester. 
The CSRs stress the potential of Member States to 
make their tax structure more growth-friendly and 
improve the design of their individual taxes. For 
VAT, this mainly means using it as a substitute for 
taxing income but also improving its efficiency as 
reduced VAT rates (
21
) lower tax collection 
without always achieving their economic or social 
objectives. 
At EU-level, the European Commission has 
recently started a wide-ranging review of the EU 
VAT system. This process began with the 
presentation of a Green Paper on the future of 
VAT in December 2010. (
22
) Then an ex-post 
evaluation of the system was carried out through a 
study produced by the Institute for Fiscal Studies 
and published in December 2011. (
23
) Combined 
with the numerous contributions received from 
stakeholders in response to the public consultation 
launched with the Green Paper, its findings 
provided the analytical input for the Commission’s 
Communication on the future of VAT adopted in 
December 2011(
24
). The main points of the 
Communication are summarised in Box 4.1, at the 
end of the chapter. 
This chapter presents some key economic issues 
related to the legal and institutional features of 
VAT in the EU and provides new analytical 
evidence, largely based on the IFS study. The first 
section will consider the cause and consequence of 
abandoning the ‘origin principle’ in favour of the 
‘destination principle’. Section 4.2 discusses the 
general economic implications of the current VAT 
systems on trade. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 give 
estimations of cross-border VAT compliance costs 
and the economic impact of VAT exemptions on 
trade neutrality. Lastly, Section 4.5 assesses the 
welfare economic cost of exemptions and reduced 
                                                          
(21) Throughout this report, the term ‘reduced VAT rates’ 
covers all VAT rates applied in the EU other than the 
standard rate. 
(22) COM(2010) 695 final, 1 December 2010. 
(23) IFS et al. (2011). 
(24) COM(2011) 851 final, 6 December 2011. 
rates and their distributional effects. Section 4.6 is 
the conclusion. (
25
) 
4.1. CHOOSING BETWEEN AN ‘ORIGIN’ AND A 
‘DESTINATION’ SYSTEM 
4.1.1. Issues related with the origin system and 
merits of the destination system 
Although the review of the VAT system has only 
recently begun, a significant change is already 
apparent: the Commission no longer aims to 
change over to a VAT origin system in the 
foreseeable future. This is important as, ever since 
the 1992 Single Market Programme, the current 
destination system was supposed to be just a 
temporary solution before switching to the 
permanent origin system. The Council has decided 
to abandon the objective of switching to the origin 
principle, although it should be noted that this is 
justified on the basis of political feasibility rather 
than on the economic desirability per se of this 
objective. (
26
) 
The difference between the two systems lies in 
how imports and exports are treated. Under the 
origin system, the country of the seller levies tax at 
its domestic rate, and the importing country does 
not levy any VAT. Under the destination system, 
the importing country levies tax at its domestic rate 
and conditions. In the current EU system, which is 
a variant of a destination system, goods for export 
are zero-rated, that is to say they are free of VAT, 
and the seller can claim back the VAT paid on the 
inputs. VAT is levied on imported goods at the rate 
and according to the rules applicable in the 
importing country, with the customer paying VAT 
to the Treasury. In the destination country, VAT is 
levied at the same rate on imported goods as on 
domestic goods and there is thus no direct effect of 
VAT on relative prices. Thus, the benefit of the 
destination system is that it allows Member States 
to have different VAT rates according to their  
 
                                                          
(25) Due to space restrictions, this chapter does not assess the 
effects of broader VAT bases on inflation or as a 
possibility for fiscal devaluation. 
(26) See Conclusions of the 3167 meeting of the Council of 
Economic and Finance Ministers, 15 May 2012. 
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revenue needs and preferences. Under the origin 
system, by contrast, any rate difference will result  
in a corresponding impact on the relative terms of 
trade. (
27
) For this reason, use of the destination 
principle was never really challenged until the 
Single Market programme of 1992 led to the 
abolition of border controls, which had been 
identified by the Cecchini report as costing intra-
community traders 2 % of their turnover. (
28
) The 
problem, as far as VAT was concerned, was that 
abolishing border controls removed one crucial 
element of the destination system, i.e. certification 
that the goods that were zero-rated for export 
actually left the country and were taxed on 
importation in the destination country. 
The solution initially proposed in 1987 by the 
Commission (
29
) involved a shift to the ‘origin 
principle’. Instead of being zero-rated, transactions 
between Member States liable to VAT would be 
subject to the tax already charged in the country of 
origin, which traders could then deduct as input tax 
in the normal way. Hence, the origin system is by 
design not exposed to types of fraud such as 
carrousel fraud that exploit the zero-rating of 
exports. The system would have resulted in goods 
moving between, say, England and France, or 
France and Germany, treated in exactly the same 
way as those moving between England and 
Scotland or Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. 
There would have remained, however, one obvious 
difference: VAT paid in England and Scotland 
goes into the same Treasury; that paid in England 
and France does not. Estimates showed that there 
would have been substantial transfers of tax 
revenues, notably to Germany and Benelux from 
the rest. Accordingly, the Commission proposed a 
clearing system (
30
) to re-allocate the VAT 
collected in the countries of origin to the countries 
                                                          
(27) It is theoretically possible that, in an origin system in which 
two countries have different VAT rates, trade will not be 
distorted in the long-term, if there is a free trade 
environment and flexible exchange rates because these will 
adjust (Genser and Schulze, 1997). However, the 
conditions required seem unlikely to apply to a real-world 
situation. Furthermore, trade neutrality would presumably 
take even longer to be achieved in a multi-country setting 
with a fixed exchange rate regime, i.e. the euro zone.  
(28) The following discussion on the origin and destination 
principle is largely based on the report from the European 
Parliament (2000). 
(29) COM(87) 322 final/2, 21 August 1987. 
(30) COM(87) 323 final/2 25 August 1987. 
of destination. This might have been based on 
VAT returns or on macro-economic statistics. (
31
) 
The Commission proposals, however, were not 
accepted by the Council. In the second half of 
1989, a high-level working party convened by the 
Council outlined an alternative which retained the 
destination principle for transactions involving 
VAT-registered traders. (
32
) This became the basis 
of the transitional system proposed by the 
Commission in the following year, and which 
came into effect at the beginning of 1993. (
33
) 
However, for sales to private individuals other than 
distance sales exceeding a significant threshold 
and sales of new means of transport, the principle 
of taxation in the Member State of origin was 
accepted. The system was originally intended to 
apply until the end of 1996 and was known as the 
‘transitional VAT system’. However, after a 
second set of simplification measures (
34
) and 
numerous other modifications, it has remained in 
force until today. 
Therefore the destination principle continues to 
apply to most transactions between registered 
traders. However, as tax controls at frontiers have 
been abolished, traders are required to keep 
detailed records of purchases from, and sales to, 
other countries, and the system is policed by 
administrative cooperation between Member State 
tax authorities. In practice, goods supplied between 
taxable persons (or VAT registered traders) are 
exempted with a right to deduct the input VAT 
(zero-rated) on dispatch if they are sent to another 
Member State. This is known as an ‘intra-
Community supply’. The customer can establish 
his status by providing his VAT number, which the 
supplier can check using the VAT Information 
Exchange System (VIES). 
Three main reasons explain the reluctance of 
Member States to change over to the origin  
 
                                                          
(31) COM(89) 260, 14 June 1989. 
(32) The origin system applies to most sales made directly to 
final consumers, except those by mail order companies and 
similar entities, which, over a certain threshold, must apply 
the rate at destination. Sales of new means of transport, too, 
constitute an exception, as they are taxed at the rate of the 
country of destination. 
(33) Directive 91/680/EEC of 16 December 1991 together with 
Directive 92/111/EEC of 14 December 1992, which 
introduced a first set of simplification measures. 
(34) Directive 95/7/EC of 10 April 1995. 
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system. The first was that Member States had 
some doubts that the proposed clearing house 
system would offer all the necessary guarantees 
and incentives regarding fiscal controls and ensure 
a fair distribution between Member States of the 
VAT collected. 
Second, shifting to an origin-based VAT would 
have required substantial convergence of the VAT 
rates between Member States, as the origin system 
can tolerate only very small differences in rates, 
owing to its immediate implications on trade 
distortion. This would mean a significant reduction 
in Member States’ room for manoeuvre. Today, 
the difference between the highest (HU) and the 
lowest (LU) rate in the Union is 12 percentage 
points, which is very high. Overall, there has been 
only a very gradual and limited closing of the gap 
between standard rates, even partly reversed in 
recent years (see Graph 2.1). 
Third, the differences in the tax base may be (for 
tradable goods, of course) even greater than for 
standard VAT rates. Although EU legislation has 
limited the right of Member States to grant a more 
favourable VAT treatment to a specific set of 
goods, major differences in the base for VAT 
remain. (
35
) 
Graph 4.1: Standard VAT rate in EU-27 
 
Source: Commission services. 
                                                          
(35) The VAT revenue ratio can give a rough measure of this. 
The indicator is the ratio between actual VAT revenue and 
the theoretical amount that could be obtained by taxing all 
consumption at the standard VAT rate. The low value of 
the indicator for most countries highlights that actual VAT 
revenue is only a small fraction of the theoretical total. 
While this is likely to be to some extent due to differences 
in rates of tax evasion, the large variation in the levels of 
the indicator seems to confirm that Member States differ 
substantially in the degree by which they exempt, or tax 
more favourably, certain goods and services. 
It appears highly unlikely that there will be 
convergence in VAT (standard and reduced) rates 
in the future. VAT is one of the main tax policy 
variables left for Member States to adjust their 
revenue in the short term, but only a VAT system 
based on taxation at destination provides the 
necessary flexibility for this, as it allows 
differentiated levels of VAT between Member 
States and changes in rates. The room for increases 
in taxes other than VAT has been gradually 
eroded, either because they have already reached 
high levels, or due to increased competition for 
mobile tax bases. In addition, recourse to the main 
alternative revenue raiser in all Member States, i.e. 
labour taxation, has been made more and more 
problematic by the need to boost the EU’s 
unsatisfactory employment levels. (
36
) VAT hikes 
have predominated as the preferred tax revenue 
raiser since the beginning of the crisis (see 
European Commission, 2012a). This also reflects 
policy suggestions by the European Commission to 
shift tax away from labour towards less 
distortionary tax bases (European Commission, 
2012b). 
4.1.2. Dealing with VAT fraud in the current 
destination system 
A consequence of abandoning the origin system is 
that it removes a promising systemic solution to 
deal with VAT carousel fraud in the current 
destination-based system. ‘Carousel fraud’ is a 
type of fraud that exploits the zero-rating of 
exports combined with the deferred payment of 
VAT on imported goods to disappear before 
paying the VAT charged on the subsequent 
domestic sale with the customer claiming its 
refunds. Although, given the nature of fraud, it is 
difficult to quantify its extent, all estimates put the 
level of fraud at extremely high levels (Baldwin 
(2007) quotes estimates ranging from € 60 to € 250 
billion annually EU wide). Carousel fraud is linked 
to the design of the current VAT system, which 
provides for an exemption of exports from VAT— 
this is the step targeted by fraudsters. So far, two 
types of solutions have been put forward to tackle 
this problem: one relies on better cooperation 
within national tax administrations, aiming at 
facilitating and speeding up detection and 
repression; the other relies on system reforms of 
various kinds. One proposal, put forward in the 
                                                          
(36) See also Chapters 2 and 3 of this report. 
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past notably by Germany and Austria, involves the 
‘domestic reverse charge mechanism’, where VAT 
on products and services delivered in the same 
Member State is owed by the recipient and not by 
supplier. Other solutions, such as the VIVAT 
system proposed by Keen and Smith (1999), 
centres on reducing the financial incentives for 
fraud, essentially by preventing the VAT chain 
from being broken by levying a low common rate 
of VAT on trade between registered traders, 
including intra-EU trade. (
37
) 
4.2. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT 
VAT SYSTEM ON TRADE 
The focus of this section is on the general 
implications of the current VAT system on trade. 
If the destination principle is to be used 
permanently, it is even more important to examine 
critically the weaknesses of the current VAT 
system, which is a variant of a destination system, 
and to reflect on alternative solutions to achieve a 
properly functioning destination system. 
4.2.1. The current VAT system: strengths and 
weaknesses 
VAT was first introduced in the EU and has been a 
very successful tax since its inception. Its success 
is measured by the fact that it has been introduced 
in at least 145 countries so far (
38
), including many 
developing countries where it was initially deemed 
to be too complicated (Bird, 2005: ‘VAT has 
swept the world’). In the EU, the long-term growth 
of VAT rates, compared with the trend for lower 
taxation of labour and capital income, is testimony 
to the robustness of this. Furthermore, according to 
recent research, VAT is considered to be one of the 
taxes that have the least negative effect on 
economic growth. (
39
) VAT also has, at a first 
approximation, by and large a neutral effect on 
international trade, a factor that was instrumental 
in its adoption in the EU, as the previous old-style 
sales tax ran the risk of generating trade distortions 
among Member States due to the difficulty in 
exempting taxes on inputs. 
                                                          
(37) The main advantage of VIVAT is that it enables neutrality 
for international trade and subsidiarity for domestic 
taxation at the same time. 
(38) See PwC (2011). 
(39) European Commission (2011b) gives a good overview of 
this literature. 
The basis of the EU system dates back to the 1st 
and 2nd Directives, originally adopted in 1967. 
Although the Directives on VAT – in particular the 
6th Directive (
40
) have been amended over time, 
the changes have been adaptive, rather than 
systemic reforms. A number of initial choices have 
not been reassessed, despite their negative 
consequences. The main characteristics of the 
current VAT system are as follows. 
Although the legal form of the tax must conform to 
the EU VAT Directive (
41
), Member States have 
considerable leeway to define their rates. 
Member States can even amend the base for VAT. 
Reduced rates and exemptions differ strongly, in 
practice, from one Member State to another. This 
is because overall, the current VAT system in the 
European Union gives considerable operational 
and administrative freedom to national 
governments. The main limit to Member States is 
that goods or services cannot be freely moved from 
the standard rate to a reduced rate, as only those 
listed in Annex III of the VAT Directive can be 
taxed at a reduced rate. 
Despite some safeguards to guarantee an equal 
playing field, the system exempts most of the 
output of the public sector, creating a number of 
distortions wherever public and private producers 
of a good or service compete or could compete one 
with another. Other newer systems have limited 
the public sector exemption. 
The system excludes most of the financial sector 
from taxation due to technical difficulties in 
determining the value added in margin-based 
activities, creating distortions and probably 
contributing to overconsumption of financial 
services. (
42
) 
4.2.2. Theoretical impacts on the current 
systems on trade 
These fundamental choices have a number of 
consequences for trade. First, the patchwork of 
legal rules on VAT, the differences in procedures 
and in the definition of the base create an implicit 
tax barrier for intra-EU trade, even though VAT is, 
in principle, neutral with regard to trade due to the 
                                                          
(40) 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977. 
(41) 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006. 
(42) See Section 4.4 for further details. 
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application of the destination system to most 
transactions. A number of elements support the 
view that the different VAT regimes do have an 
impact on trade. 
IFS et al. (2011) (
43
) identifies four potential types 
of impacts. First, the higher cross-border costs and 
the sizeable one-off learning costs needed to start 
exporting, due to the need to learn about the 
destination country’s VAT rules. Second, 
differences in VAT regimes may also affect the 
choice of exporting vs setting up a local 
subsidiary, particularly for firms that organise 
complex trade networks in intermediary goods. 
Third, they may also have an impact on the 
structure of demand. VAT rates, VAT exemptions 
and the compliance cost burden associated with a 
national VAT regime may have domestic price and 
volume effects that affect the structure of a 
country’s foreign trade. This is because multiple 
VAT rates and exemptions influence the structure 
of relative prices in a country. This may push up 
the demand for low-rated or exempted goods and 
services, while putting a brake on the demand for 
other items. This may well affect a country’s 
specialisation in international trade. 
The fourth impact of VAT regimes on trade is 
immediate and relates, of course, to cross-border 
purchases of goods by final consumers, (
44
) 
particularly between Schengen area members, as 
the abolition of cross-border identity checks 
facilitates shopping. The main impact of 
differences in tax regimes is on excisable goods. 
Cnossen (2002) notes that the impact of different 
VAT rates was found to be relatively limited in 
Denmark, despite a significant difference in rates 
vis-à-vis neighbouring Germany. However, the 
strong recent increases of VAT standard rates, 
which still diverge, may increase the scale of 
cross-border shopping. The distance-selling 
arrangements laid down in the VAT Directive 
ensure taxation at destination and therefore 
neutralise the differences in VAT rates, but only 
for those supplies for which the supplier takes care 
of the transport of the goods. (
45
) 
                                                          
(43) See p. 159-160. 
(44) Most of them are subject to the origin principle. 
(45) The rise in the use of the internet by the population may 
increase cross-border shopping, as shoppers in 
neighbouring countries find it easier to shop for goods and 
services on the other side of the border and modern GPS 
Therefore, cross-country differences in VAT 
regimes are likely to result in a sub-optimal 
international division of labour. These are not only 
limited to compliance costs and the effects of rate 
and base differences. In an early, well-known 
discussion of the impact of VAT on international 
trade, Feldstein and Krugman (1990), while 
starting from the well-known theoretical result that 
in the first approximation that VAT is neutral on 
trade, also demonstrate that exemptions and 
reduced rates may well have an impact on the 
international division of labour, notably on the 
financial sector. (
46
)  
4.3. ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF CROSS-
BORDER COMPLIANCE COSTS 
The compliance costs of VAT are not trivial. IFS 
et al. (2011) reports that past estimates for 
compliance costs have ranged from 0.3 % of 
turnover to as high as 8 or even 25 % of VAT 
collected in countries such as Croatia or Slovenia. 
Compliance costs are known to differ substantially 
between Member States, even though the general 
principles of VAT are common. Data from World 
Bank / PwC (2011) ‘Paying Taxes’ (47) show that 
for a model company, the time required to comply 
with VAT obligations varies very greatly amongst 
EU Member States. For a fictional model 
company, they range from 22 hours in Finland to 
288 in Bulgaria (PwC, 2010). This suggests a high 
level of inconsistency. Furthermore, the estimates 
of ‘Paying Taxes’ assume that companies carry out 
solely domestic transactions. 
There are good reasons to believe that the 
compliance costs linked to cross-border trade are 
even higher. This is because cross-border trade 
requires applying complex rules and fulfilling 
additional obligations. Very often it also requires 
acquiring knowledge of the foreign legislation and 
                                                                                   
technology facilitates driving to new destinations in 
neighbouring countries. 
(46) Anecdotal evidence suggests, for example, that cross-
border trade in personal services like hairdressing or 
dentistry has grown, notably in the border regions of 
Austria or Germany. While the main driver of these trends 
probably lies in strong differences in the cost of labour, 
VAT factors may either amplify or artificially restrict this 
trend. This explains the attention of Member States to 
issues such as granting reduced rates to labour-intensive 
services in neighbouring countries. 
(47) See PwC et al. (2011). 
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VAT practice. These costs are proportionately 
much higher for SMEs, as the profit to be obtained 
from foreign sales may be uncertain and limited at 
the beginning, whereas the costs sunk into setting 
up a system for dealing with foreign VAT are up-
front and certain. But there are other, more subtle 
effects. 
It has been known for a long time that the cross-
border VAT compliance costs are well above those 
for domestic transactions. In general, VAT-related 
obligations have been identified as a major source 
of the compliance costs for European firms, due to 
their pervasive role in everyday transactions. A 
European Commission survey in 2000 showed that 
26 % of businesses found difficulties related to the 
VAT system and VAT procedures to be an 
obstacle to doing business in the Internal Market. 
A further survey (
48
) in 2001 showed that VAT 
payments and refunds were the third most costly 
regulatory burden for companies. The multiplicity 
and complexity of VAT requirements in the EU-15 
Member States, i.e. the ‘old’ EU Member States, 
combined with difficulties for businesses in 
obtaining VAT refunds from other Member States 
leads to substantial costs and represents a real 
barrier to cross-border activities. (
49
) Out of 25 
priority areas identified in the VAT legislation by 
their contribution to the compliance cost burden of 
European companies, eight specifically pertain to 
cross-border activities. (
50
) 
The impact of this on trade has always been 
difficult to quantify due to a lack of estimates of 
the scale of cross-border compliance costs, 
compared with domestic costs. However, IFS et al. 
(2011) sheds some new light on the issue. It 
suggests that the distortionary effect on trade is 
strong. It found many differences across Member 
States in VAT-related administrative procedures: 
on average, a firm trading in two EU-15 Member 
States would have to deal with eleven 
differences (
51
). These intra-EU differences are a 
                                                          
(48) European Commission (2001). 
(49) An overview of these results is given in IFS et al. (2011), 
pp. 157-158. 
(50) See the report by the High Level Group of Independent 
Stakeholders on Administrative Burdens (2009), and 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/better-
regulation/administrative-burdens/priorityareas/ 
tax/index_en.htm; Ministry of Finance, et al. (2005); 
Diemer (2010); Skatteverket (2006), Verwaal and Cnossen 
(2002). 
(51) IFS et al. (2011), p. 15. 
source of trade costs that hamper the development 
of the internal market and discourage cross-border 
trade. 
The results confirm that there are considerable 
differences, not only in the structures and levels of 
VAT but also in the administrative procedures. An 
interesting finding is that administrative 
procedures in the EU-15 have not tended to 
converge appreciably, although several decades 
have gone by since the VAT system was set up. 
The VAT dissimilarity indicator (
52
) for the EU-15 
shows that on average, more than 11 out of the 30 
aspects of the administrative and procedural VAT 
regime differ between each EU-15 country pair. 
By contrast, the ten member states that joined the 
EU in 2004 have fewer administrative differences 
in their VAT regimes than the EU-15 countries 
have among each other. This may be because these 
countries were able to start a VAT tax system from 
scratch and have chosen to adapt best-practice 
procedures from the EU-15 countries. (
53
) Rates 
also differ less between the new Member States 
than among the EU-15 Members. This suggests 
that convergence is not a natural phenomenon over 
time, but the result of deliberate policy alignment. 
IFS et al. (2011) uses an innovative indirect 
approach to simulate, in the absence of data on 
cross-border compliance costs, the order of 
magnitude of the possible impact on the     
economy. (
54
) The estimates suggest that a 10 % 
reduction in differences in VAT procedures could 
boost intra-EU trade by up to 3.7 % and GDP by 
up to 0.4 %. The simulation results also suggest 
that removing national VAT obligations that go 
beyond EU requirements would yield a growth in 
                                                          
(52) The VAT-regime dissimilarity indicator compares across 
countries various aspects and functional domains in 
national VAT regimes. The aspects include rate structures, 
the heterogeneity of administrative procedures, and the 
compliance cost burdens created by national VAT regimes. 
Dissimilarity indicators are calculated for all 676 (=26x26) 
bilateral country pairs in the EU in order to allow 
maximum accuracy in detecting the VAT influences on 
bilateral trade between Member States. 
(53) IFS et al. (2011), p. 168. 
(54) The method is an econometric approach based on 
comparing the trade structure of each country with the 
above-mentioned estimates for the dissimilarity of VAT 
regimes. The results capture the direct (partial equilibrium) 
effects of VAT policy on trade only and do not take into 
account trade diversion or other indirect effects. For trade 
in services, the study distinguishes three types of trade 
flows: total services, travel, and other business services. 
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intra-EU trade volumes by 2.6 % and GDP by 
0.2 %. 
Overall, although the authors of the study consider 
these estimates, owing to methodological 
limitations, to be clearly the upper bounds of the 
range of possible impacts, the effects of this 
magnitude clearly highlight that simplifying and 
harmonising procedures and converging tax rates 
and bases are an important policy issue. This is 
confirmed by the robustness check performed by 
the study. It simulates the impact on trade of 
abolishing all VAT compliance costs, on the basis 
of the assumption that it may raise firm turnover 
by 1 %. The estimated increase in intra-EU trade is 
4.3 % and the estimated impact on GDP is 0.4 %. 
4.4. ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF VAT 
EXEMPTIONS ON TRADE NEUTRALITY 
The basic result that VAT has a neutral effect on 
vertical integration and world trade is no longer 
strictly true when there are exemptions and 
reduced rates. 
Exemptions apply in a significant number of areas 
and sectors: examples include many financial 
services (given the difficulty of identifying 
economic value added in a financial transaction) 
and certain services of public interest (e.g. health 
services). The distortion affects both the input and 
the output side. On the input side, it is due to the 
fact that exempted sectors do not have to add VAT 
to the sale price and are also not allowed to deduct 
the VAT they pay on their inputs. (
55
) As a result, 
exempted sectors have a financial incentive to 
internalise production inputs, because internal 
value added goes untaxed, but VAT paid on inputs 
acquired from other sectors is irrecoverable and 
increases production costs. This may lead the 
public or the financial sector to engage in activities 
which could be outsourced at a lower total running 
cost. A recent study (
56
) on VAT in the public 
sector and exemptions in the public interest found 
that in the EU public sector alone, thus excluding 
the financial and charity sector, eliminating this 
distortion would results in gains of up to 0.3 % of 
consumption. 
                                                          
(55) This situation is different from ‘zero rating’ where turnover 
is not taxed and the producer is allowed to deduct VAT 
paid on inputs, resulting in zero effective taxation. Exports, 
for example, are zero rated.  
(56) Copenhagen Economics et al. (2011). 
There is also a distortion on the output side: when 
an exempted sector, i.e. financial services, sells to 
a business, the sale cost must include a component 
to compensate for the VAT on inputs, which the 
banking sector cannot recover. The business will 
be unable to recover this amount, departing from 
the normal case whereby VAT paid on inputs is 
wholly recovered and therefore indifferent to the 
business. Therefore the output of the exempted 
sector is overtaxed when it makes a sale to an 
ordinary business. On the other hand, not taxing 
value added results in under-taxation of the output 
whenever the financial service industry sells to 
households or exempt entities. This may skew the 
composition of sectoral demand. Copenhagen 
Economics (2011) found that a full taxation 
solution, which would eliminate both distortions, 
would create potential economic gains from 0.04 
up to 0.19 % of EU GDP, which is significant. 
Furthermore, there are frequent situations in which 
businesses trade in both exempt and non-exempt 
goods. This creates substantial extra compliance 
costs. 
As recognised by the seminal Feldstein and 
Krugman (1990) contribution, having exempt 
sectors weakens the neutrality properties of VAT 
with regards to international trade. The authors 
argue that generally, the fact that exemptions are in 
practice mostly found in the non-traded sector 
means that they will reduce the size of the tradable 
sector. In addition, there is a competitiveness issue, 
which may affect the financial sector in particular. 
Financial sector exports are harmed by the 
inability to deduct input VAT and this creates a 
competitiveness distortion whenever there are 
different rates. The effect is significant: IFS et al 
2011 reports that if financial services firms could 
reclaim VAT on their inputs, the cost of financial 
services to businesses would be reduced by around 
3–5 % in the four biggest euro-area countries 
(France, Germany, Italy and Spain), leading to an 
increase in their international price 
competitiveness of 0.16 %, on average. For the EU, 
financial institutions may well be handicapped by 
this effect when competing with US institutions (as 
the US levies no VAT). Overall, this may result in 
barriers to trade in financial services. Several 
authors consider comprehensive VAT rates as one  
of the most important advantages of more modern 
VAT systems like the New Zealand system, which 
 
European Commission 
Tax reforms in EU Member States 
 
54 
gives no exemption for the public sector (Aujean et 
al., 1999). 
4.5. ESTIMATING THE COST OF EXEMPTIONS 
AND REDUCED RATES AND ITS 
DISTRIBUTIONAL BENEFITS 
Last year’s Tax Reforms Report discussed the issue 
of VAT efficiency and called for coordination of 
policies on VAT rates among Member States. This 
section adds to this discussion by highlighting the 
theoretical arguments in favour of using uniform 
VAT rates and presenting some new empirical 
results on their effects. 
According to Ramsey (1927), an efficient indirect 
tax system should in theory reduce the 
consumption of any good in the same proportion. 
However, this is not possible in reality. The design 
of such a rate structure would require knowledge 
of cross-price demand elasticities, which are very 
difficult to measure. A similar theoretical approach 
is followed by Corlett and Hague (1953), who 
showed that efficiency could be enhanced by 
increasing the tax burden on goods that are 
complementary to leisure. However, this policy 
suffers from the same drawback that price 
elasticities between leisure and those goods are not 
discernible. (
57
) These difficulties have led 
economists to pragmatically favour uniform VAT 
taxation. 
This is reinforced by the fact that consumption 
taxes are poor instruments for redistribution. (
58
) 
Historically, the main argument for introducing 
reduced VAT rates was the attempt to counteract 
the regressive properties of VAT. IFS et al. (2011) 
relativises this problem, arguing that, while zero 
and reduced rates can be progressive and can be 
used to encourage the consumption of socially 
desirable goods and services, they are costly 
instruments, as the benefit is by nature spread 
between all consumers, regardless of income. 
Indeed, their estimates indicate that it would be 
possible, in principle, to abolish zero and reduced 
rates of VAT, compensate low income households 
                                                          
(57) For an in-depth discussion of VAT differentiation applied 
to environmental policy, see Kosonen and Nicodeme 
(2010), on which we draw. 
(58) See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) for the theoretical 
argument and Copenhagen Economics (2007, 2008) for the 
empirical evidence. 
and still have revenue left over. (
59
) In addition, it 
is not certain that reduced rates or exemptions 
effectively result in lower prices for consumers as 
traders may not pass the gains on to consumer 
prices. Although one might expect that in 
competitive markets, tax savings should be largely 
passed on to consumers in the long run, it appears 
that only 30 % of the 2009 cut in VAT on 
restaurant and catering services in France from 
19.6 % to 5.5 % was passed on to consumers. A 
similar effect was reported for a 2010 VAT cut in 
hotel services in Germany and in South Africa on 
paraffin (Owens et al, 2011). (
60
) 
The effects of reduced VAT rates to promote 
employment or the consumption of merit goods are 
not supported by empirical evidence either (see 
Copenhagen Economics, 2007). For employment, 
although there may be some positive effects in the 
short-term, the long-term impact appears at best 
low. In addition, the cost of the jobs created appear 
high. (
61
) As for the promotion of merit goods, the 
concept does not tally with the purpose of 
redistribution as many of these goods ultimately 
benefit high-income earners (e.g. cultural goods). 
Reduced rates and exemptions generally tend to 
have a significant budgetary cost. Mathis (2004) 
found that in the EU-15, only about 69 % of VAT-
taxable transactions were taxed at the standard rate 
in 2000, with the share falling to about 50 % in 
some Member States. Besides reducing revenue, 
reduced rates and exemptions also distort 
households’ spending patterns. 
Furthermore, reduced rates and exemptions 
increase the complexity of the system — thereby 
increasing administrative costs, litigation costs and 
compliance costs. Because a large proportion of 
compliance costs are generated by differences in 
rates between different products, or between the 
same products in different countries, this creates a 
risk of a gradual increase in system complexity and 
                                                          
(59) Additional details on this are given in European 
Commission (2011a). 
(60) Preliminary reports on the VAT cut on restaurant services 
in Sweden in 2012 suggests that around 30 % of the tax 
reduction affected prices while at the same time the 
employment level in the restaurant sector has increased. 
(61) See the report by the French Senate on the effects of 
reduced VAT rates in restaurants, which estimates that the 
measure created 20 000 jobs for a net cost of € 2.4 billion, 
representing a cost of €  120 000 per job created 
(http://www.senat.fr/rap/r10-042/r10-042_mono.html). 
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in the degree of fragmentation of the internal 
market. Indeed, the countries that have adopted 
VAT more recently seem to have preferred single-
rate regimes to avoid these problems. Australia, 
Canada, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore and 
South Africa have broader bases for VAT than the 
EU. In Africa, two thirds of the 21 countries that 
adopted the VAT in the 1990s and all but one of 
the nine that did so in the 2000s have chosen 
single-rate systems. Current proposals for VAT 
reform in Switzerland also plan to replace the 
current three rates of VAT with a single rate. Some 
studies suggest this may reduce compliance costs 
by 20-30 % and add 0.1-0.7 % to growth (Owens et 
al., 2011). Moreover, avoiding the cost associated 
with reduced rates and exemptions allows 
governments to set a lower standard VAT rate. 
This may also partly explain why the OECD 
countries that have adopted VAT more recently 
also have, on average, lower standard VAT rates 
(although this may also be due to lower overall tax 
levels than in the EU in general). 
Granting exemptions and reduced rates tends to 
generate constant demand to extend the favourable 
treatment to other sectors. Uniform VAT is more 
stable and less prone to lobbyism and 
manipulation. Experience in operating the EU 
VAT system does not lead to excessive optimism 
that the prevalence of reduced rates may diminish 
over the longer term. On the contrary, events over 
the past years have tended to highlight that under 
normal circumstances, reduced rates or exemptions 
are very difficult to roll back for political reasons. 
Fundamentally, the constituency that would benefit 
from the reform, i.e. the general public, would 
derive from the reform only a limited advantage in 
per capita terms, whereas the affected sectors stand 
to lose much more from the withdrawal of special 
tax treatment and are generally much better 
organised politically. 
Overall, Copenhagen Economics (2007) concludes 
that there is a strong overall argument for a (more) 
uniform VAT rate structure in the EU. Although in 
a few cases (like sectors whose services can be 
easily substituted by shadow economy activity) 
there is a convincing case for a lower VAT rate, in 
general the arguments for reduced VAT rates or 
exemptions are limited and contingent and the 
policy aims of reduced rates or exemptions can 
 
often be equally well or better achieved by other 
means. In particular, the case for granting 
exemptions on equity grounds is substantially 
weakened by the fact that the same 
objectives can be reached at a lower budgetary cost 
and without distorting the consumption decision 
through direct payments to needy households (on 
this point see also IFS et al., 2011). 
4.6. POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
The first policy conclusion of the ongoing review 
of the EU VAT system is that the long-standing 
plan to change to a VAT system based on taxation 
at origin is no longer feasible. Maybe, due to the 
loss of flexibility that the origin system entails, it is 
not even economically desirable under the present 
circumstances. 
Confirming the destination principle reinforces the 
need to tackle VAT fraud (in particular VAT 
carousel fraud), as it results in part from the 
endemic weaknesses of the destination regime and 
from the high VAT compliance costs for cross-
border trade. This will require substantial work to 
devise alternative concepts for a more robust and 
simpler destination-based system tailored to the 
Single Market. This, as well as coordination 
between Member States, should be the priority, 
under the general objective set in the Annual 
Growth Survey 2012 of combating tax fraud and in 
the Single Market Act. (
62
) 
There would be economic benefits from 
simplifying and standardising VAT procedures as 
recent research shows that there is a potential 
increase in trade and GDP in the EU if the number 
and mismatches of procedures are reduced. The 
high VAT compliance costs for cross-border trade 
must also be addressed when seeking solutions to 
cross-border VAT fraud. 
The second important policy conclusion concerns 
the use of reduced VAT rates and exemptions. 
Reduced VAT rates and exemptions largely 
explain why different VAT regimes can impact 
trade, despite the use of the destination system. 
Their use mostly reflects policy choices made in 
the past, often linked to distributional objectives. 
                                                          
(62) COM(2011) 206, 13 April 2011. 
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Using reduced VAT rates and exemptions is, 
however, debatable from an economic perspective, 
since consumption taxes are poor instruments for 
redistribution. The effect of reduced VAT rates to 
promote employment or the consumption of merit 
goods is not supported by empirical evidence, but 
reduced rates and exemptions generally tend to 
have a significant budgetary cost and increase the 
complexity of the system, thereby increasing 
administrative and compliance costs.  
Third, the study has found new evidence 
suggesting that differences in VAT regimes, 
exemptions and reduced rates generate high costs 
in terms of distortion and fragmentation of the 
 
internal market, probably higher than previously 
believed. This confirms the recommendations 
made under the Annual Growth Survey 2012, 
which stressed that there are potential welfare 
gains to be made by increasing the efficiency of 
VAT systems by limiting VAT exemptions, 
phasing out most VAT reduced rates and using 
alternative policy instruments to achieve their 
aims. 
The findings of the study and the outcome of the 
public consultation have provided the input for the 
Commission’s Communication on the future of 
VAT presented in December 2011 (see Box 4.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 4.1: Commission's Communication on the future of VAT
This Communication, which was first presented in December 2011, had a dual purpose. First, it set out the 
fundamental characteristics that must underlie a new VAT regime (long-term objectives). Secondly, it 
defined the priority actions that were needed for the coming years in order to create a simpler, more efficient 
and more robust VAT system in the EU, tailored to the single market (short- and medium-term). 
First, VAT needs to be simplified in order to make it more workable for businesses. A simpler, more 
transparent VAT system would relieve businesses of considerable administrative burdens and encourage 
greater cross-border trade. Second, VAT must be made more efficient in supporting Member States' fiscal 
consolidation efforts and sustainable economic growth. Broadening tax bases and limiting the use of reduced 
rates could generate new revenue for Member States without the need for rate increases. Third, the current 
huge revenue losses, that are due to uncollected VAT and fraud, need to be stopped. It is estimated that 
around 12% of the total VAT which should be collected is not (the so-called VAT Gap). 
Finally, the Commission has concluded that the long-standing issue of changing to a VAT system based on  
taxation at origin is no longer relevant. VAT will continue to be collected in the country of destination, and 
the Commission will work on creating a modern EU VAT system based on this principle.  
In its Conclusions adopted on 15 May 2012, the Council expressed its support for an EU VAT system which 
should be simpler, more efficient and neutral, as well as robust and fraud-proof. The Council also 
emphasized that the current financial and economic situation is difficult and complex, and requires strong 
fiscal consolidation of national budgets. This should be taken into account at EU level when implementing 
the objectives of the Communication on the future of VAT. The Council conclusions also invite the 
European Commission to continue its in-depth analytical work and to set directions for legislative works, 
and thus are important for the future reform of VAT. 
5. TAX POLICY CHALLENGES IN EU MEMBER STATES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 5.1: Benchmarking approach to identifying Member States that face a challenge in a 
particular tax policy area
In the horizontal screening applied in this Chapter, the GDP-weighted average of the EU-27 Member States is used as a 
reference point for benchmarking. A Member State is considered to have performed badly in a particular area if the 
indicator under consideration is significantly lower than the EU average after normalising, so that a high indicator 
corresponds to a good performance. This normalisation – not displayed in the tables – is key to calculate the two 
performance thresholds: ‘LAF plus’ and ‘LAF minus’, indicating a good and a poor performance respectively. The 
direction of performance needs to be indicated, and this is always a delicate normative exercise: is the high value of the 
original indicator indicative of a bad or a good performance? Each indicator may point to several different concepts and 
its interpretation depends on its purpose. For example, the tax-to-GDP ratio may indicate either the overall tax burden or 
the existence of ‘overall tax space’. 
A Member State is considered to have performed badly in a particular area, if the indicator is significantly worse than this 
average. Technically, being significantly worse means that the indicator is at least 0.4 standard deviations below the 
weighted EU average (after normalising). This approach captures the bottom third of total distribution under the normality 
assumption (i.e. the worst performers). It is applied in the LIME Assessment Framework – LAF (see European 
Commission, 2008). For the sake of simplicity, the wording ‘LAF plus’ and ‘LAF minus’ or ‘very high’ and ‘very low’ 
are used in the Chapter. If a high value of a – normally distributed – indicator refers to a good (bad) performance, the 
values above (below) ‘LAF plus’ capture the third best performers. The values below (above) ‘LAF minus’ capture the 
third worst performers. The values between ‘LAF plus’ and ‘LAF minus’ capture the third of the distribution which is not 
significantly different from the EU average.      
A more elaborate approach is applied if several indicators are used to assess whether a Member State faces a challenge in 
a particular policy area. In that case, the general approach is to consider that a country faces a challenge if at least one of 
the indicators is significantly below the average. Different rules are applied in the various policy areas concerning the 
required minimum level for the other indicator(s). A more detailed explanation is provided in the different sections of the 
chapter and in Boxes 5.2 and 5.3. 
While this mechanical screening is consistent across countries, it does not take country specificities into account. This also 
implies that Member States coming out as better than ‘LAF minus’ for a specific policy area could still face a challenge in 
that area. Hence, before firm policy conclusions can be drawn, an in-depth analysis would have to be carried out. 
However, such detailed country-specific scrutiny clearly lies outside the scope of this report. Moreover, countries not 
displaying a strong tax challenge may still require subtle policy adjustments, which would require a more detailed analysis 
of best practices than EU-27 average performances. Nevertheless, the ‘LAF plus’ value might be a first – and rough – 
screening device for identifying countries with good practices. 
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This chapter provides an analysis of 
macroeconomic challenges that individual EU 
Member States are facing in the field of taxation 
and tax policy. The purpose of this chapter serves 
to supplement understanding of Member States' 
tax systems, rather than to prescribe 
recommendations. The coverage is extended to all 
Member States, while last year's Tax Reforms 
Report only covered euro-area Members. It should 
be borne in mind that all EU Member States are 
covered by the European Semester, which also 
recommends sound national tax policies to favour 
growth and fiscal sustainability, while avoiding 
and correcting macroeconomic imbalances. This 
cross-country analysis is a first screening and 
needs to be qualified to take relevant country-
specific features into account.  
Member States are benchmarked using the so-
called Lisbon Assessment Framework (LAF) 
approach (as explained in more detail in Box 5.1). 
In short, a Member State is considered to face a 
challenge in a particular area of tax policy if it is 
amongst the worst performers, that is, the bottom 
third of the distribution (under normality 
assumption). (
63
) This approach is more restrictive 
than the one applied last year when the GDP-
weighted average (for the euro-area Member States 
only) was used as a benchmark. Certainly 
assessing countries against best practices would be 
also very useful but requires in-depth country 
specific examination, which is outside the scope of 
this report. In some limited cases, mainly for 
sustainability indicators, alternative well-
established benchmarks are used (instead of LAF). 
While revisions of challenges compared to last 
year's report are often due to recent reform efforts, 
they may also relate to the more restrictive 
screening approach, the revision of (backward-
looking) data and the improvement of the analysis, 
which has been dug deeper on various dimensions. 
                                                          
(63) Based on the sign of the indicator value, a high value 
corresponds to a good performance. All averages are GDP-
weighted unless otherwise indicated. 
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This chapter first of all updates and refines the 
analysis carried out in last year's report on the 
broad challenges linked to the contribution of 
taxation to fiscal consolidation or related to the 
need of growth-friendly tax structures (Section 
5.1). The chapter then identifies challenges linked 
to the broadening of tax bases in direct taxation 
and VAT (Section 5.2). Tax governance is the 
subject of Section 5.3. Specific issues are 
addressed in Section 5.4, namely challenges 
related to housing taxation and environmental 
taxation. In addition, this section also touches upon 
some redistributive aspects of the tax system in a 
non-normative way. Finally, Section 5.5 
summarises the results of the analysis and provides 
in a synoptic table an overview of the tax policy 
challenges faced by individual EU Member States. 
5.1. FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND GROWTH-
FRIENDLY TAX STRUCTURES 
Last year's edition of the report analysed two 
macroeconomic dimensions of taxation in detail: 
the sustainability of public finances and the 
growth-friendliness of tax structures. This section 
updates and refines the analysis aimed at 
identifying Member States that face overarching 
macroeconomic challenges relating to fiscal 
consolidation and growth-enhancing tax structures. 
As last year, Member States are subject to 
preliminary quantitative screening. Before drawing 
firm policy conclusions, it would, of course, be 
necessary to complement this with an in-depth 
country analysis, which is outside the scope of this 
first horizontal analysis. 
5.1.1. Consolidation on the revenue side 
In the current economic context, many Member 
States need to undertake significant consolidation 
efforts. This sub-section identifies those Member 
States that face sizeable consolidation needs and 
could consider increasing their tax revenues. 
Member States that are currently following an 
economic adjustment programme (Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal) are excluded from the analysis in 
this sub-section. The fiscal sustainability indicators 
used in this sub-section cannot replace detailed and 
frequent monitoring of debt sustainability carried 
out by the European Commission, the IMF and the 
ECB in the context of the adjustment programme. 
There is considered to be potential for using tax 
increases to help consolidation if: (i) tax-to-GDP 
ratio is relatively low, and (ii) at the same time 
there is scope for increasing the least distortionary 
taxes and/or the overall tax burden has not 
increased substantially (unless warranted by large 
consolidation needs). The section is based on the 
approach set out last year, which has been 
amended this year to take medium-term fiscal 
sustainability into account. The approach is 
summarised in Box 5.2 and is explained in more 
detail in Wöhlbier et al. (2012). Finally, the 
screening results are presented in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.1: Sustainability gap and primary balance 
 
Source: Commission services. 
 
As regards the fiscal sustainability of Member 
States, the values for the main indicator for long-
term fiscal sustainability, referred to as ‘S2’, were 
revised substantially in spring 2012, following the 
publication of the new age-related expenditures 
projections by the Commission and the Ageing 
Working Group. The S2 indicator (
64
) shows the 
adjustment to the current structural primary  
 
                                                          
(64) Last year's edition of the report includes a Box with an 
explanation of the concept of fiscal sustainability and of the 
S2 indicator (see European Commission, 2011b, p. 77). S2 
indicators used in this year's report have been calculated on 
the basis of the Commission services' 2012 Spring Forecast 
and the new age-related expenditures projections by the 
Commission and the Ageing Working Group of the 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC).  
 
 
Total
Initial Budgetary 
position
Ageing 
component
BE 6.2 7.5 0.5 7.0
DE 0.6 1.8 -0.5 2.3
EE -2.1 2.1 1.2 0.8
ES 3.7 4.3 2.3 2.0
FR 3.0 2.2 1.3 0.9
IT -0.9 -2.8 -3.4 0.5
CY 2.3 5.5 -0.2 5.7
LU 0.3 9.8 1.2 8.7
MT 2.9 6.1 1.3 4.8
NL 4.1 7.9 2.4 5.4
AT 2.3 3.7 0.2 3.5
SI 2.2 7.5 0.6 6.8
SK 4.4 8.6 3.5 5.1
FI 1.2 4.9 -0.3 5.1
BG -1.7 2.6 0.4 2.2
CZ 0.4 4.9 1.1 3.8
DK -0.6 3.3 0.5 2.9
LV -1.9 -0.7 0.9 -1.6
LT -0.1 4.3 0.8 3.5
HU -0.7 0.5 -0.5 1.0
PL -0.1 1.5 0.5 1.0
RO -1.5 3.6 0.1 3.5
SE -2.9 1.8 -1.1 2.9
UK 5.1 5.2 2.6 2.5
EU-27 2.2 2.9 0.7 2.3
EA-17 2.1 2.4 0.3 2.2
S2 - "long-term"
Country of which:
Sustainability gap indicators (2012)
S1 - "medium-
term"
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balance which is required to fulfil the infinite 
horizon inter-temporal budget constraint, including 
paying for any additional expenditures arising 
from an ageing population. It, therefore, considers 
the projected changes in age-related expenditures 
over a very long time horizon (to 2060). Moreover, 
unlike last year, an indicator of medium-term fiscal 
sustainability has been used, referred to later on as 
‘S1’.(65) S1 corresponds to the required adjustment 
                                                          
(65) The values of S1 and S2 are published in the Commission 
Staff Working Papers published for each Member States by 
the European Commission on 30 May 2012 to underpin the 
Country-specific Recommendations 2012-2013 for 
Stability, Growth and Jobs under the European Semester. 
of the primary balance until 2020 to reach a public 
debt of 60% of GDP – the debt threshold in the 
Treaty – by 2030. For the sake of a prudent 
assessment and as explained in Box 5.2, the 
analysis in this report considers that Member 
States need a strong fiscal adjustment to make their 
public finance sustainable if either the indicator of 
medium-term sustainability (S1) or that of long-
term sustainability (S2) is high according to the 
                                                                                   
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-
specific-recommendations/index_en.htm. 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 5.2: Screening principles to identify a potential need for tax-based consolidation
Quantitative screening on the basis of selected indicators is applied to Member States with a view to 
identifying countries that might consider using taxation – in addition to expenditure control – to consolidate 
their public finances and steer them onto a more sustainable path. Such screening should identify both a 
strong need for consolidation and the availability of tax space. The following screening criteria are 
considered:  
Fiscal sustainability problems 
1) Fiscal sustainability is considered problematic, if: 
(i) The indicator of fiscal sustainability gap in the medium-term, "S1", is high (more than 3, which 
corresponds to the very top of the indicator distribution).  
OR  
(ii) The indicator of fiscal sustainability gap in the long-term, "S2", is high (more than 6, which 
corresponds to the very top of the indicator distribution). This generally means that both the initial 
budgetary position component of the sustainability gap (i.e. the initial deficit) and the long-term 
budgetary projections of age-related expenditure are very unfavourable.  
Availability of tax space 
AND: 2) There is ‘overall tax space’ currently available (relatively low tax-to-GDP ratio). This main 
criterion needs to be met in conjunction with one of the two qualifying criteria below: 
AND EITHER: 2(a) There is still scope for increasing the least distortionary taxes (i.e. the share of 
consumption and/or recurrent property taxes in GDP is not (significantly) above average or there is scope for 
increasing environmental taxation; see Box 5.3 for details). 
OR: 2(b) The tax burden has not increased substantially in the recent past (i.e. no marked increase in 
tax-to-GDP ratios in the period 2009-2012). The distance between the structural deficit and its medium-term 
budgetary objective (MTO) is used as a supplementary indicator to check the magnitude of the tax increase in 
relative terms, i.e. compared with the current consolidation need. Thus, a country is considered not to have 
experienced a strong rise in its tax burden if the tax-to-GDP ratio increase is above LAF minus and the 
distance to the MTO is below average. 
A low current tax-to-GDP ratio in conjunction with a high fiscal sustainability gap does not necessarily point 
to a need to change the tax code by increasing tax rates or broadening tax bases. Higher tax revenues might 
also be achieved by improving tax compliance/administration and fighting tax evasion, without changing tax 
rules. Similarly, tax increases implemented in the recent past may not lead to equivalent increases in tax-to-
GDP ratios due to (higher) tax evasion and Laffer-Curve effects (negative feedback of higher taxes on output 
and employment, i.e. tax bases). 
European Commission 
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usual thresholds used in Commission 
Sustainability Report. (
66
) 
 
Table 5.2: Assessment of 'tax space' 
 
Note: The definition of the tax-to-GDP ratio applied is slightly broader 
than the one in Chapter 2, as it includes voluntary social security 
contributions and taxes assessed but unlikely to be collected. 
Source: Commission services (AMECO database, Commission’s 2012 
Spring Forecast).  
 
Based on this approach, Belgium, Spain, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia, 
Slovakia and the United Kingdom face particular 
consolidation challenges due to serious 
sustainability issues in the medium run or/and the 
long run. Among those Member States with high 
sustainability challenges, Spain, Malta, Slovenia 
and Slovakia show some overall 'tax space', which 
may be used to contribute to consolidation (on the 
revenue side). As shown in Tables 5.2, such 
Member States are characterised by a relatively 
low tax-to-GDP ratio. Moreover, they still have 
scope for increasing the least distortionary taxes 
and/or they have not increased taxes strongly in the 
2009-2012 period, unless the distance from the 
structural fiscal balance to the medium term 
budgetary objective (MTO) is relatively high. 
Using available tax space would be particularly 
relevant for these countries given the extent of the 
sustainability issue (see Table 5.1). (
67
) Based on 
                                                          
(66) For the methodological underpinning and updated results 
see European Commission (2012k). 
(67) The data, however, does not reflect the substantial tax 
increases decided upon by Spain in July 2012. 
the indicators in Table 5.1 and 5.2 the screening 
results are presented in Table 5.3. 
A more detailed discussion of which tax categories 
could be used to increase revenues (i.e. that have 
scope for increases) can be found in Sub-section 
5.1.2. Of course, while further detailed country 
specific analysis is necessary to ascertain the 
results below, some countries with little tax space 
(reflected in a relatively high overall tax burden) 
may still need to raise taxes further – in addition to 
curbing public expenditures significantly – to meet 
their consolidation challenges, at least in the short 
to medium run. 
 
Table 5.3: Overview: fiscal consolidation challenges 
 
Note: For an explanation which Member States are considered to have 
scope to increase least distortionary taxes see Table 5.8. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
5.1.2. Promoting growth-enhancing tax 
structures 
In many Member States, a high tax burden on 
labour, especially on those groups that face a 
particularly weak attachment to the labour market, 
coexists with relatively low levels of those taxes 
considered less detrimental to growth, i.e. 
consumption taxes, recurrent property taxes and 
environmental taxes. (
68
) This indicates that there 
is room for a shift away from labour taxes to other  
 
                                                          
(68) Consumption taxes include excise duties on tobacco and 
alcohol. These are part of the so-called 'sin taxes' and 
meant to reduce their consumption and related health 
problems. A possible complement for recurrent property 
taxes could be raising inheritance taxes which are very low 
in some countries. 
Overall tax 
space: tax-to-
GDP ratio
No 'Tax Fatigue': 
Change in tax-to-
GDP ratio
Distance 
to MTO
2012 2009-12 2012
BE 45.1 X 1.9 3.2
DE 39.4 X -0.2 -0.1
EE 32.8 (X) -3.1 0.8
ES 31.8 X 1.1 4.8
FR 44.7 X 2.7 3.2
IT 44.8 X 1.8 0.7
CY 37.8 (X) 2.2 2.7
LU 37.9 X 0.2 1.1
MT 35.2 X 0.9 3.5
NL 38.8 0.5 1.9
AT 42.6 X 0.1 1.7
SI 37.7 (X) 0.1 2.2
SK 28.8 X -0.2 3.9
FI 43.3 0.4 0.2
BG 27.4 (X) -1.6 0.2
CZ 35.4 X 1.8 0.8
DK 47.2 -0.6 1.2
LV 28.0 X 1.3 1.7
LT 26.6 X -2.6 3.4
HU 38.2 (X) -2.1 0.6
PL 33.8 2.0 1.8
RO 27.8 X 0.8 1.1
SE 45.0 -1.9 -1.3
UK 37.9 (X) 2.0 ---
EU-27 39.8 1.1 1.5
EA-17 40.4 1.2 1.9
LAF plus 37.9 0.6 ---
LAF minus 41.8 1.6 ---
Country
Room to 
increase least 
distortionary 
taxes
Country
 Potential need for 
higher tax revenues 
to help consolidation 
Overall 'tax space' 
available (low tax-
to-GDP ratio)
No significant 
increase in tax-to-
GDP ratio in recent 
years
Scope for 
(further) 
increasing least 
distortionary 
taxes
BE X X X
DE X X
EE X X (X)
ES X X X X
FR X X
IT X
CY X X (X)
LU X X X
MT X X X X
NL X X
AT X X
SI X X X (X)
SK X X X X
FI X
BG X X (X)
CZ X X
DK X
LV X X X
LT X X X
HU X (X)
PL X X
RO X X X
SE X
UK X X (X)
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tax bases. Certainly, in some Member States the 
fiscal consolidation constraints are so demanding 
that a reduction in labour taxes becomes very 
difficult. However, even those Member States that 
need to increase revenues to contribute to fiscal 
consolidation should consider a shift within the 
overall tax burden in order to limit the detrimental 
effect of the overall higher tax burden on the 
economy. Shifting the tax burden towards indirect 
taxation might require accompanying policies to 
strengthen tax compliance, which may be more 
problematic for consumption taxes. (
69
) 
Box 5.3 outlines the horizontal quantitative 
screening principles used to identify countries that 
have both a need and room for improving the 
structure of taxation to enhance growth. This sub-
section first identifies Member States that have a 
particular need to reduce (overall or group-
specific) labour taxation and then highlights those 
countries that appear to have particular scope for 
increasing taxes which are the least detrimental for 
growth. (
70
) 
High tax burden on labour – need for a shift 
The overall tax burden on labour, as measured by 
the implicit tax rate on labour and the tax wedge at 
average earnings, is considered to be particularly 
high in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, 
Finland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Sweden 
(see Table 5.4). However, it is necessary to look 
also at output indicators to assess the importance 
of a labour tax reduction. Of the abovementioned 
countries, Germany, Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
have an employment rate significantly above the 
EU-27 average (above LAF plus), and with the 
exception of Finland, also above the Europe 2020 
employment target of 75%. For these countries, the 
issue of high labour costs still remains but is 
considered to be less problematic in the screening 
analysis when analysing the overall tax burden.  
It is, however, important to place a special 
emphasis on specific labour market groups that 
face particular employment problems and are at 
the same time considered to be rather responsive to 
labour supply disincentives created by a higher 
                                                          
(69) See, e.g., Watrin and Ullman (2008). 
(70) This sub-section focuses on the main results, whereas a 
more detailed analysis can be found in Wöhlbier et al. 
(2012). 
after-tax wage: low-skilled workers (
71
) and second 
earners. 
 
Table 5.4: Tax burden on labour and overall labour market 
situation 
 
Notes: Employment rate and unemployment rate (20 to 64 years), 
tax wedge of single earner without children at 100 % of the average 
wage for full-time work (AW), implicit tax rate on employed labour; 
* data for the tax wedge refer to 2010 in the case of Bulgaria, Greece, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Malta and Romania, and 2007 in the case of Cyprus.  
Source: Commission services, OECD. 
 
Low-skilled workers also face difficulties with 
employability given their supposedly high labour 
costs (including labour taxes) compared with their 
productivity. Other groups that are often seen to be 
facing particular labour market problems, in 
particular young workers and older workers will 
not be discussed here. It is generally considered 
that the tax burden is not one of the key drivers of 
these problems. (
72
) Table 5.5 nevertheless also 
  
                                                          
(71) In this document, low-skilled and low wage earners are 
used as synonyms although it is well understood that low 
wage earners are not necessarily the same as low-skilled 
workers, partly due to a trend towards over-qualification. 
(72) Reducing the tax burden is not the best way to address the 
problems faced by young and older workers. Older 
workers' disincentives to work may be due to their wage 
career rather than the supposedly declining age-
productivity profile and encouragement to retire earlier. 
Unemployment among young workers is the result of a 
wealth of complex factors, ranging from labour protection 
 
Country
Employment 
rate (2011)
Unemployment 
rate (2011)
Implicit tax 
rate on labour 
(2010)
Tax wedge 
(100% 
AW, 2011)
BE 67.3 6.9 42.5 55.5
DE 76.3 5.9 37.4 49.8
EE 70.4 12.3 37.0 40.1
IE 64.1 14.1 26.1 26.8
EL 59.9 17.6 31.3 38.0
ES 61.6 21.1 33.0 39.9
FR 69.1 8.9 41.0 49.4
IT 61.2 8.1 42.6 47.6
CY 73.8 7.7 27.0 13.9*
LU 70.1 4.8 32.0 36.0
MT 61.5 5.7 21.7 22.4*
NL 77.0 4.0 36.9 37.8
AT 75.2 3.9 40.5 48.4
PT 69.1 12.8 23.4 39.0
SI 68.4 8.2 35.0 42.5
SK 65.1 13.1 32.0 38.9
FI 73.8 7.1 39.3 42.7
BG 63.9 10.9 24.4 32.5*
CZ 70.9 6.5 39.0 42.5
DK 75.7 7.0 34.8 38.4
LV 67.2 15.3 32.5 44.2*
LT 67.2 15.4 31.7 40.7*
HU 60.7 10.9 39.4 49.4
PL 64.8 9.5 30.1 34.3
RO 62.8 7.4 27.4 44.3*
SE 80.0 6.6 39.0 42.8
UK 73.6 7.0 25.7 32.5
EU-27 70.1 8.7 36.0 43.7
EA-17 69.3 9.1 38.1 46.4
LAF plus 72.5 6.9 33.7 40.9
LAF minus 67.6 10.5 38.3 46.6
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presents data on the unemployment rate of young 
workers whose labour market situation has 
deteriorated dramatically in several Member States 
since the beginning of the crisis. 
On the basis of the indicators presented in Table 
5.5, in particular Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, 
Austria, Latvia, Hungary, Romania, and Sweden 
are faced with the challenge of reducing the tax 
burden on low-skilled workers. (
73
) Austria and 
                                                                                   
legislation to wage gaps for a supposedly inexperienced 
segment of the population and labour market mismatches. 
Thus, these two groups are not referred to in the taxation 
annex of the 2012 AGS, although they are stressed in the 
2012 AGS itself. 
(73) Given that the indicators look at specific wage levels, they 
do not reflect potential measures aimed at reducing labour 
Sweden, however, show relatively high 
employment rates for low-skilled workers, which 
is again reflected in the screening. (
74
)  
Turning to second earners, the data in Table 5.5 
show that in Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands there are specific disincentives to 
return to work from inactivity and to increase the 
number of hours worked, whereas in Latvia the tax 
disincentives to return to the labour market from 
                                                                                   
supply disincentives and/or labour costs at lower wage 
levels, as, e.g., in place in Belgium and France. 
(74) For a discussion of which components of the tax burden 
should be reduced – which of course depends on the 
specific Member State – see last year's report. Generally, a 
reduction of employers' social security contributions has a 
direct impact on labour costs, at least in the short term. 
 
Table 5.5: Labour market situation of and tax burden on specific groups 
 
Notes: (1) Employment rate and unemployment rate of low-skilled workers (25-54 years, pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education - 
levels 0-2, ISCED 1997), long-term unemployment in % of active population. Tax wedge, inactivity trap and unemployment trap for single worker 
with no children at 67 % of average earnings. *Tax wedge data for the indicators measuring the disincentives to work refer to 2010 in the case of 
Bulgaria, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, and Romania and 2007 in the case of Cyprus. (2) Unemployment rate of young workers (15-24) (3) 
Employment rate for age group 25-54. Inactivity trap for second earner in two-earner couple with two children, principal earner with 67% of average 
wage, second earner with 67%, low-wage trap for second earner in two-earner couple with two children, principal earner with 67% of average wage, 
second earner moving from 33% to 67% of average wage. Data for the traps refer to 2009 in the case of Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, and 
Romania. No detailed breakdown of the contribution from labour taxes to the low-wage trap is available. 'Contribution from labour taxes' refers to the 
contribution to the respective trap in percentage points. Inactivity includes household work. 
Source: Commission services, OECD. 
 
 
Labour market 
performance
Tax wedge 
(67% AW)
2011 2011 2011 2011
BE 59.3 49.7 66.8 35.5 92.7 35.5 18.7 73.8 84.9 46.5 46.5 59.2
DE 62.0 45.6 65.6 34.4 74.7 34.4 8.6 77.8 87.7 47.8 43.8 55.2
EE 55.1 38.8 46.3 17.6 62.7 12.7 22.3 74.8 81.5 23.2 23.2 23.2
IE 48.8 21.3 78.5 7.9 78.2 7.5 29.4 64.8 74.1 40.6 11.0 14.5
EL 62.4 35.6 5.9 16.0 60.8 16.0 44.4 57.7 80.0 30.4 16.0 19.1
ES 57.9 36.6 44.7 17.5 83.2 13.2 46.4 62.7 74.5 23.1 23.1 28.4
FR 68.2 46.5 61.2 26.1 77.0 19.3 22.1 76.2 86.7 38.8 25.4 49.6
IT 61.2 44.5 24.5 24.5 78.3 21.7 29.1 58.9 83.4 39.7 30.7 38.8
CY 74.9 11.9* --- --- --- --- 22.4 76.6 86.5 --- --- ---
LU 73.9 29.2 69.7 16.6 85.7 5.7 16.8 72.9 90.8 32.9 22.5 54.9
MT 59.9 18.1* 59.1 12.0 58.6 12.0 13.7 50.6 89.7 32.9 16.2 19.7
NL 71.5 33.1 82.0 32.7 83.7 8.7 7.6 79.0 89.4 45.7 38.2 60.3
AT 69.2 43.7 65.2 26.3 66.8 26.3 8.3 80.2 89.6 28.8 28.8 38.1
PT 73.4 33.1 36.3 16.8 79.2 16.8 30.1 74.1 81.6 21.3 19.2 21.7
SI 62.9 38.5 60.2 28.7 83.2 13.2 15.7 81.3 84.8 52.4 28.7 44.8
SK 36.9 36.1 40.3 17.6 67.6 17.6 33.2 70.4 82.6 21.8 21.8 26.7
FI 65.8 37.2 68.6 25.3 72.2 13.9 20.1 79.6 84.8 27.6 25.3 51.4
BG 43.5 32.5* 37.7 20.9 80.9 20.9 26.6 73.0 75.0 20.9 20.9 20.9
CZ 54.8 39.5 62.2 18.2 80.0 18.2 18.0 74.3 90.9 33.2 25.4 47.6
DK 69.9 36.8 86.8 26.3 89.2 11.6 14.2 78.9 85.7 79.0 27.4 40.9
LV 55.7 43.5* 59.5 29.9 89.9 29.9 29.1 75.4 76.2 34.9 34.9 32.7
LT 41.0 38.8* 44.0 19.7 69.8 19.7 32.9 78.3 76.3 49.4 19.7 26.3
HU 46.0 45.2 49.9 27.8 82.1 22.1 26.1 66.6 79.6 31.0 27.8 38.3
PL 52.7 33.4 51.5 27.0 81.9 21.4 25.8 71.4 83.0 42.2 23.4 35.6
RO 57.2 43.1* 36.9 27.1 70.6 27.1 23.7 67.4 80.7 32.9 28.2 30.6
SE 69.2 40.7 69.8 28.8 74.7 9.8 22.9 83.2 88.8 22.5 28.8 40.4
UK 62.5 28.5 50.0 22.6 50.0 22.6 21.1 74.5 85.9 46.8 22.6 58.4
EU-27 62.8 40.2 54.6 26.3 74.0 22.1 21.6 72.6 84.9 40.4 30.2 46.4
EA-17 63.4 42.6 54.4 27.0 77.6 22.7 21.6 71.8 84.7 39.2 32.1 45.4
LAF plus 65.1 35.9 47.6 23.8 69.4 18.8 17.2 75.4 86.5 36.8 26.6 42.3
LAF minus 60.6 43.0 61.4 28.7 78.4 25.3 26.0 69.6 83.3 44.7 33.7 51.8
Tax burden on low-wage earners and labour market situation of low-skilled 
(1)
of which 
contribution 
from labour 
tax
of which 
contribution 
from labour 
tax
20102011
Inactivity trap (67% 
AW)
2010
Employment 
rate - male
2010
Inactivity trap (67% 
AW)
of which 
contribution 
from labour 
tax
Unemployment 
rate (youth)
Unemployment trap 
(67% AW)
Country
Tax burden on second earners and female labour market situation 
(3)
Employment 
rate (low-skilled)
Disincentives to work Labour market performance Disincentives to work
Low-wage 
trap (33% to 
67% AW, 
2010) 
Youth labour 
market 
performance (2)
Employment 
rate - female 
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inactivity are high. The labour market situation of 
second earners, taking the female employment rate 
as a proxy, is, however, significantly better than 
the EU-27 average in Germany, the Netherlands 
and Latvia. Again this is reflected in the screening. 
The employment rate, however, does not capture 
the number of hours worked, which is another 
important indicator of labour underutilisation. In 
particular, the average number of hours worked is 
low for second-earners in the Netherlands, while 
the share of women working full-time is low in 
Germany. 
Room for manoeuvre– potential to increase 
consumption, property or environmental taxes  
Member States are considered to have room to 
shift taxes away from labour if their tax burden is 
relatively low in at least one of the following three 
areas: consumption taxes, recurrent property taxes 
or environmental taxes. All of these tax categories 
have been found to be among those which are the 
least detrimental to growth.  
By far the broadest tax base to which a tax shift 
could be considered is consumption. As measured 
by the share of consumption taxes in GDP in 2010, 
revenues from consumption taxes are particularly 
low in Ireland (
75
), Spain, Italy, Luxembourg and 
Slovakia and are also below the EU-27 average in 
Belgium, Germany, France, the Czech Republic 
and Latvia (see Table 5.6). In addition to those 
countries, Greece, Portugal, Lithuania and the UK 
as well as Cyprus, Malta and Romania had a tax 
burden on consumption below the EU-27 average 
in 2010, as measured by the implicit tax rate on 
consumption. (
76
) Moreover, in France there is a 
large gap between the tax burden on labour and 
consumption, as measured by the two implicit tax 
rates, clearly above the EU-27 average. Hence, 
there appears to be potential room for shifting 
taxation from labour to consumption. 
However, as the data used in the screening stop in 
2010, there is a need to take into account the often 
substantial tax reforms implemented in 2011 and 
early 2012 and presented in Chapter 3. As a rough 
                                                          
(75) The rather low value is also due to a high share of 
multinational companies in the Irish economy and a 
comparison of consumption taxes to GNI would provide a 
more favourable picture. 
(76) For an explanation of the concept of implicit tax rates see 
Glossary and Chapter 2. 
proxy for the impact of these changes on revenues 
from consumption taxes, the change in revenues 
from indirect taxes over the 2010-2012 period is 
used. (
77
) Among those countries found to have the 
potential to increase consumption taxes, revenues 
from indirect taxes are forecast to increase by more 
than one percentage point in Italy, Malta and 
Portugal and by more than 0.5 percentage points in 
Greece, France, the Czech Republic, Romania and 
the United Kingdom. (
78
) Assuming that these 
increases are confirmed and indeed linked to 
higher consumption taxes, they would tend to limit 
the actual scope for future increases. This points to 
the need for further country-specific analysis, as 
this dimension is not factored into the screening. 
When considering increases in consumption taxes 
it is important to see in which sub-category (VAT, 
excise duties on alcohol and tobacco or energy) 
Member States have a particular scope for 
increasing revenues, as was done in last year's 
report.(
79
) 
 
Table 5.6: Indirect and consumption taxes 
 
Note: The last column shows the difference between the ITR on labour 
and the ITR on consumption. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
                                                          
(77) Indirect taxes are broader than consumption taxes as they 
also include revenues from other taxes, in particular large 
parts of property tax revenues, some additional smaller 
environmental taxes, stamp taxes and payroll taxes. 
(78) The data does not include the increase in VAT in Spain 
applicable since 1 September 2012. 
(79) The scope for increases in environmental taxes is discussed 
below. For a detailed discussion on which consumption 
taxes could be increased, see Wöhlbier et al. (2012). 
Share of 
consumption 
taxes in total 
taxation
Consumptio
n taxes as % 
of GDP
ITR on 
consumption
Gap: ITR on 
labour and 
consumption
2012
change  
2008-12
2012
change 
2010-12
2010
BE 28.7 0.4 12.9 0.1 24.7 10.9 21.4 21.1
DE 28.9 1.1 11.4 0.3 28.4 10.8 19.8 17.6
EE 42.4 4.8 13.9 0.0 39.8 13.6 25.6 11.4
IE 39.5 -2.2 11.5 0.1 35.5 10.0 21.6 4.5
EL 39.1 0.4 12.8 0.8 38.9 12.1 15.8 15.5
ES 30.8 1.1 9.8 -0.6 27.2 8.7 14.6 18.4
FR 35.0 0.4 15.6 0.8 25.6 10.9 19.3 21.7
IT 34.5 2.4 15.5 1.4 24.2 10.2 16.8 25.8
CY 39.9 -6.7 15.1 -0.4 37.8 13.5 18.8 8.1
LU 31.6 -1.5 12.0 0.2 26.8 9.9 27.3 4.7
MT 43.4 1.2 15.3 1.6 39.5 13.2 18.9 2.8
NL 29.6 -1.5 11.5 -0.6 31.0 12.0 27.0 9.9
AT 33.9 0.9 14.5 0.0 28.1 11.8 21.4 19.1
PT 43.6 0.7 14.8 1.4 37.1 11.7 17.4 6.1
SI 38.3 0.7 14.4 0.1 37.5 14.2 24.1 10.9
SK 36.5 1.0 10.5 0.3 36.1 10.1 17.7 14.4
FI 33.0 3.1 14.3 1.0 31.2 13.1 25.2 14.0
BG 53.3 -0.7 14.6 -0.2 53.0 14.5 22.8 1.6
CZ 34.2 3.6 12.1 0.9 32.3 10.9 21.1 17.9
DK 36.1 0.5 17.0 0.3 31.5 15.0 31.5 3.3
LV 42.1 4.9 11.8 0.5 39.5 10.8 17.3 15.2
LT 44.8 6.9 11.9 0.1 42.5 11.5 18.2 13.5
HU 45.6 6.9 17.4 0.5 39.2 14.8 27.2 12.2
PL 41.4 0.2 14.0 0.4 38.6 12.3 20.2 9.9
RO 45.6 4.0 12.7 0.8 42.4 11.5 18.9 8.5
SE 41.3 2.9 18.6 0.7 29.0 13.3 28.1 10.9
UK 35.4 4.3 13.4 0.7 31.5 11.2 18.4 7.3
EU-27 33.9 1.6 13.5 0.5 29.1 11.0 19.7 16.3
EA-17 32.5 0.9 13.1 0.4 27.7 10.7 19.2 18.9
LAF plus 35.6 2.3 14.3 0.7 30.7 11.5 21.0 13.4
LAF minus 32.2 0.9 12.6 0.3 27.4 10.5 18.2 18.7
Country
2010
Share of indirect taxes 
in total taxation
Indirect taxes as % of 
GDP
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Box 5.3: Screening principles when identifying a potential need, and room, for a tax shift
Quantitative screening on the basis of selected indicators is applied to Member States with a view to 
identifying countries that might consider shifting taxation away from labour. Such screening should identify 
both a need for a reduction in labour taxation and the availability of tax space for specific tax categories. The 
following screening criteria are considered:   
Need to reduce labour taxation 
Labour taxation is problematically high if: 
1(a) The ‘overall tax burden on labour’ is very high (significantly above the average, i.e. above LAF 
minus). This is considered the case if either the implicit tax rate (ITR) on labour or the tax wedge at average 
earnings are significantly above the average, with the other indicator not being significantly below this 
average. 
OR: 1(b) The tax burden on specific labour market groups is very high (low-skilled workers and/or 
second earners). The assessment is based on different tax wedge and trap indicators. 
The tax burden on low-skilled workers is considered very high if 
(i) the tax wedge on low-skilled workers is very high (significantly above the average) 
AND/OR 
(ii) labour taxes contribute to a high inactivity trap and/or a high unemployment trap (with the 
contribution from labour taxes to the other trap not being significantly below the average). 
The tax burden on second-earners is considered very high if   
(i) the contribution from labour taxation to the inactivity trap is very high 
AND/OR 
(ii) the low-wage trap is very high (with the contribution from labour taxes to the inactivity trap not being 
very low. The low-wage trap acts as a disincentive for the second-earner to work full-time, instead of 
part-time). 
If the employment level is very high (either overall or for specific groups), a very high tax burden is still an 
issue, but less problematic. 
Scope for increasing the least distortionary taxes 
There is still scope for increasing the least distortionary taxes. Increasing taxes does not necessarily point to a 
need to increase tax rates. The result could also be achieved by a broadening of tax bases, while paying 
attention to enhance tax compliance effectively in the short- to medium-term. 
AND EITHER: 2(a) There is scope for increasing consumption taxes. This means that: 
(i) the share of consumption taxes in % of GDP is (significantly) below the EU average, 
OR 
(ii) the ITR on consumption is (significantly) below the EU average 
OR 
(iii) the gap between the ITR rate on labour and consumption is very high and the ITR on consumption 
not yet very high. 
OR: 2(b) There is scope for increasing recurrent taxes on housing (i.e. the share of revenues from 
recurrent tax on housing in GDP is significantly below average). 
OR: 2(c) There is scope for increasing environmental taxation (i.e. either the share of revenues from 
environmental taxes or the ITR on energy are significantly below average with the other indicator not being 
significantly above it). 
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The rise of consumption taxes might lead to a rise 
in price levels, translating into higher inflation in 
the short run. This may (partly) counteract the cut 
in labour costs from the tax shift, depending on the 
response of wages to prices. 
A second category of less growth-harmful taxation 
is recurrent property taxes, although substantially 
smaller in revenue terms than consumption taxes. 
In terms of revenues, those are particularly low in 
Malta, Luxembourg, Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Germany and Slovenia (see Graph 5.7 in 
Sub-section 5.4.1). Those Member States could 
raise revenues by 0.4% of GDP or more by 
bringing revenue in line with the EU-27     
average. (
80
) However, taxes on imputed rent, the 
revenue from which are not included in the data, 
are applied in the Netherlands and Luxembourg 
and could explain the very low revenue from 
recurrent taxes on immovable property in these 
countries. As discussed in Sub-section 5.4.2, 
revenue from recurrent housing taxes should, first 
of all, be increased by bringing the cadastral values 
of housing in line with market values. Tax rates 
should only be increased as a second step.  
The third tax category which has been found to be 
less detrimental to growth is that of environmental 
taxes, in particular those falling on consumption. 
Moreover, as discussed in more detail in Sub-
section 5.4.2 they can help to reach environmental 
targets. There is potential to raise revenue both 
through tax increases as well as through reducing 
tax expenditure in this area, i.e. by reforming 
environmentally harmful subsidies. Revenue 
expectations should not be too high, however. 
Based on the criteria outlined in Box 5.3 and the 
data provided in Table 5.7, Belgium, Greece, 
Spain, France, Austria, Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania seem 
particularly apt to increase revenues from 
environmental taxes. (
81
)  
                                                          
(80) Countries that are below, but not significantly below, the 
EU-27 average are not looked into here as the EU-27 
average is partly driven by the United Kingdom. The      
EU-27 average excluding the UK would be rather in line 
with LAF minus. 
(81) The two indicators shown in Table 5.7 are both used for the 
assessment. Each one has its own weaknesses. 
Environmental (or energy) tax revenue as a % of GDP does 
not take into account the level of energy consumption in a 
country and, therefore, does not measure a 'true' tax burden. 
 
Table 5.7: Tax burden on the environment 
 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Summary findings on the need and potential 
for tax shifting 
Based on the screening summarised in Table 5.8, 
Belgium, France, Italy, the Czech Republic, Latvia 
and Romania in particular and, to a lesser extent, 
Germany, Austria, and Hungary face the challenge 
of reducing the tax burden on labour (either overall 
or for specific groups) and at the same time appear 
to have room to increase taxes which are less 
detrimental to growth. Thus, these Member States 
should analyse in greater detail whether to shift the 
tax burden away from labour and if so, how. 
In this analysis, Member States need also to take 
into account the effect of such a shift on tax 
compliance, which, in some countries, might be 
more difficult to ensure in the area of indirect 
taxation than direct taxation. Therefore, tax shifts 
should go hand in hand with measures to improve 
tax compliance, namely in the area of VAT and 
                                                                                   
In the case of the implicit tax rate on energy, it is not the 
whole base (level of energy consumption) that is actually 
taxed: i.e. transport is heavily taxed in most countries, 
while energy use for heating and industrial production is 
taxed much less or exempt. Therefore, Member States with, 
in relative terms, a large low taxed industrial sector and 
low, or not taxed, heating use appear 'bad'. Moreover, an 
increased use of (untaxed) renewable energy over time (as 
set out in the energy/climate policy) leads to a lower 
indicator and hence a weaker performance. 
Country
Environmental taxes as % of 
GDP, 2010
 Implicit tax rates on energy, 
2009
BE 2.1 125.2
DE 2.2 215.4
EE 3.0 127.5
IE 2.4 198.3
EL 2.4 135.5
ES 1.6 154.2
FR 1.8 178.8
IT 2.6 259.4
CY 2.9 142.1
LU 2.4 210.1
MT 3.1 195.5
NL 4.0 231.9
AT 2.4 169.5
PT 2.5 175.3
SI 3.6 226.8
SK 1.9 100.7
FI 2.8 129.1
BG 2.9 108.6
CZ 2.4 130.6
DK 4.0 330.9
LV 2.4 97.1
LT 1.9 116.4
HU 2.6 112.6
PL 2.6 106.8
RO 2.1 86.1
SE 2.8 210.0
UK 2.6 220.9
EU-27 2.4 198.5
EA-17 2.3 198.3
LAF plus 2.6 217.0
LAF minus 2.1 179.9
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other indirect taxes. The effect on income 
redistribution – discussed in more detail in Sub-
section 5.4.3 – also needs to be taken into 
consideration. 
 
Table 5.8: Overview: tax structure indicators 
 
Note: High tax burden on specific labour market groups in a Member 
State either refers to low-skilled workers or second earners in couples or 
both. (X) depicts borderline cases. Member States are considered to 
have a room to shift if consumption tax indicators are very low (below 
LAF minus), if they are low (below average) combined with a very low 
burden on at least one of the two other potential bases for tax shifts, or if 
the burden on at least one of the other bases is very low with the burden 
on the other one being low. Member States are considered to have 
limited room for a tax shift if at least one of the indicators signals some 
potential to shift. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
5.2. BROADENING TAX BASES 
There is wide agreement that broader tax bases 
allow for lower tax rates and, therefore, help to 
reduce the distortionary effects of taxation. (
82
) As 
discussed in Chapter 3, in recent years many 
Member States have implemented measures aimed 
at broadening tax bases via a reduction in tax 
expenditures. Tax expenditures not only reduce the 
amount of revenues collected and tend to lower the 
efficiency of the tax system; they also increase 
compliance costs and the costs of tax collection 
(see Section 5.3). However, a reduction is often 
difficult, notably for political reasons. 
                                                          
(82) See, e.g. OECD (2010b). 
Tax expenditures can be defined as ‘…provisions 
of tax law, regulation or practices that reduce or 
postpone revenue for a comparatively narrow 
population of taxpayers relative to a benchmark 
tax.’ (Anderson, 2008). As stressed in last year's 
edition of the report and in OECD (2010a), it is 
difficult to distinguish unambiguously tax 
expenditures from what is considered to be a norm, 
as the latter is loosely defined. This makes 
international comparisons very difficult. (
83
) 
Moreover, estimates of tax expenditures, based on 
micro studies, are not available for all Member 
States and not consistent across countries. 
It is important that Member States regularly inform 
the public about the cost of tax expenditures in 
terms of revenues foregone and that they assess to 
what extent the original objectives are still being 
met or if they could be met via other means at a 
lower cost. The redistributive effects (
84
) of tax 
expenditures are also important as several of these 
items tend to benefit high-income households and 
therefore have a regressive effect. It also needs to 
be ensured that such tax expenditures do not 
constitute illegal state aid under Art. 107       
TFEU. (
85
) Tax measures meeting the cumulative 
criteria of Art. 107 TFEU are subject to a system 
of prior Commission authorisation and Member 
States may not put the proposed aid measures into 
effect until the Commission has approved them. 
When designing their tax measures and especially 
differential tax treatments, Member States 
therefore have to assess the need to notify the 
Commission, in particular where such tax 
measures introduce favourable tax treatment for 
certain categories of undertakings or for the 
production of certain goods. 
This section analyses tax expenditure in 
personal and corporate income taxation, looks into 
the debt bias in corporate taxation, and assesses the 
efficiency of the VAT system in Member States. 
                                                          
(83) See OECD (2010a and 2010b) for a discussion of the 
difficulties of measuring tax expenditure. 
(84) For an analysis of redistributive aspects of the tax system 
see Sub-section 5.4.3. 
(85) Article 107(1) TFEU state that 'any aid granted by a 
Member State or through state resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects 
trade between Member States, be incompatible with the 
Internal Market'. 
Overall
Specific 
groups
Low 
consumption 
taxes
Low 
recurrent 
taxes on 
housing 
Low tax 
burden on the 
environment
BE X X (X) X X
DE (X) (X) (X) X (X)
EE X
IE X
EL X X X
ES X X
FR X X X X X
IT X X X X
CY (X)
LU X
MT (X) X
NL (X)
AT (X) (X) X X (X)
PT X
SI X
SK X X X
FI (X)
BG X
CZ X (X) X X X
DK
LV X (X) X X
LT X X X
HU X X X (X)
PL
RO X (X) X X
SE (X) (X)
UK (X)
Country
High tax burden on 
labour
Need and 
room for 
tax shift
Potential to shift
5. Tax policy challenges in EU Member States 
 
67 
5.2.1. Reviewing tax expenditures in personal 
and corporate income taxation 
This sub-section restates the main findings of last 
year's report on tax expenditure in personal income 
taxation (
86
) and analyses in more detail tax 
expenditure in corporate income taxation. 
Personal income tax expenditures 
The analysis contained in last year's report 
highlighted those euro-area countries for which 
OECD data or other specific information on levels 
of tax expenditure in the area of personal income 
taxation are available. According to this      
analysis (
87
), Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, France 
and Austria as well as Belgium need to review 
their tax expenditure in personal income taxation 
given their scale and the overall revenue foregone 
(as a % of total revenue from personal income 
taxes). In general, several Member States have 
implemented base-broadening measures in recent 
years but no updated data on tax expenditure levels 
have been published by the OECD since. (
88
) In 
addition to the above mentioned euro-area Member 
States, OECD data points to high levels of tax 
expenditure in two non-euro-area Member States, 
namely the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, 
Poland. In both these countries, tax expenditures 
amounted to around 20% (in 2007-08) and around 
11% (in 2007) of revenues from personal income 
taxation, respectively. Given the lack of 
(comparable) data it is important that those 
Member States that have not published data yet, 
step up their efforts to do so. Moreover, it is 
important that individual tax expenditure items are 
assessed regularly. 
Corporate tax expenditures 
Tax expenditures are also widely used for 
corporate tax purposes. An important distinction 
should be drawn between those affecting the tax 
rate and those impacting the tax base. 
                                                          
(86) Tax expenditure items related to housing taxation are 
discussed in more detail in Sub-section 5.4.1. 
(87) The data does not take into account all the specific features 
of the national tax system. 
(88) Portugal has, e.g. in line with the Memorandum of 
Understanding started to substantially reduce tax 
expenditure in personal income taxation (see European 
Commission, 2012l). 
Reduced tax rates and special regimes 
Many Member States favour specific companies 
by granting them reduced corporate income tax 
rates or special regimes. Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 
show which Member States make use of reduced 
tax rates to support particular types of companies, 
regions or sectors. In most cases, these reduced 
rates are provided for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), for companies operating in 
economically-distressed regions or for companies 
operating in specific economic sectors. 
 
Table 5.9: Reduced corporate income tax rate for small 
businesses (2012) 
 
Notes: (1) As of 2011, companies in Spain that grow above the limits 
applicable for small companies can benefit from the lower rate for three 
years after losing their small-business status. 
Source: Commission services, national authorities. 
 
Country
Standard 
rate
Reduced 
rates for 
SMEs
Eligibility criteria for reduced rates / 
thresholds for lower rates
Companies that fulfil a number of 
conditions relating to the activities of 
the company, the shareholding of the 
company, the rate of return of 
distributed profits and the remuneration 
of their managers benefit from reduced 
rates.
24.25% profits of up to €25,000
31% profits between €25,000 and €90,000
34.50% profits between €90,000 and €322,500
25%
Companies with a turnover below €10 
million. Only on a taxable base of up to 
€300,000.(1)
20%
In 2009-2012: micro-enterprises with a 
turnover less than €5 million, 
employing fewer than 25 employees and 
maintaining or increasing employment. 
Only on a taxable base of up to 
€300,000.
FR 33.33% 15%
Largely independent businesses with an 
annual turnover no greater than €7.63 
million. Only on the first €38,120 of 
profit.
21% 20% Taxable base up to €15,000
NL 25% 20% On the first €200,000 of profits
LV 15% 9%
Micro-enterprises with a turnover less 
than LVL 70,000, employing up to 5 
employees (if turnover above, excess 
taxed at 20%)
LT 15% 5%
Companies with a taxable profit less 
than LTL 1 million, employing up to 10 
employees
HU 19% 10%
On the first HUF 500 million of profits 
per annum
RO 16% 3%
Privately-owned companies with a 
turnover less than €100,000, employing 
up to 9 employees (optional)
UK 24% 20%
Companies with profit under GBP 
300,000. Marginal relief is available on 
profits between GBP 300 000 and GBP 
1.5 million
LU
ES 30%
+ 5% solidarity tax
BE
33%
+ 3% austerity surcharge on income tax rate
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As discussed in last year’s report, the preferential 
treatment of SMEs may find its roots in the general 
perception that corporate taxation could be 
regressive, in the wish to make up for possible 
market imperfections — such as difficulties in 
accessing credit, the absence of large economies of 
scale for SMEs or their lack of resources to 
optimise their tax burden. However, using the tax 
system to correct these possible distortions does 
not seem to be the first-best solution. (
89
) Instead, 
considerations of political economy may lie behind 
the choice to provide SMEs with reduced 
corporate income tax rates, even though the latter 
encourage entrepreneurs to incorporate for tax 
purposes (
90
) and discourage companies to grow. 
As shown in Table 5.9, ten Member States 
currently make use of reduced corporate tax rates 
to support SMEs.  
In some Member States companies operating in 
specific, often economically-distressed, regions 
may also benefit from reduced tax rates. Table 
5.10 indicates those Member States which grant 
tax relief to companies solely on the basis of their 
location, (often) independently of their economic 
activity. 
Moreover, specific sectors of activity are 
sometimes granted a favourable tax regime, which 
affects the general tax rate to which those sectors 
are in principle subject. (
91
) Many EU Member 
States (see Table 5.10), for instance, provide a 
specific corporate tax regime for the shipping 
sector (‘tonnage tax’) under which the taxable 
income is determined based on the volume 
transported (tonnage of vessels) rather than the 
income generated.  
In the past, regional and sector-specific incentives 
used to be more numerous but as a consequence of 
the OECD work on harmful tax practices, of the 
EU Code of Conduct on Business Taxation and the 
rules on State Aids, as well as the supervisory role 
performed by the European Commission as the 
guardian of the Treaties (
92
), many of these 
                                                          
(89) An alternative solution could be to impose a minimum 
corporate tax as some Member States already do. 
(90) See de Mooij and Nicodeme (2008). 
(91) Some Member States, like Hungary, also apply surcharges 
to specific sectors. 
(92) http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/ 
company_tax/harmful_tax_practices/index_en.htm  
specific measures have been put on standstill and 
rolled back. 
 
Table 5.10: Reduced corporate income tax rates and special tax 
regimes for specific regions and sectors 
 
Note: The list of economic sectors is non-exhaustive. ‘Sh’ refers to the 
shipping sector (tonnage tax), ‘Ag’ refers to the agricultural sector, ‘In’ 
refers to investment companies, and ‘Tr’ refers to trusts. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Reduced tax bases 
Tax provisions impacting the computation of the 
tax base are common in almost all Member States. 
By deviating from the domestic tax norm, those 
provisions grant a favourable tax treatment for 
specific items. These tax provisions often serve 
economic purposes, but their extended use may 
make corporate taxation more distortive. This 
section focuses on the most common tax 
expenditures used across Member States. (
93
) 
Most EU Member States allow the taxable base to 
be reduced by the economic depreciation of assets 
according to a straight-line method or a declining-
                                                          
(93) Tax expenditures related to company cars are discussed in 
Sub-section 5.4.2. Although many Member States offer the 
possibility to carry-forward (or back) unused losses for tax 
purposes, this feature of the tax system is not analysed 
here. For information on this item see European 
Commission (2010d) and 'Taxes in Europe' Database. 
Country
Standard 
Rate
Reduced rates for 
economically-distressed 
regions
Special tax 
regimes for 
specific sectors
BE
33% + 
austerity 
surcharge
Sh
DE 31% Sh
IE 12.5% Sh
EL 20% Some Aegean islands (12%) Sh
Canary Islands (4%)
Ceuta and Melilla (15%)
Basque country (28%)
Navarre (20%-27%)
FR 33.3%
Overseas departments      (0% 
for newly-created companies)
Sh
IT 31.1% Sh
CY 10% Sh
MT 35% Sh, In
NL 25.5% Sh
Azores (17.5%)
Madeira (20%)
SI 20% Koper and Maribor (10%) Sh, In (0%)
FI 26% Sh
CZ 19% In (5%)
DK 25% Sh
LV 15% Free Economic Zones (3%) Sh
LT 15% Free Economic Zones (0%) Sh
HU 19% Tr (0%)
PL 19% Sh
UK 24% Sh, Tr (0%)
BG 10%
High unemployment regions 
(0%)
PT 25%
ES 30% Sh
Sh, Ag
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balance method. (
94
) In all, 15 of them allow 
accelerated depreciation or immediate expensing 
for small-value items (
95
) (see Table 5.11), which 
not only narrows the tax base but also distorts 
investment choices. That said, going closer to a 
cash-flow tax where investment is immediately 
expensed has interesting economic properties, in 
particular a zero marginal effective tax rate on 
investment. 
The corporate tax system of most EU Member 
States also includes provisions aiming at 
promoting R&D or spurring investment. A 
majority of Member States has R&D or investment 
incentives (see Table 5.11), which are given in the 
form of a tax credit or a tax allowance. Obviously, 
fine-tuning the focus of these measures is 
important to avoid distortions in investment and 
R&D choices. Some Member States also direct 
their investment incentives to specific economic 
activities, such as audio-visual activities (e.g. 
Luxembourg), the sponsoring of sport (e.g. 
Hungary), venture capital (e.g. Luxembourg), 
urban renovation (e.g. Portugal) or new industrial 
activities (e.g. Luxembourg).  
A number of Member States also try to boost 
employment through the use of specific tax 
expenditures. These employment incentives take 
the form of a tax credit for disabled workers in the 
Czech Republic and tax deductions for newly 
created jobs in Bulgaria, Portugal (young or long-
term unemployed) and Slovenia (young or older 
unemployed). 
Table 5.11 indicates for each EU Member State the 
corporate tax expenditure items that may be worth 
assessing and points to which Member States are 
                                                          
(94) Depreciation based on declined-balance does not 
necessarily provide a more accelerated system than 
straight-line. It all depends on how many years straight-line 
depreciation is given for (e.g. a 4-year straight-line 
depreciation for PCs allows faster depreciation than a 25% 
declined-balance system). 
(95) For more information on the items for which accelerated 
depreciation is available, see the 'Taxes in Europe' 
Database. This report lists Member States with available 
accelerated depreciation. An assessment of the budgetary 
impact, which might be relatively low for some schemes, 
is, however out of the scope of the report and for example, 
the impact of the depreciation at will for environmentally 
friendly assets (VAMIL) in the Netherlands is estimated at 
€ 40 million per year. For Belgium, accelerated 
depreciation is almost limited to newly launched sea ships. 
In Spain, a recent decree from March 2012 limits the 
choice of depreciation by large companies. 
particularly suitable for such a tax expenditure 
review. Although some of the tax expenditure 
items may find their rationale in the achievement 
of specific policy objectives (growth, employment, 
innovation, etc.), the question remains whether 
they are effective and whether they are the best 
instruments for achieving their goals.  
 
Table 5.11: Issues in the area of corporate tax expenditures in 
EU Member States 
 
Note: Member States are considered to have a room for a tax 
expenditure review if they have an 'x' in at least three categories in 
columns 2-6.  
Source: Commission services, IBFD and Taxes in Europe Database. 
 
In the light of this overview and on the basis of a 
cost-benefit analysis, some countries may review 
their tax systems and consider making use of other 
channels to accomplish their policy objectives. 
Based on available information, a regular (partial 
or complete) assessment of tax expenditures is 
carried out in a limited number of Member States 
only (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (
96
)). Such 
regular assessment by Member States should be 
                                                          
(96) See OECD (2010b) for an overview and IGF (2011) for the 
full French review. No information is currently available 
for non-OECD EU Member States. So far a review of tax 
expenditures in Poland has only been carried out once (in 
2010). According to national authorities, Sweden also 
carries out a regular review. 
Reduced 
rates for 
SMEs
Reduced 
rates for 
regions / 
sectors
Accelerated 
Depreciation
R&D 
Incentives
Investment 
Incentives
BE X X X X X X
DE X X
EE
IE X X
EL X X
ES X X X X X X
FR X X X X X
IT X X
CY X
LU X X X X
MT X X X X
NL X X X X X X
AT X
PT X X
SI X X X X X
SK X X
FI X X
BG X
CZ X X X X
DK X X
LV X X X X X
LT X X X X X X
HU X X
PL X X
RO X X X X
SE
UK X X X X X
Corporate tax expenditures
Country
Room for 
tax 
expenditure 
review
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the norm as it provides relevant information to 
policy-makers and taxpayers. 
Debt bias in corporate taxation 
The corporate tax system of almost all EU Member 
States allows interest payments on corporate debt 
to reduce the taxable base. This type of tax 
expenditure, however, considerably favours the 
use of debt over equity as a financing mode. The 
issue of tax-induced debt-bias in corporate taxation 
was developed in last year’s report. (97) Graph 5.1 
shows the effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) on 
debt- and equity-financed new corporate 
investment. It highlights the gap between the tax 
treatment of debt and equity in all Member States. 
As in 2010, Malta, Greece, Luxembourg and 
France stood out as the countries with the highest 
gap in 2011. Although clearly lower, the gap was 
also significantly above the EU average gap, in 
Portugal and Italy and above the EU average in 
Belgium, Spain, Germany and Sweden in 2011. 
Graph 5.1: Effective marginal tax rates on debt- and equity-
financed new corporate investment, 2011 
 
Source: ZEW (2012), unpublished, partly provisional data. 
To counter this debt-bias, some Member States, 
have introduced some type of Allowance for 
Corporate Equity (ACE) making it possible to 
deduct equity costs for corporate tax purposes. 
Belgium has an ACE in place since 2006 and 
Latvia since 2009. (
98
) Italy introduced it for new 
                                                          
(97) Fatica et al. (2012) also review the topic and possible 
solutions to address the bias. 
(98) For Belgium, the notional interest rate used in the EMTR 
computation is the 10-year state interest rate (OLO). 
Because this rate is relatively low (3.425% for 2011), there 
remains a gap between the EMTR on debt-financing (-
28.2%) and on equity financing (13.2%). A sensitivity 
analysis shows that increasing this rate reduces and 
eventually nullifies this gap. Note that the European 
Commission has officially asked Belgium to amend its 
legislation on the notional interest deduction. Current 
Belgian rules provide that a notional interest deduction is 
granted for Belgian real estate and permanent 
equity in 2011 (
99
) - after a previous episode 
between 1997 and 2003. (
100
) Although an ACE 
further narrows the corporate income tax base and 
would, at least ex ante, lead to a revenue shortfall 
at unchanged tax rates, it seems an appropriate 
way of limiting the debt bias. 
On the other hand, some Member States have 
developed alternatives to limit the interest 
deductibility. One alternative involves thin-
capitalisation rules, which disallow the tax 
deductibility of interest costs related to debt 
exceeding a given ratio of total (or alternatively 
internal) debt to equity.  
 
Table 5.12: ACE, CBIT, thin-capitalisation and earnings-
stripping rules in EU Member States, 2012 
 
Source: Commission services and Blouin et al. (2012). 
 
In 2012, 16 Member States are using some kind of 
thin-capitalisation rule for corporate tax purposes, 
although their details vary dramatically from one 
country to another. Another possibility involves 
earnings stripping rules, which disallow the tax 
deductibility of interest costs exceeding a 
percentage of a company’s taxable profit (often 
measured as the earnings before interest, taxes, 
                                                                                   
establishments, while no deduction is granted for foreign 
real estate and permanent establishments. 
(99) This recent reform is not reflected in the data in Graph 5.1. 
(100) Portugal has applied a form of ACE for SMEs since 2010. 
Austria had an ACE in place between 2000 and 2004. See 
Klemm (2007) for an overview of ACE systems in 
practice. 
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BE X X
DE X
EE
IE
EL X
ES X
FR X X
IT X X
CY
LU
MT
NL X
AT
PT X X
SI X
SK
FI
BG X X
CZ X
DK X 
LV X X
LT X
HU X
PL X
RO X
SE
UK X
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depreciation and amortisation — EBITDA). (101) 
Table 5.12 provides an overview of rules which 
reduce the debt-bias in EU Member States. Estonia 
only taxes distributed earnings. (
102
) 
5.2.2. Increasing VAT efficiency 
As discussed in detail in Section 4.5, results from 
the economic literature, confirmed by recent 
econometric estimations, underline the benefits in 
terms of efficiency of a uniform VAT system. 
Deviations from uniformity even though justifiable 
from a theoretical point of view, seem to lack 
practicability (e.g. updating cross price elasticity in 
real time), not to fulfil their primary objective (e.g. 
redistribution) or to lead to substantial economic 
costs (including compliance costs). Regarding the 
latter, VAT should in general be levied to the 
extent possible on a broad base minimising 
revenue losses from exemptions and reduced rates.  
When designing their VAT systems Member 
States are bound by the VAT Directive. In this 
respect they are not free to transfer goods or 
services from the standard to the reduced rate, as 
only those listed in Annex III to the Directive can 
be taxed at a reduced rate. However, within this 
legal framework national governments retain 
significant operational and administrative freedom 
as to the possibility of amending the base for VAT. 
In practice, VAT is heterogeneously designed 
across Member States and reduced rates and 
exemptions differ strongly. (
103
) 
Broadness of VAT base 
To give an idea of the share of consumption 
expenditure spared from taxation at the standard 
VAT rate, Graph 5.2 compares actual VAT 
revenue with the revenue that would accrue if all 
private consumption (
104
) were taxed at the 
                                                          
(101) Germany and Italy introduced this kind of rule in 2008. 
Finland and Spain are in the process of adopting similar 
rules. 
(102) Estonia applies an S-base cash flow tax. 
(103) Denmark is the only Member State that does not apply any 
reduced rates. However, Denmark applies zero rates to 
supplies such as newspapers and exempts supplies such as 
education and passenger transport. 
(104) Note that, although this is a reasonable approximation, 
private consumption is in some respects narrower than the 
VAT base (as the latter includes some construction work, 
which is classified as investment in the national accounts) 
and in some respects wider than it (some items belonging 
to personal consumption are exempt from VAT, such as 
spending on financial services or on public services). 
standard rate and revenue effectively         
collected. (
105
) This share gives a good first 
indication of the impact of exemptions and 
reduced rates, i.e. of ‘policy efficiency’. However, 
it is also affected by the share of tax evasion or tax 
non-compliance (‘collection efficiency’), which 
also diminishes the ratio. (
106
) 
Graph 5.2 suggests that the impact of reduced 
rates, exemptions and/or VAT fraud and evasion is 
indeed significant, as actual VAT revenue in the 
EU-27 is less than 50 % of the theoretical total in 
2010. It should be mentioned, however, that these 
figures might be overestimated as the indicator 
includes (untaxed) imputed rents in the base. This 
leaves the country ranking largely unchanged. (
107
) 
Compared to the previous year the indicator 
increased by 1.5 percentage points, reversing a 
backward trend since 2007. The same development 
can be seen for the euro-area, where the indicator 
rose even more markedly, by 1.9 percentage 
points. This indicates that old EU Members States 
have increased reduced rates and/or broadened the 
base more strongly.  
Although quite high on average, the impact of 
reduced rates, exemptions and tax fraud varies 
significantly across Member States. In fact the 
difference between the highest VAT revenue ratio 
in Luxemburg (
108
) and the lowest one in Greece is 
substantial: 56 percentage points. Next to 
                                                          
(105) This measure is analogous to the ‘C-efficiency’ or the 
‘VAT revenue ratio’ computed by the OECD, see OECD 
(2011c). 
(106) Unless, due to the existence of the informal sector, private 
consumption is understated by national accounts in an 
equal proportion to the share of VAT evasion, which seems 
unlikely. 
(107) The consumption of housing services by owner-occupiers, 
an item on which VAT cannot be levied, on average 
accounts for slightly less than 12 % of final consumption, 
which is used as a proxy for the potential tax base. On the 
other hand, while this results in a downward bias in the 
ratio, other items tend to boost it, one example being sales 
of residential housing, which yield VAT revenues but are 
not part of final consumption. Overall, the exclusion of 
consumption of housing services by owner-occupiers does 
not have a major impact on the ranking of countries in 
terms of the ratio. An alternative calculation, e.g. the one 
made in the OECD review of France, identifies the same 
countries as having the narrowest VAT base (see OECD, 
2011a, page 17). 
(108) However, the high value of Luxemburg might be affected 
by cross-border shopping, as VAT revenues are included in 
the nominator of the indicator while the denominator 
excludes consumption expenditure of non-resident 
households. 
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Luxemburg only five countries – Cyprus, Estonia, 
Bulgaria, Slovenia and Austria – gather more than 
60% of the theoretical amounts.  
The two dotted lines shown in Graph 5.2 indicate 
an indicator's value significantly below the EU-27 
average (LAF minus) and significantly above the 
average (LAF plus). According to this assessment, 
six Member States – Greece, Italy, Spain, Latvia, 
Romania and United Kingdom – exhibit a VAT 
revenue ratio significantly below the EU-27 
average (LAF minus). This means that these 
countries could substantially improve the design of 
VAT in order to increase its efficiency. In addition, 
the ratio is below the EU average in Slovakia, 
Portugal, France, Belgium, Ireland, Poland and 
Lithuania, signalling scope for increasing VAT 
efficiency. 
From a comparison of 2010 to 2009 it is clear that 
the increase in the EU-27 VAT revenue ratio is 
driven by an augmentation in fifteen Member 
States. The strongest increase was in Spain where 
the indicator's value rose by almost a fifth from 
35% to 41.7%. This development could to a large 
extent be due to the increase of the two reduced 
rates by 1 percentage point as of July 2010. Latvia 
exhibited the second and Italy the third strongest 
increase of 13% (from 37.9% to 42.8%) and 10% 
(from 37.6 to 41.3%) respectively. The 
improvement of the ratio in Latvia may have been 
driven by an augmentation of the reduced rate by 
100% (from 5% to 10%) which was effective in 
2009 but came fully into effect in 2010 most likely 
due to the crisis. 
There are a number of reasons why the indicator 
could have been affected negatively by the crisis 
and the economic cycle in general, even though 
VAT is a proportional tax. First, the recession is 
likely to have shifted consumption patterns 
towards primary goods, which are more frequently 
subject to lower VAT rates. Second, the share 
calculated here is affected (
109
) by the decline in 
construction activity, which was particularly 
marked in this recession. Third, rising bankruptcies 
reduce the amount of VAT paid, as do inventories 
                                                          
(109) This is because VAT paid on construction is counted in the 
numerator of the ratio, but is excluded from the 
denominator (not being consumption expenditure). This 
statistical bias implies that any decline in construction 
activity will tend to have an over-proportional impact on 
the share. 
involuntarily accumulated by businesses during the 
recession. (
110
) Finally, many countries have 
introduced measures aimed at making it possible 
for companies to defer tax payments, including 
VAT. 
Graph 5.2: Actual VAT revenues as a percentage of theoretical 
revenues at standard rates in 2009 and 2010 
 
Note: The ratio consists of actual VAT revenues divided by the product 
of the VAT standard rate and net final consumption expenditure, i.e. 
final consumption expenditure minus VAT receipts. A low value of the 
ratio suggests that exemptions, reduced rates, or tax evasion have a 
significant impact. 
Source: Commission services. 
The increase of the revenue ratio in Italy was 
partly due to measures taken by the government to 
combat VAT fraud and evasion. The outlook for 
future development with respect to improvement 
of the VAT efficiency in Member States may be 
favourable. As shown in Chapter 3 quite a number 
of Member States increased recently reduced rates 
and/or broadened the VAT base. This will help 
reduce the significant cost created by deviation 
from uniformity – not only in budgetary terms, but 
also in terms of administrative and compliance 
costs. 
VAT compliance gap 
As mentioned above, the difference between 
theoretical and actual tax revenue is also due to 
VAT fraud and evasion, which is already included 
as one element in the VAT revenue ratio discussed 
above. It is certainly very difficult to quantify this 
variable. The 2009 study by Reckon is the most 
comprehensive recent report attempting to do so. It 
quantifies and analyses the VAT ‘compliance’ gap 
in the EU-25 Member States over the period 2000-
2006.  
                                                          
(110) National accounts data indicate, however, that a destocking 
of inventories took place in 2009. 
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Table 5.13: VAT ‘compliance’ gap, EU-25, in % 
 
Note: The study covers the EU-25 Member States. No data is available 
for Cyprus. The VAT gap compares VAT receipts with a theoretical net 
VAT liability. The latter is calculated by identifying the categories of 
expenditure that give rise to irrecoverable VAT and combining them 
with appropriate VAT rates. 
Source: Reckon (2009). 
 
As explained in last year’s report, the aggregate 
VAT gap for the EU-25 (excluding Cyprus) 
amounted to € 106.7 billion in 2006, which 
constituted 11 per cent of theoretical liability. 
On the basis of the 2006 results of the Reckon 
Study (
111
), in particular the following Member 
States, faced in this year the challenge of 
addressing a high VAT compliance gap: Greece, 
Slovakia, Italy, the Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary and the United Kingdom. All 
these countries have an indicator value higher than 
LAF minus, which points to a need to improve 
VAT compliance. 
5.3. IMPROVING TAX GOVERNANCE 
Efficient tax collection is a prerequisite for 
financing European welfare states with a relatively 
high level of public services and redistributive tax 
and transfer systems. Tax evasion, which results 
from shadow economic activities (undeclared 
work) and underreporting of income in tax returns, 
undermines the revenue-raising and redistributive 
 
                                                          
(111) The European Commission is in the process of updating 
this study because of possibly significant changes in VAT 
compliance.  
objectives of the tax system. It leads to unintended 
redistribution from those who do respect the rules 
to those who do not. Moreover, it creates unfair 
competition between formal and informal actors. 
Finally, it further weakens tax morale and can lead 
to more evasion. This is a risk at a time when tax 
increases are necessary to meet severe 
consolidation challenges. Reducing tax evasion 
and improving tax compliance is, therefore, of 
particular importance at this juncture and, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, several Member States are 
seeking to step up efforts to improve tax 
collection.  
In the conventional view of economic models of 
taxpayer behaviour, taxpayers comply with tax 
laws if the expected value of the penalty where 
evasion is detected exceeds the tax to be paid. 
However, a host of other factors such as social 
values, public morality, and people’s perception of 
the efficiency of the public sector and the fairness 
of the tax system also matter in shaping attitudes to 
tax laws. (
112
) 
The goal for revenue authorities is to collect the 
full amount of taxes and duties payable in 
accordance with the law. Tax authorities should 
aim at reducing the tax compliance gap while at 
the same time minimising the administrative costs 
of collecting taxes for the government (collection 
costs) and of paying taxes for taxpayers, i.e. 
businesses and individuals (compliance costs).  
Tax authorities apply policies to facilitate and 
stimulate ‘voluntary’ compliance, to prevent and 
deter evasion, to detect and combat tax fraud, to 
enforce compliance, as well as to collect 
effectively taxes which are due and in arrears. 
These policies are interlinked: facilitating 
voluntary compliance decreases the need for 
enforcement, while an effective enforcement 
policy will contribute to more voluntary 
compliance. In general, policies aimed at 
enhancing voluntary compliance will have a 
positive impact on administrative burdens, while 
the opposite might be the case for enforcement 
policies. However, a tax administration policy 
needs to include both. The challenge is to strike a 
proper balance between these two elements. This 
                                                          
(112) See e.g. Dell'Anno (2009) and Slemrod (2007). 
Country 2000 2002 2004 2006
BE 10 13 12 11
DE 12 13 14 10
EE 12 15 21 8
IE 5 3 4 2
EL 24 20 29 30
ES 9 12 8 2
FR 5 7 7 7
IT 22 24 27 22
CY  ---  ---  ---  --- 
LU 12 5 2 1
MT 17 4 14 11
NL 7 9 6 3
AT 13 10 13 14
PT 5 7 8 4
SI 16 13 8 4
SK 27 27 24 28
FI 2 4 5 5
CZ 15 16 13 18
DK 9 8 7 4
LV 31 32 31 22
LT 15 18 28 22
HU 15 25 24 23
PL 22 20 19 7
SE 6 4 4 3
UK 16 17 15 17
EU-25 12 14 14 11
EA-17 12 13 13 10
LAF plus 10 11 11 8
LAF minus 15 16 16 14
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section extends the analysis of tax governance 
contained in last year's report. (
113
) 
5.3.1. Tax compliance issues: Reviewing 
available indicators 
The size of the shadow economy gives an initial 
idea of the extent of tax non-compliance. 
According to Dell’Anno (2003), the shadow 
economy includes those economic activities and 
the income derived thereof that circumvent or 
avoid government regulation or taxation. The 
avoidance of tax and social security contribution 
(SSC) payments, but also the avoidance of labour 
protection legislation and consumer rights 
protection laws can contribute to a large share of 
the shadow economy in official GDP. 
By definition, the size of the shadow economy is 
difficult to ascertain. Reflecting these difficulties, 
different studies, which apply different methods, 
come to rather different results for some Member 
States. (
114
) One of these approaches, applied by 
Schneider (2012), uses the Multiple Indicators 
Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model which examines 
the relationship between the unobserved shadow 
economy and a set of observable variables. 
Although the methodology faces strong criticism 
and should not be taken as producing uncontested 
values, the results have the advantage of coming 
from the consistent application of a methodology 
across Member States and time, allowing for a 
basis for comparisons between countries and 
identifying trends in the phenomenon. (
115
) 
However, the available results only provide an 
indication of the extent of the problem and the 
development over time, so that the levels should 
                                                          
(113) It is also partly based on Jensen and Wöhlbier (2012). See 
also Gayer and Mourre (2012). 
(114) Available methods include direct approaches (based on 
audits and taxpayers' surveys), indirect approaches (using 
the gap between declared income and income in national 
accounts; the currency demand approach based on the 
relationship between the quantity and the velocity of 
money; the estimated gap between official income and that 
estimated from an assumed relationship between income 
and the observed consumption of specific goods and 
services (e.g. energy); the rate of non-filing; and 
experiments using behavioural economics approaches. See 
Alm (2012) for a survey. 
(115) It is an indirect measure based on statistical relationships, 
notably the currency demand, which can partly capture 
home production. It might not take country specific 
characteristics and differences sufficiently into account as 
the parameters of the model are estimated jointly for a 
large group of countries. 
not be taken as an absolute measure of the 
phenomenon. (
116
) 
According to Schneider (2012), shadow economic 
activity varies considerably across Member States. 
In 2012, Bulgaria is estimated to have the largest 
shadow economy in the EU, followed by Romania, 
Lithuania, and Estonia (see Table 5.14). According 
to Schneider (2012), the size of the shadow 
economy increased steadily between 2008 and 
2010, but dropped again in 2011 and 2012.  
Another important source is the European 
Employment Observatory, which collected 
national data in 2004 and 2007 for the share of 
undeclared work. Depending on availability, these 
figures are based on micro surveys, labour-force 
survey studies, macro studies or other available 
information. (
117
) Hence, the reported national data 
for undeclared work are not fully comparable 
across countries but appear to complement usefully 
the indicator scheme, given its methodological 
drawbacks. In some cases, divergences between 
the two indicators stress the need for cautious 
assessment based on this set of indicators. The data 
for undeclared work points to a great deal of 
heterogeneity with estimates ranging from 2% to 
30%. The estimated size of undeclared work is 
usually significantly lower in the reported national 
data than in the Schneider (2012) estimates for the 
size of the shadow economy. For most Member 
States, the difference between figures in Schneider 
(2012) and national estimates amounts to around 
6-8 percentage points. For Greece, Slovakia, Malta 
and Hungary, the discrepancy is lower or even 
absent, while national estimates are more than 10 
percentage points lower for Cyprus, Estonia (in 
both cases around 21 pp), Portugal, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Denmark and Italy. (
118
) 
                                                          
(116) Arguably, they overestimate the true measure of the 
shadow economy. 
(117) In micro surveys individuals are asked if they have 
performed (or acquired) activities in the shadow economy 
during the previous year. One reason for the lower results 
is that micro surveys usually apply a more narrow 
definition of the shadow economy, focusing on households' 
supply of black labour, whereas the macro studies tend to 
include also other types of tax evasion. Another possible 
reason might be biased reporting. Nevertheless, it is likely 
that the size of the shadow economy is overestimated, at 
least for some countries, in macro estimations like 
Schneider (2012). 
(118) In the case of Cyprus, information included in the 2012 
National Reform Programme points to a high level of 
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Comparable micro surveys are only available for a 
few Member States (see right-hand side column of 
Table 5.14).  
There seem to be some common characteristics in 
the prevalence of undeclared work: it is most 
prevalent among men, singles, people with short or 
craft education as well as workers employed in the 
construction sector and in the hospitality sector. It 
is more common in sparsely populated areas.  
In addition to the shadow economy, which is not 
necessarily driven only by tax reasons but has a 
large impact on tax revenues, a sizeable part of tax 
evasion consists of underreporting in the formal 
sector. The ability to misreport and the will to 
exploit opportunities to do so – tax morale – seem 
to be decisive explanatory variables for the size of 
the shadow economy and the total amount of tax 
evasion. (
119
) 
As discussed in Sub-section 5.2.3, Reckon (2009) 
provides estimates for the VAT gap in 25 Member 
States, which includes fraud, legal avoidance (
120
) 
and unpaid VAT liability due to insolvencies (see 
Table 5.13). Although the exact amount involved 
in VAT fraud is difficult to quantify, filing of false 
returns and unauthorised deductions of VAT are 
believed to be a key factor in explaining revenue 
loss. For this reason, some Member States have 
tightened their measures to combat VAT fraud, by 
imposing new obligations on taxpayers in the 
chain of production and distribution to submit 
additional information to the tax authorities.  
Member States are considered to have a particular 
need and scope for improving tax compliance if: 
(i) the size of the shadow economy as estimated by 
Schneider (2012) is significantly above the EU-27 
average and other national sources indicate that the 
extend of undeclared work is above the EU-27 
average, or, (ii) the VAT gap is significantly above 
the EU-27 average. According to these criteria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
                                                                                   
undeclared work and confirms the high figures in 
Schneider (2012). 
(119) See, e.g., Robinson and Slemrod (2011) and Kleven et al. 
(2011). 
(120) Although legal, tax avoidance involves the abusive 
exploitation of ‘loopholes’ in national or international laws, 
allowing companies to shift profits from one country to 
another with the intention of reducing the amount of taxes 
they pay. 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia and Spain as well as Cyprus (
121
), face a 
particular challenge in this area. 
 
Table 5.14: Size of the shadow economy and undeclared work in 
the EU Member States 
 
Note: The size and development of the shadow economy is calculated 
with the MIMIC estimation procedure. The currency demand approach 
was used for Austria, Germany and Poland. Averages are GDP-
weighted. For undeclared work, national data is collected by European 
Employment Observatory, Spring Review 2004 and 2007 (figures for 
Belgium, Italy and Lithuania are based on the articles on undeclared 
work from national SYSDEM correspondents). 
Source: Schneider (2012), European Commission (2004, 2007) and 
Pedersen (2003). 
 
Various policy instruments can be used to increase 
tax compliance. Box 5.4 provides an overview of 
practical measures which are crucial for improving 
tax compliance. The effectiveness of each measure 
depends on the underlying cause of non-
compliance. Moreover, reform priorities differ 
across Member States, reflecting differences in tax 
systems, stages of development, administrative 
capacity, and the extent and type of tax evasion. 
Thus, reforms need to be tailored to each Member 
State's circumstances. The relatively wider tax 
compliance gaps and lower revenue productivity of 
the less developed Member States generally 
 
                                                          
(121) Based on the national source referred to in footnote 118. 
2005 2010 2012
BE 20.1 17.4 16.8 6-10
DE 15.4 13.9 13.3 7 4.1
EE 30.2 29.3 28.2 7-8
IE 14.8 13 12.7 NA
EL 27.6 25.4 25.0 25
ES 21.3 19.4 19.2 12
FR 13.8 11.3 10.8 4-6.5
IT 24.4 21.8 21.6 12
CY 28.1 26.2 25.6 4.2
LU 9.9 8.4 8.2 NA
MT 26.9 26 25.3 25
NL 12 10 9.5 2
AT 10.3 8.2 7.6 2
PT 21.2 19.2 19.4 5
SI 26 24.3 23.6 17
SK 17.6 16.4 15.5 13-15
FI 16.6 14 13.3 4.2
BG 34.4 32.6 31.9 22-30
CZ 18.5 16.7 16 9-10
DK 16.5 14 13.4 3 3.8
LV 29.5 27.3 26.1 18
LT 31.1 29.7 28.5 16-18
HU 24.5 23.3 22.5 15-20
PL 27.1 25.4 24.4 12-15
RO 32.2 29.8 29.1 16-21
SE 17.5 15 14.3 5 2.3
UK 12 10.7 10.1 2 1.2
EU-27 17.4 15.4 14.9 7.2
EA-17 17.6 15.5 15 8
LAF plus 15.1 13.4 12.8 5.3
LAF minus 19.1 17.4 16.8 9.1
Undeclared work 
(share of GDP or 
employment, 1995-
2006) 
Micro survey, 
Undeclared work 
(working hours in 
% of hours in 
formal economy) 
Country
Size of shadow economy 
(in % of GDP)
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(Continued on the next page) 
Box 5.4: Selected measures to improve tax compliance and promote efficient tax 
administration*
Developing a compliance strategy and targeting efforts against tax evasion 
Developing an overall compliance strategy is critical for tax authorities’ ability to improve taxpayer compliance and 
enhance revenue collection.(
1
) The purpose of a compliance strategy is to identify and respond to the most 
significant risks in the tax collection system and achieve the widest possible impact on voluntary compliance. 
Revenue agencies following this approach have moved away from administrative assessment systems, where all or 
most tax returns are examined, to a system which relies on limiting standard taxpayers’ ability to evade and on 
taxpayers' voluntary compliance with their obligations without the intervention of a tax official. Voluntary 
compliance is encouraged through an appropriate balance of targeted audits, taxpayer education and assistance, to 
help taxpayers and their advisors understand and fulfil their obligations and entitlements (see European 
Commission, 2010c). 
Taxpayers are more likely to comply if they perceive the likelihood of detection as high and see blatant non-
compliers being brought to account. The use of risk-management approaches improves compliance behaviour by 
deterring non-compliance through targeting of audits. Segmenting taxpayers into four compliance categories 
(compliant; attempt to comply but fail; general non-compliant; deliberate fraud) in the so-called compliance 
pyramid can help tax authorities differentiate in their approach towards the taxpayer between service and control (or 
even criminal investigation in the event of fraud). Moving beyond segmentation to determine whether a taxpayer 
should generally be approached with service or control, the building up of databases with information on taxpayers’ 
income and assets can lead to better targeting of tax authorities' audits, through a system of flags for instance. Flag 
systems use available data to pinpoint which tax returns of individuals and businesses can be expected to have the 
largest deviations and which it would be most beneficial to examine more closely. The flag system could build on 
data relating to sources of income, size of taxpayers’ reported changes to the preliminary assessment of income, 
income levels, any mismatch between income and consumption levels, and perhaps socio-economic factors as 
well.(
2
) 
Third-Party Information 
Third-party reporting of income is a crucial element in an efficient tax administration. It limits a normal taxpayer’s 
possibilities of under-declaring income and makes tax evasion considerably more difficult. For example, it is 
mandatory for employers to report the taxable wages of their employees directly to the revenue authorities together 
with the payee details. The relevant fields on the tax return containing third-party information can then be locked, so 
that the taxpayer cannot change the information. This is in contrast to self-declaring, where individual citizens are 
responsible for reporting their incomes and deductions themselves. In a detailed study on Danish data, Kleven et al. 
(2011) found a significant negative correlation between the share of an income type reported by third parties and the 
proportion of tax evasion for the income type. 
In most Member States, employers are obliged to report to the tax authorities the taxable wages and royalties they 
pay their employees (including non-monetary wage components). Some Member States have extended the 
obligation to conduct third-party reporting to financial institutions regarding each account holder's interest payments 
(positive and negative), dividends and yields on bonds, as well as the purchase and selling prices of shares and 
bonds. This means that large parts of the taxpayer’s capital income, including capital gains, can be calculated 
automatically by the tax authorities. In some Member States, deductible expenses such as union fees and child-care 
expenses are third-party reported directly to the tax authorities. 
The better the coverage of third-party information, the more resources are freed up to be targeted, for example, at 
revenue sources reliant on self-reporting and at combating the shadow economy.(
3
) 
                                                          
 *    This box is based on Jensen and Wöhlbier (2012). 
1) Kleven et al. (2001) found that the presence of types of income difficult to detect (e.g. self-employed income and 
other income not reported by a third party) is the most important factor in predicting evasion, whereas the 
socio-economic characteristics of the individual have little explanatory power. 
(2) See, e.g., Russell (2010). 
(3) It should, however, be kept in mind that in small companies with only a few employees, it could be relatively easy for 
the employee and the employer to collaborate on under-declaring, and thus third-party reporting conducted by small 
businesses should not be totally excluded from scrutiny. 
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Box (continued) 
 
 
 
 
Pre-filled tax returns 
Pre-filling appears to be a successful formula for improving the efficiency of tax collection for personal income tax. 
Pre-populated tax returns have become a significant component of e-government strategies by revenue bodies in 
many countries. While not removing the possibility of under-declaration, pre-filled tax returns with third-party 
information have a significant impact on tax compliance and make it easier for the taxpayer to comply and pay 
taxes. 
In pre-filling, revenue bodies use information already held by them (e.g. taxpayer identity information, elements of 
taxpayer history, and third-party reports of income and deductions) to populate fields within tax returns that are 
made available to taxpayers for their examination. In its most advanced form, tax return preparation has been fully 
automated for the vast majority of the taxpayer population. In the Nordic countries, at the end of the year tax 
administrations generate a fully completed personal income tax return in electronic and/or paper form for the vast 
majority of taxpayers required to file tax returns. The remaining share of taxpayers receives a partly pre-filled tax 
return (see OECD, 2011). 
When taxpayers receive the pre-filled return, they have the option of making adjustments and submitting a new 
return. Taxpayers’ access for adjusting the final tax return should be limited technically to those types of income 
and deductions for which the tax authorities do not possess hard and reliable information from third parties. 
Measures to contain the shadow economy 
In most Member States, the shadow economy (undeclared work) accounts for the vast majority of tax evasion. 
Increasing the probability that working in the shadow economy will be exposed, or increasing the penalties, reduces 
the expected gains from shadow-economy activities and can have a deterrent effect. However, simply to increase 
control measures could prove relatively costly in relation to the direct revenue gains. Unlike under-reporting of 
income or over-reporting of tax deductions, it is difficult for tax authorities to detect undeclared work when auditing 
annual tax returns, as it is not possible to obtain third-party reports on income from the shadow economy and the 
activity is typically concealed both by the person performing the work and by the customer. 
One potentially powerful option would be to criminalise the purchaser of undeclared work if the seller does not pay 
the appropriate tax on the transaction, unless the purchaser pays by electronic means. Some studies have shown that 
the buyer of undeclared work reaps a large part of the evaded taxes through a lower price.(
4
) Thus, there is currently 
a lack of proportionality between buyers’ gain and their potential punishment. 
In Italy it is illegal to purchase undeclared work. However, to avoid criminal liability it is sufficient for the buyer to 
show a receipt for the work performed. In other Member States it is mandatory to keep invoices for work carried out 
for some time (e.g. for two years in Germany). However, these systems create an administrative cost for the buyer, 
who must keep track of receipts. It would be preferable to require the purchaser to pay by electronic means in order 
to avoid criminal liability for purchases of undeclared services. This system has, e.g., been implemented in Norway 
and is due to be implemented in Denmark. 
A common measure in the fight against the shadow economy is the use of mandatory electronic payments for 
purchases over a certain threshold, as they leave a trace. The obligation to pay for purchases over a certain amount 
by electronic means exists, e.g., in Italy (€ 1 000) and Greece (€ 1 500). 
A related measure to detect tax evaders is to exploit data relating to an individual's electronic transactions and 
compare them with that individual's declared income. If a person has a low reported income and at the same time a 
high level of private consumption, it could be an indication that the taxpayer requires a closer audit. Italy pursues 
this strategy fairly systematically with the so-called ‘income meter’. Denmark and Sweden also exploit data on 
electronic purchases for audits of taxpayers. 
Introducing tax deductions for certain activities and sectors (such as the construction sector and household services) 
with a high prevalence of undeclared work, i.e. monetary incentives (‘carrot approach’), could be effective although 
very costly. This approach, which is applied in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and Sweden for example, 
tends to be very costly.(
5
) It involves a high deadweight loss and implies an undermining of the fairness of the tax 
system. 
Tax morale is considered to be a key factor for tax compliance. Low tax morale can be contagious. If an individual 
justifies his evasion by the fact that everyone else does it, existing tax evasion becomes a motive for further 
cheating. Hence, it is important that governments protect and nurse the tax morale of the population. This can be 
achieved by highlighting the risk of being detected. In combination with a high likelihood of detection, an active 
communication strategy drawing attention to successful control measures and detection of evaders can prove a cost-
effective way of underpinning tax morale and increasing the perceived probability of being detected. 
                                                          
(4) See Danish Economic Council (2011). 
(5) This, for example, concerns the titre service in Belgium, the Servicefradraget in Denmark, mini-jobs and tax 
deductions for services close to home in Germany, and the RUT deduction in Sweden. 
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suggest potential for bigger revenue increases 
based on initiatives to improve compliance. For 
these countries, taxpayer service operations and 
effective audit and enforcement should be the first 
step. 
5.3.2. Quality of tax administration 
In the area of tax governance, an important 
question is the cost of tax collection for the 
administration. According to OECD (2011a), the 
average costs of tax collection in the EU-27 
amounted to € 1.1 per 100 units of revenue (see 
Graph 5.3). No clear trend is discernible for the 
period 2005-2009. (
122
) In 2009, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Portugal, Belgium, Bulgaria and France 
faced a challenge in the high costs of tax 
collection. Slovakia's costs were high in 2007, the 
latest year for which data are available. 
In general, it is difficult to construct indicators that 
give an exhaustive description of the quality of tax 
administration. However, comparative data do 
exist for a few specific areas which are of 
particular relevance for efficient tax 
administration: i) number of employees and local 
branches per capita; ii) use of third-party 
information to obtain information on taxpayers' 
taxable activities; and iii) the use of pre-filling of 
tax returns. 
Graph 5.3: Administrative cost per net revenue collection (costs 
per 100 units of revenue, 2009) 
 
Note: No data available for Greece. Data for Slovakia refers to 2007. 
Data for Cyprus is currently under revision following a request by the 
Cypriot authorities for the year 2009 and over.  
Source: OECD (2011a). 
                                                          
(122) The trend in the ‘cost of collection’ ratio is influenced by a 
series of factors: (i) changes in tax rates over time; (ii) 
macro-economic changes; (iii) abnormal expenditure by 
tax administrations; and (iv) changes in the scope of taxes. 
Thus, its value as an indicator of effectiveness is rather 
limited. 
Size and organisation of tax administrations  
The size and organisation of tax administrations 
vary considerably between Member States. Some 
of these disparities can be attributed to different 
ways of organising the administration of SSC, 
customs and excises which may or may not be part 
of the tax agency. Setting up an integrated tax and 
SSC collection agency could improve efficiency 
and effectiveness, and reduce the compliance 
burden for businesses. (
123
) First of all, the 
differences concern the total staffing of tax 
authorities. This is rather low in Italy, Spain and 
Estonia, while it is relatively high in the 
Netherlands and Latvia. Although there are no 
norms in terms of the ideal size of a tax 
administration, the examples of Austria, Finland, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom show that it 
appears possible to run an efficient tax 
administration with staff of slightly above 1 000 
per 1 million inhabitants (see Graph 5.4).  
Graph 5.4: Size of tax administrations (total staffing) and 
number of local branches 
 
Note: Averages are unweighted. 
Source: OECD (2011a). 
To ensure cost efficiency and specialisation of 
staff, field offices should not be too widely 
dispersed geographically. In smaller Member 
States, local tax centres might not contain the 
whole range of functions. Some specialised 
functions such as corporate income tax, large 
corporations or frontier taxpayers (taxpayers who 
derive income in one Member State but reside in 
another), may be concentrated at one physical 
address. 
The number of local and regional tax offices or 
branches varies considerably between Member  
 
                                                          
(123) See Kidd (2010). 
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States: from 35 in the United Kingdom to 3,271 in 
France (
124
) and 1,421 in Belgium. At a time when 
information technology is playing an ever 
increasing role in connecting taxpayers and 
administrations, a relatively small number of local 
tax offices (less than 10 per 1 million inhabitants), 
could support professional competency, ensure 
quality of service and improve administrative cost 
effectiveness. (
125
) 
Third-party information and easy tax reporting 
An overview of the use of third party information 
in the EU by the Fiscalis Risk Management 
Platform (European Commission, 2012e), shows 
that third-party information regarding individual 
income is widely used (see Table 5.15). According 
to this source, ten Member States (Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain and Sweden) use the 
information to pre-fill tax returns. Other sources 
 
                                                          
(124) The two main fiscal administrations in France were merged 
in 2008. The process should end in 2012 and aims at a 
reducing administrative costs. 
(125) There is no doubt that political factors and aspects such as 
the federalist structure of a country have an impact on the 
organisation of tax administrations.  
show that additional countries including France 
use pre-filling. (
126
) Pre-filling appears to be a 
successful formula for improving the efficiency of 
tax collection for personal income tax. Pre-filled 
tax returns containing third-party information 
make it easy for taxpayers to comply and pay 
taxes. At the same time, pre-filling more or less 
eliminates taxpayers' ability to misreport and 
evade taxes if the third-party reported fields on the 
tax return are locked for editing. Many Member 
States also make use of third party information for 
audit or control and for assessment, while the 
majority of countries use the information for risk 
analysis. Third-party information is also an 
important source for debt collection. 
It should be as easy as possible for taxpayers to fill 
in and file their tax returns, even if they are not 
pre-filled. While in some cases complicated tax 
rules cannot be avoided, appropriate IT solutions 
should simplify the filling-in process. As shown in 
                                                          
(126) According to the OECD, substantial use of pre-filling to 
complete tax returns (fully or partly) for a significant share 
of taxpayers takes place in Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Spain and Sweden (see OECD, 2011a). 
 
Table 5.15: Use of third party information in Member States 
 
Note: 'P's for pre-filled returns are put in bold to emphasise the importance of this dimension. A missing 'P' for financial information in European 
Commission (2012e) is added for Denmark. 
Source: European Commission (2012e). 
 
Interest payments Dividends
Sales and purchase of 
financial assets
Suspicious transactions
BE P, A, R A, R
DE NA NA NA NA NA NA
EE A, R R
IE R R A, R
EL A A
ES P, R P, R R
FR NA NA NA NA NA NA
IT A, R A, R A, R
CY A, R A, R
LU NA NA NA NA NA NA
MT P, R P, R P, R
NL P, R P, R P, R A R
AT R
PT P, R A
SI A, R A R
SK A, R A, R
FI P, A, R P, R P, R P, R
BG
CZ NA NA NA NA NA
DK P P P P P
LV R R R
LT P, R P, A A
HU A, R A, R A, R A, R
PL A, R A
RO P A A A
SE P P P P P, R
UK R R
Wages and salaries (reported 
by employer, entity paying the 
income)
Financial information (reported by financial institution and insurance companies)
P (Pre-filled Returns);  A (Audit / Control);  R (Risk Analysis)
Royalties
Country
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Graph 5.5, the use of electronic filing varies 
widely across Member States. (
127
) 
Graph 5.5: Use of electronic filing for PIT, CIT and VAT, 2009 
 
Note: No data is available for Slovakia, Czech Republic (for CIT and 
VAT) and Cyprus (for CIT). 'Weighted use of e-filing' is calculated with 
a weight of 50% of PIT and 25% of CIT and VAT respectively. 
Source: OECD (2011a). 
Costs of compliance 
Compliance costs are an important variable often 
associated with non-compliance. A widely used 
indicator for measuring tax compliance costs for 
small and medium-sized enterprises is the ‘paying 
taxes’ indicator. (128)  
Graph 5.6: Administrative burden of tax systems for a medium-
sized company 
 
Note: Total hours to comply across the EU include: corporate income 
tax time, labour income tax time, and consumption tax time. Data for 
Malta are not available. 
Source: PwC et al. (2011). 
In 2011 the Czech Republic and Bulgaria in 
particular but also ten other Member States 
                                                          
(127) Several Member States have implemented measures 
recently to increase the share of electronic filing. In 
Cyprus, for example, e-filing is compulsory for legal 
persons in PIT and CIT who submit audited accounts in 
since 2010. 
(128) It measures the time required to prepare, file and pay (or 
withhold) corporate income tax, value added or sales tax 
and labour taxes, including payroll taxes and SSC for a 
case study company. The indicator is calculated annually 
by PwC, the World Bank and IFC; see PwC et al. (2011).  
showed high tax compliance costs (above LAF 
high, see Graph 5.6). Overall, however, 
compliance costs have trended downwards in the 
EU recently (2005 average: 212 hours, 2011: 189 
hours). 
Overall results for quality of tax administration 
When assessing whether Member States are 
considered to have a particular need and scope for 
improving the administrative system, the following 
four criteria are applied: (i) administrative costs 
per net revenue collection is significantly above 
the EU-27 average; (ii) the administrative burden 
of tax systems for mid-sized companies are 
significantly above the EU average; (iii) third party 
information is not used for pre-filling tax returns; 
and (iv) the extend of e-filing is significantly 
below the EU average. Table 5.16 presents an 
overview of these four indicators. Member States 
that fulfil either the first two criteria or three of the 
four criteria are considered to face a particular 
challenge to review their tax administration. This 
applies to Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, 
Portugal, Poland and Slovakia. 
 
Table 5.16: Overview table of tax administration challenges 
 
Note: An ‘X’ in columns four and five indicate that third party 
information and e-filing, respectively, are not used in the Member State. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
5.4. SPECIFIC ISSUES 
This section addresses three specific issues in more 
detail: housing taxation, environmental taxation 
and redistributive aspects of taxation. Whereas the 
discussion in the first two sub-sections is an 
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UK X
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extension of the analysis in last year's report, the 
discussion of the redistributive aspects of taxation 
is an innovation which has been included in this 
report because of its increasing importance in 
policy discussions. 
5.4.1. Housing taxation 
Various studies have shown that property taxes, 
and in particular recurrent taxes on immovable 
property, are among the taxes least detrimental to 
growth. Taxes on immovable property or housing 
take various forms and include both recurrent and 
transaction taxes. (
129
) Moreover, taxes on capital 
gains also affect investment decisions in residential 
housing. As these taxes affect incentives to invest, 
rent and build residential housing, the design and 
structure of housing taxes matters for the overall 
functioning of the economy. (
130
) 
Transaction vs recurrent taxes on housing 
Transaction taxes tend to discourage transactions 
that would allocate properties more efficiently. 
The market will be thinner and the price discovery 
process, which is already slow in the housing 
market, could be hampered. These taxes would 
also have a negative impact on labour mobility 
given the high transaction costs incurred by 
changing property. Theoretically, it is always 
possible to replace a transaction tax with a 
recurrent tax, which would entail less distortion on 
the housing market. (
131
) Moreover, revenues from 
transaction taxes are often very volatile as revenue 
development in the crisis has recently shown, with 
tax windfalls in housing market booms and tax 
shortfalls in busts.  
On the positive side, a tax on real property 
transactions could theoretically deter speculation 
and thus possibly help reduce the risk of housing 
market bubbles. However, this relationship 
                                                          
(129) European Commission (2010c) provides an overview of the 
literature on this topic. The analysis here is limited to 
residential property because commercial buildings, along 
with other physical capital used as an input in the 
production process, should ideally not be taxed due to 
efficiency considerations. 
(130) This section draws on last year's report. A more elaborate 
analysis is available in Johannesson Linden and Gayer 
(2012). See also Gayer and Mourre (2012). For a 
discussion of other structural features of the housing 
market, e.g. regulations that are important for the stability 
of market itself and of the broader economy, see European 
Commission (2011g). 
(131) See, e.g., Johansson et al. (2008). 
remains empirically ambiguous. It could also 
prove to be politically difficult to use the 
transaction tax as a timely policy response to 
mitigate price increases in the housing market. 
Moreover, other policies are available that can deal 
more effectively with housing market bubbles. (
132
) 
Current systems for taxing immovable property 
that rely heavily on transaction taxes provide scope 
for improving tax design. A shift from taxes on 
transactions to recurrent taxes on real estate would 
reduce the distortions introduced by taxation and 
improve economic efficiency. The latter is 
warranted by the fact that this type of tax has a 
limited negative impact on the overall allocation of 
resources in the economy compared to other 
sources of revenue. 
Property taxes generally play a relatively small 
role in the EU Member States in terms of revenue 
(1.4% of GDP), and around a third of that refers to 
taxes on transactions (0.5% of GDP). (
133
) 
Variations between Member States are significant, 
and transaction tax revenues were estimated to be 
close or higher than 1% of GDP in Belgium, 
Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Malta in 
2010. However, these data include revenue from 
other capital and financial transactions. (
134
) The 
tax rates applied also provide an indication of the 
importance and the distortive impact of the tax. 
Belgium, Italy and Greece apply a tax on real 
estate transactions at a rate above or equal to 10 % 
(see Table 5.17), even if reductions and 
exemptions apply in some cases (e.g. for first-time 
buyers).  
 
Table 5.17: Tax rates on real estate transactions in EU Member 
States, 2012 
 
Note: * indicates a progressive or multiple rate structure; no rate 
indicated for Romania; the top rate in the UK of 7% applies to properties 
above GBP 2million. In Italy some rates are levied on cadastral values 
rather than transaction values. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
                                                          
(132) Crowe et al. (2011).  
(133) For country data, see Graph 5.7. 
(134) No further disaggregation of data is currently available.  
Tax level  Member State
≥10% BE, EL*, IT*
5-8% FR, ES, LU, CY*, PT*, UK*
<5% AT, DE, IE, MT, NL, SI, FI, CZ, DK, LV, SE, HU*
None EE, SK, BG, LT, PL
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A second set of countries (Portugal (
135
), Spain, 
Luxembourg, France and Cyprus (
136
)) currently 
apply rates in the 5-8 % range, while nearly half of 
the Member States apply tax rates below or at 5 % 
on real estate transactions. Ireland reduced its 
stamp duty to 1-2% (from 7-9%) in 2011, while 
the Netherlands first temporarily and then 
permanently reduced the real estate transaction tax 
from 6% to 2% as from July 2011. Moreover, 
Cyprus has suspended the application of the tax on 
real estate transactions until the end of 2012. 
Several Member States do not levy taxes on real 
estate transactions. A gradual shift from a tax on 
real estate transactions to a recurrent tax on real 
estate could potentially improve the functioning of 
the housing market in Belgium, Italy and Greece, 
but also in Spain, Luxembourg, France, Cyprus, 
and Portugal. (
137
) 
The design of recurrent taxes on housing 
Several approaches to designing taxes on 
residential property have been discussed in the 
literature and are applied in different countries. 
One difficulty lies in the fact that ownership of a 
house involves both a consumption decision and 
an investment decision, which potentially has an 
impact on the design of the tax. In most cases, the 
taxation of immovable property is related to the 
capital taxation rules. Alternative approaches are 
to consider the real estate tax as a tax on the 
consumption of housing services or as a payment 
for local public services. 
Capital-based housing taxation  
An ideal tax system aims at neutrality, which 
implies that returns from residential property 
should be taxed as other capital income. 
Accordingly, the return from the house, less 
depreciation allowances and interest payments (i.e. 
                                                          
(135) In Portugal the transaction for first residences ranges from 
0% to 8%. 
(136) The rate in Cyprus varies between 4 and 8 %, with lower 
rates and reduced valuations for transactions within the 
extended family. 
(137) Under the financial assistance programmes, Greece has 
committed to updating property values and raising more 
revenue, while Portugal has committed to rebalancing 
property taxation towards recurrent real estate taxes and 
away from the transaction tax while protecting vulnerable 
households. Moreover, incentives to rent and own should 
be equalised by removing mortgage interest deductibility. 
Italy recently increased recurrent taxes on real estate with 
the introduction of the so-called IMU. 
the net return), should be subject to personal 
income tax or capital income tax at the personal 
level. (
138
) In the case of owner-occupied housing, 
this principle of neutrality translates into taxing an 
imputed return, while at the same time allowing 
for mortgage interest deductibility and 
depreciation. Consistent with the treatment of 
other financial assets, capital gains from housing 
transactions should also be taxed in order to 
achieve neutrality vis-à-vis other assets. (
139
) A tax 
on imputed rental income could be approximated 
through a recurrent annual tax on the          
property. (
140
) In both cases, it is important that the 
value of the tax base is regularly updated.  
A tax on imputed rents and/or a recurrent property 
tax are essential to balance the tax subsidy 
provided through interest rate deductibility. The 
tax is needed to achieve a neutral tax treatment of 
various investment possibilities. If interest 
deductibility is provided to house-owners while 
imputed rental income is either (i) not taxed or 
taxed too low or (ii) approximated with recurrent 
property tax which is too low, a tax subsidy is 
provided which favours investments in owner-
occupied housing and household indebtedness 
through mortgage loans. A neutral tax treatment 
will depend on the taxation of other financial 
investment, which implies that a recurrent property 
tax or a tax on imputed rents can be motivated by 
the taxation of other financial returns/returns on 
savings. (
141
) 
Favourable tax treatment of home ownership is 
based on the assumption that it generates positive 
externalities for society (e.g. in the form of better 
social outcomes for the children of homeowners 
and more commitment to the local community). 
However, there are several drawbacks of such tax 
subsidies to home ownership and of interest rate 
deductibility. Home ownership tends to reduce 
labour mobility. (
142
) There is a risk that interest 
                                                          
(138) In a comprehensive income tax system, it would be taxed 
as part of the (progressive) personal income tax, while in a 
dual-income tax system the tax rate on capital income at 
the personal level would apply.  
(139) OECD (2010c). 
(140) A tax on imputed income is a direct tax levied on the 
income. A recurrent property tax is generally classified as 
an indirect tax as the tax burden is typically independent of 
the taxpayer’s income situation. 
(141) See, e.g., Keen et al. (2010) and Andrews et al. (2011). 
(142) See Andrews and Caldera Sanchez (2011) for an overview 
of the benefits and costs of homeownership (box 1). 
5. Tax policy challenges in EU Member States 
 
83 
deductibility encourage households to invest too 
much in housing in relation to other assets, which 
could contribute to higher private-sector debt and 
an over-allocation of capital to the housing     
sector. (
143
) Empirical studies also indicate that 
reduced interest costs are capitalised into higher 
house prices, implying that the policy does not 
achieve its aim of lowering costs for     
homebuyers. (
144
) Tax subsidies for mortgage 
interest payments have also been found to be 
correlated with price volatility on the housing 
market. (
145
)
 
 
In this context, a second-best design of the taxation 
of owner-occupied housing could be: (i) not to 
allow mortgage interest deductibility and (ii) to 
levy a (lower) recurrent tax on real estate 
properties. In this way, housing investments would 
be taxed in line with other capital assets and the 
tax system would not favour debt. In order to relate 
the tax to the return from the house, it is important 
for the tax base to be closely linked to properly 
updated market values. Moreover, the tax level 
should broadly take account of the tax treatment of 
interests (i.e. the absence of mortgage interest 
deductibility in relation to other assets) and capital 
gains (possibly favourable). (
146
)  
Consumption-based housing taxation 
One way to tax the consumption of housing 
services is to levy VAT on the first sale of all new 
houses. The tax would then be regarded as a levy 
on the present value of the stream of services that 
the house will generate in the future. (
147
) This 
would be in line with the treatment of other 
durable goods, e.g. cars or refrigerators.  
                                                          
(143) European Commission (2010d). 
(144) Capozza et al. (1996), Harris (2010) and Agell et al. 
(1995). Moreover, recent results indicate that demand 
shocks (e.g. through financial deregulation) have a greater 
likelihood of being capitalised into real house prices when 
the country provides interest deductibility. (Andrews 
2010). 
(145) Van den Noord (2005), Andrews (2010). 
(146) To ensure neutral tax treatment vis-à-vis other assets, 
capital gains from housing transactions should be taxed as 
other capital gains are. In practice, many countries reduce, 
exempt or defer the tax on the capital gains made on the 
primary residence. Capital gains tax on housing 
transactions generally suffers from the same set of 
drawbacks as a transaction tax, i.e. it creates lock-in effects 
and risks reducing labour mobility.  
(147) It would also imply that subsequent sales should not be 
taxed, nor should the yearly consumption service, as the 
first application of VAT covers all future services. 
An alternative approach to taxing housing services 
would be to tax the consumption value of the 
housing service, i.e. imputed rents, every year with 
VAT, in the same way as for other services. A 
practical problem in this context is the difficulty of 
properly and fairly estimating the housing service 
for owner-occupied housing. Thus, most countries 
do not apply this approach, and with a view to 
achieving equal treatment, do not levy VAT on 
rental payments either. (
148
)  
In line with the tax treatment of other durable 
goods, the financial return of a house should 
normally not be taxed with a consumption-based 
approach, as the VAT is levied on the rent (i.e. the 
service provided). To achieve consistency between 
the tax treatment of the consumption and 
investment aspects of housing, Mirrlees et al. 
(2011) propose levying a tax on housing services 
as a substitute for VAT, which ideally could be 
combined with a capital tax on above normal 
returns on owner-occupied and rental housing.  
At present, most Member States apply VAT on 
some housing-related consumption, namely the 
construction, alteration and maintenance of 
immovable property. Moreover, several Member 
States levy reduced rates on renovation and repair 
works of private dwellings. The rental of 
residential properties is normally exempt or zero-
rated. VAT is levied on the sale of new buildings 
in about 2/3 of the Member States and exempted in 
the others, while construction work on new 
buildings is normally covered by VAT. This 
implies that VAT is generally levied on the 
construction of a residential property, but not 
always on the final sale of it (European 
Commission, 2012f and OECD, 2010c). 
A charge for local service 
Property taxation has also been regarded as a 
payment for the local provision of public service, 
i.e. as a user charge. Tiebout (1956) and Hamilton 
(1976) model local government in order to analyse 
                                                          
(148) In the case of the UK, the Mirrlees review proposes a 
Housing Service Tax to approximate a VAT on housing 
services. It reflects the fact that the UK applies a zero 
VAT-rate on the construction and sale of residential 
property, and the difficulties of covering both new and old 
houses. The proposal is a tax on the flow of housing 
service consumed, which is based on the rental value of 
each property, both owner-occupied and rented. (Mirrlees 
et al., 2011) 
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the conditions which ensure efficiency of resource 
allocation in the local public sector. In this field of 
work, a property tax is regarded as a payment in 
exchange for benefits of local public service, and 
thus is considered to be non-distortive. Moreover, 
it should not affect capital intensity or aggregate 
land or property values as the tax only reflects the 
level of local public service. However, most 
empirical work indicates that local property taxes 
should rather be regarded as a capital (or 
consumption) tax which does have an impact on 
house prices and the allocation of housing 
investments. (
149
) In terms of their practical 
implementation, recurrent taxes on immovable 
property are usually levied at the municipal level 
to finance the local community. In many cases 
central government sets specific bands in order to 
limit municipalities' discretion in determining the 
tax rates. 
Increasing tax revenue on housing: revaluation of 
the tax base and increasing rates 
As the available data indicate, reliance on recurrent 
property taxes varies considerably between 
Member States. Recurrent taxes on immovable 
property range from nearly 3.4 % of GDP to nil 
(there is no recurrent property tax in Malta) with 
an average of 0.9% of GDP (see Graph 5.7). In 
some cases very low shares can partly be explained 
by the taxation of imputed rents, whose proceeds 
fall within the personal income tax and are 
therefore not included in the data. Generally 
revenues from recurrent real estate taxes should 
first be increased by bringing the tax base in line 
with the market value of the property. This is 
important if the tax is to function properly, that is 
to reflect the return on the investment or the rental 
value. The rents charged for the housing will 
reflect the value of the property in well-
functioning markets. Hence, the quality of the 
service received will depend on the building's 
location and its condition, which will be reflected 
in its value. If the tax is part of an overall tax on 
capital, it should be levied on the market value of 
the house in order to tax correctly the various types 
of assets and not distort the allocation of capital. 
Rising house prices result in higher tax liabilities if 
the tax base properly reflects the market valuation. 
In a rising market, this tends to result in political 
                                                          
(149) See Zodrow (2007) for an overview. 
pressures to freeze the valuation (or reduce tax 
rates). Once the tax base is frozen, however, it 
becomes politically very difficult to update the tax 
base as reflected by the actual practice across the 
EU. Any property revaluation creates losers and 
winners, with losers often being very vocal. (
150
) 
As market prices diverge from the valuation used 
for taxation purpose, both the economic 
implications and the political difficulties of a 
revaluation grow. As failures to increase the tax 
base support rising prices, it is important to 
maintain a regular revaluation of the cadastral 
values used as the tax base. Failure to update 
regularly risks leading to erosion of the tax base 
and of revenues over time. 
Graph 5.7: Revenues from property taxes, 2010 (in % of GDP) 
 
Note: Ordered by revenues from recurrent property taxes. ‘Other taxes 
on property’ includes taxes on net wealth, inheritance, gifts and other 
property items as well as financial and capital transactions. Data does 
not include PIT on imputed rents. * Data for Greece is provisional. 
Source: Commission services. 
Many Member States have not updated property 
values for many years. Examples include Austria, 
which applies cadastral values from 1973, Cyprus 
(1980), and the UK (1991). (
151
) Belgium (values 
from 1975) and Germany (generally from 1964) 
update cadastral values with inflation or a 
corrective factor respectively, but do not link them 
to house-price developments. A few Member 
States show examples of good practice and 
undertake regular updates. The Netherlands does 
so annually, Denmark biannually and Sweden 
every third year. According to the information 
available, at least ten Member States (Belgium, 
Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, 
Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Austria) apply out-dated 
property values. A few Member States (e.g. 
Greece, Portugal and Italy) are currently 
reassessing real estate values with a view to 
                                                          
(150) See Mirrlees et al. (2011) 
(151) Cadastral values in Wales refer to 2003. 
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bringing them into line with market values and 
some others (e.g. Germany) are considering doing 
so. (
152
) However, Denmark and Sweden, which 
regularly update cadastral values, do not use these 
updated values as a general basis for the recurrent 
property tax. (
153
) 
One alternative is simply to increase the tax rates 
for the recurrent property tax. However, to adjust 
the rate without updating the tax base implies that 
the increased tax burden reflects the valuation of 
properties at some specific time in the past. 
Moreover, as the tax burden is not proportionate to 
current house values, the tax increase could not 
properly help to dampen the price increase by 
increasing the costs of owning a house.  
Measures addressing distributional aspects might 
need to accompany housing taxation reforms to 
facilitate their implementation. As property taxes 
often accrue to the local level of government, 
inter-governmental transfer systems might also 
need to be adjusted accordingly.  
Reducing the debt-bias in housing taxation 
The tax deductibility of mortgage interest 
payments (or even capital (re)payments) in many 
Member States favours debt creation and leads to a 
debt bias in the taxation of housing. Even if 
account is taken of recurrent property taxes, the 
taxation of housing appears debt-biased in many 
Member States as recurrent tax rates or cadastral 
values are low compared to proper taxation of the 
rental return. This type of tax relief is considered 
to have contributed to the increase in housing 
prices, debt leverage and household over-
indebtedness. (
154
) 
An indicator that measures the wedge introduced 
by tax relief (reflecting tax systems in 2010) is 
presented in Andrews et al. (2011). These 
empirical results indicate that the Dutch and Czech 
tax rules are the most generous ones and the most 
favourable to debt-financed housing investments 
within the European Union. The systems in the 
Nordic countries appear generous, but Belgium 
 
                                                          
(152) See Chapter 3 for countries that are currently carrying out 
reassessments. 
(153) In Sweden the cadastral value is used to calculate the tax 
burden for low-value properties.  
(154) See Keen et al. (2010). 
and Spain also provide a sizeable tax subsidy to 
mortgage interest payments. (
155
) This ranking is 
based on an indicator that takes into account the 
deductibility of mortgage interest payments 
(including potential time limits or ceilings) and tax 
credits for loans, but does not include taxation of 
imputed rents or recurrent property taxes. The 
indicator applies the value of zero to those 
countries that do not subsidise mortgage interest 
payments via a tax deduction.  
Several Member States are in the process of 
changing their rules on the tax deductibility of 
mortgage interest payments, thereby reducing the 
debt bias in the tax system. In 2011, France 
stopped providing five years of tax deductibility of 
mortgage interest rates. Ireland is in the process of 
phasing out interest deductibility by 2017, while 
Estonia has decided to reduce both the personal 
income tax (as of 2015) and the ceiling for tax 
deductibility (in 2012). Finland is reducing the 
share of mortgage interest rate payments that are 
deductible. The share is 85% in 2012 and will be 
80% in 2013 and 75% in 2014. In line with the 
Memorandum of Understanding, Portugal will 
eliminate the deductibility of payments of principal 
and interests for new mortgages in 2012 and will 
be phasing out the deductibility of mortgage 
interest payments for owner-occupied housing. 
Following several reforms in the recent past, Spain 
decided in July 2012 to eliminate the income tax 
deduction for mortgage interest payments on house 
purchases from 1 January 2013. 
As Table 5.18 shows, around half of the Member 
States’ tax systems continue to favour mortgage 
debt financing of homeowners. In all, 12 Member 
States (Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark and Sweden) face 
the challenge of a debt-biased tax system 
favouring housing investments, although to a 
different degree. It is noteworthy that nine of these 
countries were singled out in the context of the 
macro-economic imbalance procedure as having a 
private debt above 160% of GDP in 2010. (
156
) As 
mentioned above, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are  
 
                                                          
(155) Hemmelgarn et al. (2011) confirm the generosity of the 
Dutch system when calculating an effective personal 
income tax rate on housing covering eight EU Member 
States.  
(156) European Commission (2012g). 
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phasing out interest deductibility, while Bulgaria 
strictly limits deductibility both in monetary terms 
and as regards eligibility (young families). 
In the presence of mortgage interest deductibility, 
a neutral tax system of investments in residential 
property should, ideally, provide for taxation of the 
corresponding return on the property. In practice, 
however, as in the above-listed countries, taxes on 
imputed rents or recurrent property taxes are 
normally too low to tax imputed rents properly in 
line with other investments. However, a few 
countries have recently taken steps to increase the 
recurrent property tax. Political considerations 
often make it difficult to tax property at the level 
required to make the tax system neutral. If this is 
the case, removing the debt bias in the tax system 
by gradually phasing out interest rate deductibility 
would be a viable second-best option. If necessary 
for distributional concerns, the tax deductibility of 
mortgage interest payments could be retained as a 
targeted subsidy for those households that need 
this support, e.g. low-income households and/or 
first-time homebuyers. 
 
Table 5.18: Rules for mortgage interest deductibility for owner-occupied properties in EU Member States 
 
Source: Commission services, OECD. 
 
 Country Mortgage interest deductibility
Belgium Yes. All of the payment (interest, insurance, and capital repayment) can be deducted up to a ceiling of €2,770 for the 
first 10 years, and €2,080 thereafter. According to the political agreeement on the reform of the federal system in 
December 2011, interest mortgage deductibility will be phased out at the federal level and this competence will be 
transferred to regions as of 2014 (regions have not yet indicated their intentions with respect to deductibility).
Germany No
Estonia Yes
Ireland Yes. To be phased out by 2017. Relief of 20% on the interest of qualifying loans for 7 tax years, (higher rates for first 
homebuyers). Mortgage interest relief is restricted to € 3000 for singles and € 6000 for married/widowed taxpayers.
Greece Yes. Mortgage loans taken after 2002, a credit of 20% of the annual mortgage interest on principal home is granted (on 
the first € 200,000 of the loan). The tax credit was reduced to 10% in October 2011.
Spain Yes, 15% of quantities paid for the house (repair, mortgage etc) to a max EUR 9040, thus the maximum credit is 
EUR1356 (for a period, the credit was removed for incomes above EUR 24170). Spain decided to abolish the mortgage 
interest deductibility for new mortgages taken for house purchases from 1 January 2013.
France No (2007-2010 Tax credit for interest on loan for principal residence for 5 years. The credit is equal to 20% up to € 
3750 per year, increased by € 500 per year for each dependent person. The limits are doubled for couples.) In 2010, 
subsidised loan schemes were introduced targeted at first-time buyers, low-earners, housing-shortage areas, and 
purchases of new dwellings.
Italy Yes. Interest on mortgage loans for building or buying the principal residence is subject to a tax credit equal to 19% up 
to a maximum interest payment of EUR 4000 (i.e. a  maximum tax credit of EUR 760).
Cyprus No
Luxemburg Yes, with a ceiling of the tax deduction at EUR 1500 per person in the household. Reduced to EUR 750 after 12 year of 
occupancy. No tax deductable on secondary homes.
Malta No
Netherlands Yes, fully.
Austria No
Portugal Yes, tax credit of 30% of interest and principal repayments on loans for permanent residence. The Memorandum of 
Unterstanding foresees that the mortage interest deductibility for new mortages will be eliminated in 2012 and the 
mortage interest deductiblity for owner-occupied housing in general will be phased out. 
Slovakia No. Subsidised interest rates
Slovenia No
Finland Yes
Deductible from capital income. Beyond that, 28% of the deficit due to interest on owner occupied dwellings up to EUR 
1400 can be credited  against taxes paid on earned income. The share of deductible interest payments is  reduced to 85% 
in 2012 (80% in 2013, 75% in 2014).
Bulgaria Yes, but limited to the interest payments on the first BGN 100000 of a mortgage loan.Only applicable for young married 
families below 35 years of age owning one family dwelling.
Czech Republic Yes, interests relating to the main recidence are deductible up to a limit of CZK 300000 (a reduction to CZK 80000 will 
enter into force in 2014).
Denmark Yes. The tax deduction on interest has a taxable value corresponding to approximative 33%, which is to be phased down 
to 25% by 2019.
Latvia No .
Lithuania No (deduction provided for interest on a loan taken before January 1 2009, limited to one dwelling).
Hungary No 
Poland No (loan taken 1 January 2002 through 31 December qualify for deductability based on older provisions up to 2027) 
Romania No
Sweden Yes. Deductible against capital income, in case of deficit then 30% tax reduction against labour income.
UK No
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5.4.2. Environmental taxation  
Environmentally related taxes primarily serve an 
environmental purpose, but also provide fiscal 
revenue. Fiscal consolidation, which reduces the 
scope for environmental policy measures on the 
expenditure side of the budget, strengthens the 
need to use taxes as well as other                  
market-based (
157
) policy instruments in 
environmental policy. A uniform tax, i.e. price on 
emissions or other negative environmental 
externalities, has the advantage of providing an 
incentive to change behaviour as well as allocating 
emission reduction efforts in a cost-efficient way. 
Market-based instruments also provide incentives 
for further technology developments which will 
reduce the environmental impact. 
In terms of environmental policy, there are several 
tax-related challenges. First, it is important to 
ensure that the policy instruments in place, 
including taxes, other market-based instruments 
and regulation (
158
), are sufficient to meet the 
agreed policy objectives. If there is a need for 
further policy measures, environmental taxes (or 
other market-based instruments) should play a role 
in the policy mix to achieve cost-efficiency. 
Secondly, energy taxes and other environmental 
taxes should be designed in such a way that they 
provide appropriate incentives to reduce emissions 
over time and improve resource efficiency, 
including through environmentally consistent tax 
rates across various energy carriers and emissions 
(e.g. across fuels). Finally, environmentally 
harmful subsidies in the tax systems should be 
phased out. (
159
) Various measures, outlined below, 
could be taken at national level to improve on 
existing tax systems. 
Fulfilment of the agreed limitation targets for 
green-house gas emissions 
Energy taxes, together with the EU Emission 
Trading System (ETS), are two of the main 
instruments in climate and energy policy. In this 
                                                          
(157) The importance of market-based instruments is underlined 
in the Europe 2020 Strategy, which refers to the use of 
these policy instruments as well as the work to phase out 
environmentally harmful subsidies as essential elements of 
the climate and energy policy. 
(158) Which can be substitutes or complements.  
(159) This concerns preferential tax treatment of specific sectors, 
uses and goods. See e.g. the Inventory of Estimated 
Budgetary Support and Tax Expenditure for Fossil Fuels 
(OECD (2011d)).  
context, the Member States have undertaken to 
reach legally binding national targets concerning 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. (
160
) The 
overall EU-wide target is to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 20% as compared to 1990 levels, 
which is equivalent to a 14% reduction in relation 
to 2005 emission levels. (
161
) National targets, 
which cover emissions in the sectors outside the 
ETS, range from limiting the increase in emissions 
by 20% to implementing a 20% emission reduction 
(vis-à-vis 2005 emission levels). According to the 
latest projections, the EU-wide target is expected 
to be reached in 2020. However, several Member 
States will still need to adopt and effectively 
implement additional policy measures to achieve 
their individual targets for non-ETS emissions. 
The level of ambition relating to these targets 
varies considerably between Member States. 
One sub-set of these countries is expected to 
achieve their reduction targets provided they 
implement those additional measures that have so 
far only been planned. These countries include 
Austria, Finland, Italy, Slovenia, Cyprus and 
Denmark. For another sub-set of countries, the 
measures that are planned but not yet implemented 
are judged as insufficient. Projections regarding 
greenhouse gas emissions indicate that 
Luxembourg, Malta, Ireland, Lithuania, Belgium, 
Greece, and Slovakia risk not to achieve their 
targets in 2020 unless they implement new policy 
measures. (
162
) (
163
) 
All those countries that need to undertake further 
policy measures to achieve the targeted emission 
reduction should work primarily with market-
based measures, i.e. taxes, charges, or emission 
quotas. Taxes have the advantage of providing 
fiscal revenue while at the same time allowing for 
a cost-efficient allocation of abatement efforts. All 
those Member States should allow carbon and 
                                                          
(160) The national targets are defined in the Effort Sharing 
Decision (406/2009/EC, 23.4.2009). 
(161) This effort will be divided between the EU ETS and non-
ETS sectors as follows: a 21% reduction in EU ETS sector 
emissions by 2020 and a reduction of approximately 10% 
for sectors that are not covered by the EU ETS.  
(162) COM(2011)624 final. 
(163) Note that a few countries (i.e. France, Germany, Spain and 
Sweden) have projected emission gaps close to 0% and 
have, therefore, not been included in this list. As the 
emission gaps are based on projections, the future policy 
might need to be reviewed to take account of changing 
conditions in order to ensure fulfilment of the emission 
targets.  
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energy taxation to play an important role when 
designing the policy mix to fulfil their 
commitments according to the Effort Sharing 
Decision.  
However, the projected distance to 2020 emission 
limitation targets per se is not specific and targeted 
enough to assess the extent to which 
environmental taxation reforms are needed. Even 
Member States that are projected to meet their 
targets easily should consider such reforms. The 
role of environmental taxes in fiscal consolidation 
policies and tax shifts to more growth friendly tax 
structures is analysed in Section 5.1. The following 
sub-sections consider the need to improve the 
design of energy taxes and other environmental 
taxes so that they do not contain any implicit 
environmentally-harmful subsidies and provide 
appropriate incentives to reduce emissions over 
time and improve resource efficiency. (
164
)  
Structure of excise duty rates on fossil fuels  
In the current fiscal context, and faced with the 
serious challenge of climate change, it becomes 
crucial to use energy taxes to their full extent in 
climate and energy policy in order to minimise the 
overall cost of the policy. However, the current 
structures of excise duty rates in Member States do 
not normally reflect the environmental and energy 
properties of the various fuels. In fact, the current 
structures implicitly promote fuels that are 
relatively more detrimental to the environment 
and/or are less energy-efficient. It is important that 
the relative tax rates reflect the environmental and 
energy properties of the fuels correctly. Proper 
ranking of fuels could be achieved by a carbon or 
an energy tax, or through a combination of the 
two. (
165
)  
The Energy Tax Directive currently provides for 
lower EU minimum levels of taxation (expressed 
in € per 1000 litre) for diesel than for petrol. In fact 
all Members States apply lower tax rates on diesel 
                                                          
(164) The need to achieve resource efficiency is captured by the 
2020 renewable energy targets and the 2020 energy 
efficiency targets. 
(165) A carbon tax would be based on the carbon content of the 
fuel and would thereby rank the various fuels according to 
their carbon content. A neutral energy tax, in terms of 
promoting energy efficiency equally across energy 
products, would tax fuels according to their energy content. 
The Commission proposal to revise the Energy Tax 
Directive (COM(2011) 169/3) addresses these issues. 
given the higher energy and CO2 content of this 
fuel. This results in preferential treatment 
favouring the road transport sector. It reflects a 
different tax treatment of fuels mainly used for 
commercial versus private use, also partly 
motivated by tax competition. As a result, the 
market share of diesel cars has increased 
substantially in the EU since 1995 to around 60%. 
Tax rates determined according to carbon or 
energy content would result in a higher tax rate per 
volume on diesel than on petrol. A carbon tax on 
motor fuels would imply a tax rate on diesel which 
is around 15% higher than the tax on petrol in 
terms of litres. A tax based on energy content 
would only translate into a tax rate which is around 
8% higher for diesel. A combination of these two 
types of taxes would result in a relative rate 
differential within this range of 9%-15%. In 
contrast, Member States tend to promote strongly 
the use of diesel through their relative tax rates 
(see Graph 5.8). The EU average for the diesel vs 
petrol tax ratio has increased slightly in 2012 
compared to last year. Several Member States have 
increased their tax on diesel more than their tax on 
petrol, namely Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Hungary, Poland and Finland. In a few other cases 
(Latvia and Slovenia) the ratio has fallen, 
potentially pointing towards a larger tax subsidy to 
diesel. Overall, substantial progress still needs to 
be made and the preferential tax treatment of 
diesel, particularly in Belgium, Germany, Greece, 
France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Finland, to be 
reviewed. (
166
) Some countries offset this 
advantage for diesel by levying a higher annual 
circulation tax. Such a tax adds to the overall cost 
of owning the car. However, it has the drawback 
that it does not impact on the marginal cost of 
additional driving in the same way as a fuel tax 
does. Consistent and neutral taxation of all 
transport fuels is important with a view of 
providing proper incentives for the development of 
carbon- and energy efficient fuel technologies 
without favouring specific fuels or technologies. 
There are similar inconsistencies in the taxation of 
fossil-based heating fuels in many Member States. 
Normally, heating oil is taxed heavily, while rates 
on natural gas and coal are relatively low. This rate 
                                                          
(166) Some of these countries are already taxing diesel at 
relatively high rates in level terms.  
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structure is based on the tradition of taxing oil 
rather heavily, while coal and natural gas have 
been brought into the energy tax framework more 
recently at lower rates. Thus, coal – but also 
natural gas – is normally given a tax advantage as 
a heating fuel. The situation is rather complex as 
conditions vary considerably between Member 
States according to industrial structure and fuel 
mix. The issue mainly concerns households and 
businesses falling outside the scope of the ETS. 
Several countries also exempt household 
consumption of heating fuels. It is important to 
ensure that energy tax rates become more 
consistent across both fuels and uses, and that the 
tax system does not unduly favour fossil-based 
solutions. Consistent tax rates are also important in 
order to provide correct framework incentives for 
technology development. 
Graph 5.8: Diesel/petrol ratio, 2012 
 
Note: The ratio compares the excise duty rates per 1000 litres of fuel. 
Source: Commission services.  
Indexation of environmental taxes 
Neither the current EU Energy Tax Directive nor 
the majority of the Members States' current tax 
frameworks require automatic indexation of 
energy and other environmental taxes. (
167
) 
Indexing excise duty levels to inflation has two 
advantages: (i) it helps maintain the real value of 
taxes over time and thereby also prevent an erosion 
of government tax revenues and - more 
importantly for the functioning of the tax - (ii) it 
helps maintain the impact of the tax on relative 
prices and thereby on agents' behaviour. (
168
) The 
fact that revenue from environmental taxation fell 
in relation to GDP in the 1999 – 2008 period is 
                                                          
(167) Indexation is relevant for all excise duties that are levied on 
the quantity of the product (i.e. not ad valorem).  
(168) Indexing EU minimum level excise rates could also help to 
reduce (or at least maintain the current degree of) price 
divergence across Member States and hence the potential 
for downward tax competition.  
partly attributed to the fact that these excise duties 
are normally not adjusted to changes in the general 
price level. Only few Member States currently 
apply indexation (e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands 
and Sweden). It is noteworthy that Sweden 
introduced indexation of major excise duties, 
including the energy tax, in 1994 (
169
) as part of 
fiscal consolidation efforts. The introduction of 
indexation of excise duties to core inflation in 
2012 is included in the Memorandum of 
Understanding for Portugal. (
170
) 
However, indexing environmental taxes does have 
a few disadvantages that need to be taken into 
consideration. The major drawback is that it can 
potentially influence inflation expectations. Hence, 
there is a risk of damaging feedbacks to inflation 
and inflation expectations dynamics, in particular 
if the indexation is endogenised by economic 
agents. Nevertheless, this effect can be expected to 
be rather limited as energy accounts for a relatively 
low share of overall consumption (around 11% of 
the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP)). Moreover, the adjustment should 
preferably be based on an index of consumer 
prices that excludes energy and unprocessed food. 
Using this measure of core inflation (rather than 
headline inflation (HICP)) diminishes volatility 
stemming from energy and food prices, which are 
not included in this core inflation measure. As 
such, this would lead to a smoother adjustment 
and, most importantly, it avoids a situation in 
which the indexation of energy taxes feeds into the 
same index which is used for the indexation. This 
is an important aspect in relation to energy price 
developments.  
Indexation also entails some minor administrative 
costs related to the decision mechanism and the 
adjustment of tax rates. However, these costs are 
no higher than the transaction costs incurred by a 
discretionary increase of energy taxes. Such costs 
could also be reduced by adjusting the frequency 
of the indexation, e.g. by adjusting the rates every 
second or third year and by setting a minimum 
HICP change threshold for this indexation. 
However, at the same time it is vital to maintain 
regular adjustments in order to secure the real 
value of the tax rate and of the revenue.  
                                                          
(169) Svensk Författningssamling (SFS) 1993:1508; 1512-1513. 
(170) See European Commission (2012i).  
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Reduced VAT on energy 
As discussed in Chapter 4 and Sub-section 5.2.2, a 
broadening of the VAT base (i.e. removing 
reduced rates, zero rates and exemptions) would 
improve efficiency by reducing the distortions 
generated by differential treatment while at the 
same time generating more revenue. At present, 
Member States have the possibility to levy lower 
VAT rates on electricity and natural gas, as well as 
district heating. However, these reduced rates 
conflict with overall ambitions in energy and 
climate policy and constitute environmentally 
harmful subsidies. Moreover, targeted support can 
be provided more efficiently to vulnerable 
households through general welfare payments, 
which would also avoid windfall gains for more 
affluent households. 
According to the European Commission (2012f), 
at the beginning of 2012 Greece, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta and the UK were 
reported to tax natural gas and electricity at a 
reduced VAT rate. Moreover, Belgium, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and the UK apply reduced 
VAT rates on fuel oil and/or solid fuels (European 
Commission, 2011h). These Member States face a 
challenge in phasing out these subsidies. However, 
it should be acknowledged that since 2011, 
Portugal has removed the reduced VAT rate on 
electricity and natural gas (
171
), while Latvia has 
removed the reduced rate on natural gas for private 
consumers. 
Taxation of company cars 
Company cars are defined as passenger light-duty 
vehicles leased or owned by companies, but used 
by their employees for business or personal travel. 
Copenhagen Economics (2009) conclude that the 
favourable taxation of company cars in many EU 
Member States is distortionary and imposes 
welfare costs on society. Tax treatment depends on 
how the ownership and use of the car are taxed in 
corporate taxation for the employer and in income 
tax as a benefit for the employee. The rules tend to 
encourage car ownership and affect the choice of 
car model, as well as driving habits. Company car 
schemes in particular mitigate and counteract 
incentives to reduce fuel consumption provided 
 
                                                          
(171) In line with the Memorandum of Understanding, see 
European Commission (2011h). 
through energy and vehicle taxation. Moreover, tax 
regimes often provide incentives to buy relatively 
larger cars, which have a detrimental impact on the 
environment through increased overall fuel 
consumption. Roughly 50 per cent of all new cars 
sold in the EU in 2008 were company cars, which 
imply that these schemes have a large and long-
term impact on the overall composition of the car 
fleet.  
At present, the taxation regime for company cars 
in most Member States promotes the use of such 
cars beyond merits. According to Copenhagen 
Economics (2009) private use of company cars has 
been heavily subsidised in several Member States. 
The subsidy (measured as the percentage gap in 
the imputed tax base) is particularly large – 
according to the LAF-criteria – in Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Portugal and Slovakia. Against this background, r 
these countries in particular should consider 
reviewing the tax treatment of company cars. (
172
) 
It would be beneficial to reduce these subsidies 
and thereby favour the deployment of cleaner 
vehicles. Belgium is reviewing its company car 
regime with a view to reducing the incentive to 
choose large cars, while Hungary and Portugal 
have increased the tax on company cars.  
Vehicle taxation  
Transport taxes are an important category of 
environmentally-related taxes in the EU, 
accounting on average for 0.5% of GDP and 21% 
of environmental tax revenues. The two main 
forms of transport taxes are registration taxes 
levied on acquisition of the car and circulation 
taxes levied annually on car ownership.  
Today the transport sector accounts for close to 
one quarter of all the CO2 emissions in the EU 
Member States, the share of road transport being 
close to 70%. Moreover, the share of CO2 
emissions of the transport sector in the EU is 
projected to rise rapidly over the next 30 years in 
spite of the fact that the fuel efficiency and CO2 
intensity of new cars sold in the EU have 
constantly improved due to regulatory and other 
  
                                                          
(172) Note, however, that there is missing data for Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and 
Romania. 
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measures taken. (
173
) It is essential to address 
transport sector emissions to achieve the ambitious 
EU climate policy targets. In this context, vehicle 
taxes have recently started to be used as an 
environmental policy instrument. (
174
) They are 
increasingly designed in such a way that the tax 
burden depends on the car's CO2-emissions. 
CO2-based vehicle taxation can be regarded as a 
complement to transport fuel taxes, which also 
induces consumers to purchase fuel-efficient and 
hence low-emitting cars. Fuel taxation has the 
added advantage that it also affects driving habits. 
Several studies (
175
) suggest that when consumers 
make decisions to purchase cars they are more 
affected by retail prices than by future fuel costs. 
One explanation could be that consumers are 
short-sighted and hence apply very high discount 
rates on future fuel costs. Another possible 
explanation is that new cars are sold after a few 
years of use, and hence fuel costs in the more 
distant future are not taken into account by the 
buyer or the initial user of the car. This would 
                                                          
(173) European Commission (2012i). 
(174) Vehicle taxes were originally introduced for fiscal purposes 
and to finance road infrastructure. Moreover, private cars 
were seen as luxury goods that could be taxed higher than 
normal goods. 
(175) See the Impact Assessment accompanying the Commission 
proposal for a Council Directive on passenger related taxes 
(SEC(2005) 809), Kågeson (2005) and the report for the 
Commission by TNO, IEEP and LAT (2006). 
apply, in particular, to company cars, which are 
generally sold after 2-3 years of use. There are also 
indications of very high own-price elasticities (in 
absolute terms) of car demand. (
176
) Such evidence 
implies that registration taxes, which affect the 
retail price, could have a strong influence on the 
fuel-efficiency of cars. There is not yet much 
evidence relating to the efficiency of the recently 
introduced CO2-based vehicle taxes in reducing 
transport-related CO2 emissions. (
177
) 
The number of countries applying CO2-based 
vehicle taxation has increased rapidly in recent 
years. In 2010, 17 countries applied CO2-based 
registration taxes, circulation tax or both, while in 
2006 only 9 countries had done so. (
178
) (
179
) 
                                                          
(176) See Adamou et al. (2010). On the other hand, Vance and 
Mehlin (2009) present econometric evidence according to 
which circulation taxes and fuel costs also have a 
significantly negative impact on car demand, in addition to 
retail prices.  
(177) Giblin and McNabola (2009) studied the Irish reform in 
2008 which introduced both CO2-based registration and 
circulation taxes. The reform would bring about a 3 % 
reduction in CO2 emissions from private transport, which 
reflects a 3.8% reduction of emission intensity for petrol 
cars and a 3.6% reduction for diesel cars, as well as a shift 
of 6% from petrol to diesel car ownership.  
(178) ACEA (2012); European Commission, Taxes in Europe 
Database.  
(179) In 2005, a Commission proposal (COM(2005) 261final) 
aimed at removing cross-border obstacles to trade in cars 
and improving the functioning of the internal market by 
 
Table 5.19: Summary of challenges in area of environmental taxation 
 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Summary
Diesel vs. petrol 
ratio
No indexation of 
evironmental taxes
Reduced VAT on 
energy
Low taxation of 
company cars
Scope for CO2-
related vehicle 
taxation
BE X X X X X X
DE X X X X
EE X X
IE X X X
EL X X X X X X
ES X
FR X X X X
IT (X) X X X X
CY (X) X
LU X X X X X
MT X X X
NL X
AT (X) X
PT X X X X
SI (X) X X
SK X X X X X
FI (X) X X
BG X X
CZ X X
DK (X)
LV X
LT X X X X X
HU X X
PL X X
RO X
SE
UK X X
Scope to improve environmental tax designAdditional measures to 
achieve national 
greenhouse gas emission 
target
Country
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At present, 18 EU countries apply a registration 
tax. In 14 of them the tax is based on CO2 
emissions, often in addition to other characteristics 
of the car. In all, 23 Member States currently apply 
a circulation tax, and in half of these countries the 
tax rate is determined, partly or entirely, by CO2 
emissions. However, the design of the CO2-
component varies considerably between countries. 
Tax rates usually increase with CO2 emissions, but 
may also depend on many other of the car's 
characteristics. 
Some countries use ‘bonus-malus’ systems 
(Austria, Belgium (Wallonia), France), in which a 
‘bonus’ is granted for very low-emitting cars, 
while high-emitting cars pay a penalty. In a 
number of countries (seven) electric (and hybrid) 
vehicles are exempt from vehicle taxes, while in 
some countries they receive a subsidy (bonus). 
Estonia and Lithuania are the only two countries 
that do not apply any vehicle taxes. Bulgaria and 
Poland apply one of these taxes, but without CO2 
or fuel-efficiency differentiation. Thus, these four 
countries could benefit from reviewing whether a 
CO2-based vehicle tax could help them to reduce 
transport-related CO2 emissions more efficiently.  
                                                                                   
first making the registration taxes refundable and then 
phasing them out. A further aim was to transform vehicle 
taxation into a more efficient environmental policy 
instrument by introducing differentiation according to CO2 
emissions. The proposal has not been adopted by the 
Council, but as shown above, Member States have 
integrated parts of the proposal into their tax systems.  
Summary of challenges in the area of 
environmental taxation 
The challenges discussed in this section can be 
divided into: (i) the need to make more use of the 
taxation tool to achieve environmental objectives; 
and (ii) tax design issues in the area of 
environmental taxation. There are of course links 
between these two dimensions. For example, 
indexation of environmental taxes has an impact 
on incentives and hence the achievement of the 
objectives, in particular over time. The various 
measures that could be taken at a national level to 
improve the existing design of the tax system in 
this area include: (a) adjusting the structure of tax 
rates on fossil fuels according to their carbon and 
energy content; (b) indexing environmental taxes; 
(c) considering the abolition of reduced VAT rates 
on energy; (d) reducing tax subsidies for company 
cars; and (e) introducing CO2-related vehicle 
taxation. Individual Member States are considered 
to face an overall challenge regarding tax design 
issues if challenges have been defined in three out 
of the five areas discussed. On this basis, nine 
Member States have particular scope for 
improving the design of their environmental taxes: 
Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovakia, and Lithuania. 
Table 5.19 provides an overview of the challenges 
Member States face in the area of environmental 
taxation. 
5.4.3. Some redistribution aspects 
The previous sections have focused on improving 
the efficiency of the tax systems in EU Member 
Graph 5.9: Concentration of market income and disposable income measured by the Gini-coefficient 
 
Note: Member States are ranked in increasing order of disposable income inequality according to Eurostat. Eurostat data is available only for 
disposable income and cover the entire population, while OECD data refer to the working-age population (18-65 years old). Late 2000s refers to a year 
between 2006 and 2009. Income data are adjusted for household size (equivalation). Averages are arithmetic and refer to the Member States for which 
the respective data is available.  EU-21 refers to those 21 OECD member countries that are also EU Member States. 
Source: Eurostat and OECD. 
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States. However, the redistributive effects of a tax 
system can be just as important as its efficiency. 
There is often – although not always – a trade-off 
between efficiency and equity. Assuming that 
there is a social preference against inequality, 
social welfare is greater when consumption 
possibilities are more equally distributed, but 
redistribution may reduce the incentives to work 
and earn income in the first place. Therefore, when 
efficiency is scrutinised it is relevant to consider 
redistributive outcomes as well.  
Furthermore, income redistribution is one of the 
three objectives of taxation, alongside 
macroeconomic stabilisation, and resource 
allocation. (
180
) Redistribution can take place 
through several instruments, including taxation – 
in particular progressive taxation of labour income 
– but also through income replacing transfers, 
targeted benefits and public consumption 
expenditures (transfers in kind). Redistribution 
through the tax and transfer system is the 
prerogative of Member States, which – depending 
on their citizens' preferences – have different 
perceptions of social equity and different collective 
preferences for the balancing of efficiency and 
equality. However, a Member State which faces 
substantial efficiency challenges in the tax-benefit 
system (e.g. measured by a large share of tax 
expenditures) and at the same time achieves an 
inferior outcome in terms of mitigating market 
income inequalities, may have scope for improving 
efficiency without compromising redistribution 
policies or for increasing redistribution without 
hampering efficiency. (
181
) Redistributive policies 
should also take account of the need to ensure the 
sustainability of public finances. 
Comparing the distribution of market and 
disposable income  
The distribution of market income, obtained either 
from labour or capital, is a prior determinant of the 
distribution of household disposable income. (
182
) 
                                                          
(180) See Musgrave (1959).  
(181) In formal economic terms, this means that a government 
could enhance one dimension without harming the other 
until the optimal Pareto frontier is reached. The position on 
this ‘trade-off’ frontier, once reached, depends on 
collective choice.  
(182) Market incomes are wages, self-employed income, and 
personal capital income before deduction of taxes and 
social security contributions. Disposable income is market 
income plus social transfers less income taxes. 
The more unequally market income is distributed, 
the greater the amount of redistribution required to 
achieve a given degree of equality in disposable 
income.  
The distribution of market income is more unequal 
than the distribution of disposable income in the 
EU. (
183
) On average, the Gini-coefficient (
184
) for 
market income for working-age population in the 
EU-21 (0.41) is about 35% higher than for 
disposable income (see Graph 5.9). This reflects 
the significant role of (country-specific) tax-
benefit systems to smooth out market-income 
inequality. However, inequality patterns are less 
dispersed across countries in terms of market 
income than in terms of disposable income, 
suggesting differences in national preferences for 
redistribution. Member States with low inequality 
in market income for the working-age population 
also tend to redistribute the most (i.e. they are the 
ones with the highest difference between the two 
Gini coefficients). According to OECD data for 21 
EU countries, the range of the Gini-coefficient is 
about 10 points for market income (from 0.36 to 
0.46) and around 12 points for disposable income 
(from 0.23 to 0.35). 
Lithuania and Latvia display the highest levels of 
inequality for disposable income of the entire 
population in 2010, followed by Spain, Portugal, 
Romania, Ireland, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom 
and Greece. Disposable income is most equally 
distributed in Slovenia, followed by Hungary, 
Sweden, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and 
Belgium. (
185
)  
                                                          
(183) Redistribution is expressed by the difference between the 
Gini-coefficient for market income and disposable income. 
Working-age population (rather than total population) is 
used to compare redistribution across Member States 
because it avoids the influence of differences in pension 
systems and different demographic patterns. 
(184) The Gini-coefficient is the most used inequality measure. It 
varies between 0, when everyone receives an identical 
amount of income, and 1, when a single individual receives 
all the income. Higher values of the Gini-coefficient thus 
indicate higher inequality in the income distribution. 
Besides the Gini-coefficient, several other indicators are 
available to describe inequality and the redistributive 
impact of tax-and benefit systems; see, e.g., European 
Commission (2009b). 
(185) However, there is a significant difference between the 
Eurostat figures and the OECD figures for the Gini-
coefficient for disposable income. This is in particular the 
case for Hungary, Ireland and the Netherlands, which all 
have a Gini-coefficient close to the EU-21 average 
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Turning to the difference between market income 
and disposable income, Slovakia, Denmark and 
Sweden show the lowest levels of market income 
inequality of the working-age population but not of 
disposable income inequality. On the other hand, 
Luxembourg, Germany and France have market 
income inequality at or above the (un-weighted) 
EU-average, but the tax-benefit system reduces the 
inequality to a level below the average. A strong 
redistributive effect is also visible in Italy, Poland, 
the United Kingdom and Portugal, although the 
inequality of disposable income remains above the 
EU average in these countries. In Spain and 
Estonia, by contrast, the redistributive effect is 
rather modest, as the Gini-coefficient for 
disposable income is close to the one for market 
income. 
From a long-term perspective, inequality has 
generally been rising in the EU since the 1970', 80' 
and 90', although there are several exceptions, 
particularly in southern Europe. (
186
) Since the 
mid-2000s, however, inequality in disposable 
income has hardly changed in the EU.  
Tax policy instruments for redistribution  
Different types of taxes have different distributive 
properties. Personal income taxes are in most cases 
progressive, but the degree of progressivity and, 
therefore, the redistributive power varies 
considerably among Member States. Social 
security contributions are often proportional or 
even regressive (if they are capped). As they are 
largely equivalent, economically speaking, to 
personal income taxes on labour income, their 
distributional impact should be evaluated jointly 
with personal income tax. VAT is often thought to 
be regressive because of the higher propensity to 
consume at low income levels. However, all 
income is going to be spent at some point. 
Theoretically, from a life-time perspective with no 
bequests, uniform VAT without reduced rates is 
proportional. (
187
) (
188
) In general, excise duties are 
regressive as they are set as a fixed amount per 
quantity, but the redistributive properties also 
                                                                                   
according to OECD figures, and for Denmark, which 
would rank as having the second lowest Gini-coefficient. 
(186) See OECD (2011b). 
(187) In a closed economy, a uniform commodity tax is 
equivalent to a proportional tax on wage income, both in 
terms of distortions and (absence of) distributional impact. 
(188) See Caspersen and Metcalf (1995). 
depend on which income groups consume the 
commodity in question. 
It is well established that the most efficient policy 
instrument for redistributing income is progressive 
taxation of labour income along with income-
replacing transfers and targeted benefits. (
189
) It is 
possible to introduce progressive elements in taxes 
other than labour income taxes, such as personal 
capital income taxes, corporate income taxes and 
consumption taxes. However, these instruments 
are less efficient than progressive labour income 
taxation and subsidies. 
Personal capital income taxes adversely affect 
savings/consumption as well as portfolio decisions 
and capital is far more mobile than labour. (
190
) 
However, a counter argument for taxing personal 
capital income at progressive rates, despite 
additional distortionary effects compared to labour 
taxes, is that capital income is more unevenly 
distributed than labour income. (
191
) Corporate 
income taxes do not directly affect the income 
distribution of individuals (
192
), but they do 
adversely affect capital formation and, therefore, 
reduce labour productivity and wages. 
With regard to consumptions taxes, most EU 
Member States apply different VAT rates 
apparently for redistributive reasons (e.g. reduced 
rates on food, housing, medicine, children’s 
clothing etc.). However, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
differential commodity taxation is an ill-targeted 
and costly instrument for the pursuit of equity 
objectives. While it is true that the less well-off 
spend a higher proportion of their income on 
consumption items taxed at reduced rates than the 
better off do, high-income individuals spend a 
larger absolute amount on such items. Crawford et 
al. (2010) show for the United Kingdom (which 
has a zero rate for certain consumption items) that 
it is possible to unify VAT rates, while at the same 
time compensating the losers with direct transfers  
 
                                                          
(189) See e.g. Mirrlees et al. (2010), Sørensen (2007) or 
Boadway and Keen (2000).  
(190) See Sørensen (2006). 
(191) Furthermore, property taxes could be made progressive 
through a basic allowance. Inheritance taxes could also be 
made progressive on the same grounds as capital income 
taxation. 
(192) Profits of corporations net of corporate income tax are 
eventually taxed as dividends or capital gains under 
personal income tax. 
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(Continued on the next page) 
Box 5.5: Distributional effects of environmental taxation
Environmental taxes can be cost-effective instruments for achieving environmental policy goals. They 
increase the relative price of consumption with a negative environmental impact, thereby encouraging 
consumers to switch to more sustainable patterns of consumption and providing incentives for producers to 
invest in clean technologies. However, the distributional consequences of such taxes are debated and could 
be an obstacle for implementing environmental tax reforms. In fact, environmental tax reform does not 
necessarily have a negative impact on the distribution of consumption possibilities. 
The commonest forms of environmental taxes, and the most important ones from the fiscal point of view, 
are taxes on energy. Energy products, such as electricity and fuels for heating and transport, are considered, 
like food, to be necessary goods to the extent that the share of income devoted to these goods typically 
declines with the level of income. Hence, poorer households bear a larger burden of the taxes imposed on 
these products than richer households do, relative to their income. 
Most empirical evidence indicates that taxing domestic heating and electricity does tend to be regressive. At 
the EU-27 level, Cambridge Econometrics (2008) show that a 10 % increase in gas and electricity prices will 
have a regressive impact across five income quintiles of real household disposable income (see Table 1A). 
Table 1A: Changes in real household incomes (per cent) as a result of a 10 per cent increase in 
electricity and gas prices for five income quintiles, EU-27 
All households 1st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile 
-0.54 -0.69 -0.65 -0.59 -0.53 -0.43 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics (2008), reproduced in European Commission (2011). 
Similar evidence is found in studies concerning individual Member States. (1) Evidence in Tuuli (2009) 
indicates that electricity taxes are at least mildly regressive in Finland. In Denmark, the Danish Ministry of 
Taxation (2005) shows that the excise duties on electricity and on fuels for heating purposes are clearly 
regressive, both measured in relation to consumption and total household income. A recent study by Vivid 
Economics (2012) concludes that taxes on residential energy are regressive in Spain, Hungary and Poland. 
There is also evidence indicating that countries may differ with respect to the regressive nature of energy 
taxes. For instance, energy taxes appear to be more regressive in the UK and Ireland than in other European 
countries (see EEA, 2011 and Kosonen, 2012). Differences in the levels of consumption of energy for 
heating in northern and southern Europe and differences in the design of vehicle taxation also affect the 
overall distributional effects of environmental taxes across Member States. 
However, not all environmental taxes are regressive. Taxes on transport fuels and other transport-related 
taxes tend to be somewhat progressive.(2) This is because car ownership increases heavily with income, so 
that taxes affecting the cost of fuel or the purchase and ownership of cars are paid more by middle- or high-
income households than by those with the lowest incomes.(3)  Several empirical studies from individual 
countries indicate that the shares of income paid on transport-related taxes or expenses also tend to rise with 
income up to a relatively high-income level. Jacobsen et al. (2003) conclude that in Denmark the share of 
disposable income paid on transport-related taxes (car registration tax, annual ownership tax, tax on 
insurance premiums and excise duty on petrol) increase up to the 9th decile. Thus, these taxes are 
progressive as a whole.(4) Tuuli (2009) studies the incidence of motor fuel taxes in Finland using total 
expenditure as the income concept. The findings show that the share of total expenditure spent on motor 
fuels increases up to the 6th-8th expenditure decile and declines slightly thereafter and thus would be 
progressive for a large share of the income scale. Ahola-Carlsson-Sterner (2009) present similar evidence 
                                                          
(1) See EEA (2011) for an overview of the literature. 
(2) Taxes on transport fuels represent about 78 % of energy tax revenues in the EU-27. 
(3) While car ownership and purchase increases with income all the way throughout the income distribution, annual 
driving per household is flat  in the upper half of the income distribution. 
(4) See also Danish Ministry of Taxation (2005). 
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in a way that improves both the progressivity and 
the efficiency of the overall tax system and also 
increases overall revenues to finance desirable 
reforms. A number of indirect taxes other than 
VAT may also have non-negligible effects on the 
distribution of consumption possibilities. The  
distributional impact of environmental taxes is 
reviewed in Box 5.5. 
Personal income tax and social security 
contribution progressivity 
A tax schedule can be considered to be progressive 
if the average tax rate rises with income, i.e. the 
marginal tax rate at a given level of income 
exceeds the average tax rate. (
193
) (
194
) An index of 
progressivity (IP) can be defined as follows: 
IP = 1 – (1-MTR)/(1-ATR) 
where MTR = marginal tax rate and 
ATR = average tax rate. For a progressive tax 
system, i.e. MTR higher than ATR, the index of 
progressivity is bounded between 0 and 1. Higher 
                                                          
(193) The marginal tax rate is the amount of personal income tax 
and social security contributions paid on an additional unit 
of income. The average tax rate is the ratio of the total 
amount of personal income tax and social security 
contributions to total gross income.  
(194) See Jakobsson (1976) for an overview of different 
measures of tax progression.  
values of the index imply higher          
progressivity. (
195
) 
This index varies substantially between Member 
States (see Graph 5.10 and Table A.8 in the 
Annex). At the average wage (AW) level, 
progressivity is by far the highest in Ireland (0.41), 
followed by Luxembourg and Hungary. Italy, 
Germany, and France, rank approximately in the 
middle with a mean comprised between 0.13 and 
0.17.  
Graph 5.10: Index of progressivity at the 100% and 167% level 
of the wage of the average worker (single no 
children), 2010 
 
Note: Data not available for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta 
and Romania. 
Source: OECD. 
 
                                                          
(195) For MTR=100% and ATR <100%, IP=1. For ATR=MTR, 
i.e. a purely flat tax system, IP=0. 
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from Sweden: taking total expenditure, the tax burden would increase from the lowest up to the 8th decile. 
Evidence from the UK also indicates that middle-income households would be more affected by fuel tax 
increases than low- or high-income households (5), while if only car-owning households are considered, fuel 
taxes would be regressive. Several studies also point out that rural households are more affected by transport 
fuel taxes than urban households are. 
This evidence implies that transport-related taxes can significantly mitigate the regressive impact of other 
energy taxes, or even completely offset that impact. In this respect, however, there is variation across 
countries, and this needs to be taken into account when a tax reform is designed. The Cambridge 
Econometrics (2008) study for the Commission investigates the impacts of various energy tax reform 
packages at EU level. The results indicate that the inclusion of transport fuel taxes in the reform package 
more or less neutralises the regressive overall impact of other energy taxes. However, the distributional 
effect of tax reforms also depends on how the extra revenue from excise duties is used. If distributional 
neutrality is a reform objective, such as in a reform increasing environmental taxes and reducing taxes on 
labour income, low-income and non-labour-income households could be compensated through a higher 
basic allowance or a targeted income transfer. 
As with many environmental taxes, excise duties on health-related products such as tobacco, alcohol, 
confectionary and saturated fat (sin taxes) tend to be regressive. Again, it is possible to mitigate the impact 
on low-income households via personal income taxation or direct transfers. 
                                                          
(5) Blow-Crawford (1997) and Johnstone-Alavapati (1998). 
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Most of the Member States that have joined the 
EU since 2004 display lower progressivity. For 
Austria, Germany and Spain, ceilings on social 
security contributions create a negative index of 
progressivity at the 167% AW level. The index of 
progressivity is also rather sensitive to the 
threshold of the top personal income tax rate. 
Another related measure of progressivity compares 
the tax wedge for a single person with no children 
earning 167% of the AW, with the tax wedge of a 
single person earning 67% of the average (see 
Graph 5.11 and Annex Table 8).  
Graph 5.11: Ratio of tax wedge 167% / 67% of the average 
worker (single, no children), 2010 
 
Source: Eurostat and OECD. 
At EU level, the average tax rate (including SSC 
and standard family benefits) at the 167% AW 
level is 19% higher than the average tax rate at 
67% of the average wage. According to this 
measure, redistribution is high in Ireland (where 
the tax wedge is very low at 67% of the AW), 
Luxembourg and Malta. On the contrary, in 
Bulgaria the 67% earner and the 167% earner face 
exactly the same tax wedge. There is also a 
relatively low difference in the tax wedges in 
Romania, Poland and the Baltic countries. 
5.5. OVERVIEW OF TAX POLICY CHALLENGES 
This chapter analysed potential challenges that EU 
Member States are facing in the area of tax policy. 
These challenges concern both the macroeconomic 
effects of the tax system and the design of 
individual taxes. Table 5.20 provides a synoptic 
overview of Member States that may need to 
consider tax policy measures in the different areas 
discussed.  
Based on a quantitative screening, Section 5.1 
analysed in which Member States tax increases 
could contribute to consolidation and in which 
there appeared to be scope, and a need, for a tax 
shift. The analysis found that Spain, Malta, 
Slovakia and Slovenia faced consolidation 
challenges and had 'tax space' at the same 
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Table 5.20: Overview table: Tax policy challenges in Member States 
 
Note: (X) depicts borderline cases. Member States under an economic adjustment programme (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) are excluded from the 
analysis in the first column. 
Source: Commission services. 
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time. (
196
) They could, therefore, consider using 
measures on the revenue side of the budget – in 
addition to those on the expenditure side – to 
consolidate their public finances and make them 
more sustainable. Such revenue raising measures 
have been taken recently in Spain but are not 
reflected in the data yet. 
Around one third of Member States could benefit 
from a tax shift from labour taxes to taxes 
considered less detrimental to growth 
(consumption taxes, recurrent property taxes, 
environmental taxes). In particular Belgium, 
France, Italy, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania 
and – to a lesser extent – also Germany, Austria 
and Hungary were found to have both a need to 
reduce labour taxation and scope for increasing 
less detrimental taxes. 
Section 5.2 analysed which countries might benefit 
from a broadening of tax bases in direct and 
indirect taxation. As shown in Table 5.20 many 
Member States face the challenge of reviewing and 
potentially reducing tax expenditure in personal 
and corporate income taxation. Concerning such a 
review in the area of corporate income taxation, 
Member States should, where appropriate, assess 
reduced rates for SMEs, special regions or sectors, 
accelerated depreciation schemes as well as R&D 
and investment incentives. Moreover, several 
Member States should consider addressing the debt 
bias in corporate taxation (in particular Greece, 
France, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, but also 
Germany, Spain and Sweden). Despite recent 
measures to improve VAT efficiency, many 
Member States still need to address the often very 
high policy and/or compliance gaps in the area of 
VAT. 
A number of Member States face the challenge of 
improving tax governance as analysed in Section 
5.3. Challenges can be related to either (i) the need 
to improve tax compliance as a consequence of a 
large shadow economy and/or high levels of 
potential VAT fraud and evasion, or (ii) a specific 
potential to improve their tax administration as 
indicated by high costs of paying and/or collecting 
taxes and little use of pre-filling or third-party 
information. 
                                                          
(196) In that analysis programme countries Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal were not included. 
Housing taxation in EU Member States is often 
based too much on rather distortive transaction 
taxes as opposed to recurrent taxes on immovable 
property, which are considered less detrimental to 
growth. In particular Belgium, Greece, Spain, 
France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Portugal 
should consider a shift within property taxes in 
favour of recurrent taxes and/or continue with the 
measures recently implemented or discussed. (
197
) 
Moreover, nearly half of the Member States face 
the challenges of reducing the debt bias in housing 
taxation created by the (partial) deductibility of 
mortgage interest, although to differing degrees. In 
these countries, either imputed rents or recurrent 
property taxes on owner-occupied housing are too 
low to tax immovable property returns at a level 
consistent with alternative investment items. Given 
the political difficulty of raising property taxes, a 
second-best option might be the gradual phasing 
out of interest-rate deductibility in order to remove 
this debt bias in the tax system and make the tax 
treatment of different capital goods more neutral.  
Sub-section 5.4.2 analysed tax-related challenges 
in terms of environmental policy. First, it is 
important to ensure that the policy instruments in 
place, including taxes, are sufficient to meet the 
agreed environmental objectives concerning GHG 
emissions. If there is a need for further policy 
measures, environmental taxes should play a role 
in the policy mix. Secondly, energy taxes and other 
environmental taxes should be designed so that 
they provide appropriate incentives to reduce 
emissions over time. Various measures could be 
taken at the national level to improve the existing 
design of tax systems, in particular by: i) adjusting 
the structure of tax rates on fossil fuels according 
to their carbon and energy content; ii) indexing 
environmental taxes; iii) considering the abolition 
of reduced VAT rates on energy; iv) reducing tax 
subsidies for company cars and v) introducing 
CO2-related vehicle taxation. Overall, a third of 
Member States appear to have specific scope for 
improving the design of their environmental taxes. 
The challenges identified in this chapter relate to 
improving the efficiency of national tax systems. 
However, the redistributive effects of the tax 
system can be equally important. Redistribution  
 
                                                          
(197) For instance Italy recently increased recurrent taxes on real 
estate with the introduction of IMU. 
5. Tax policy challenges in EU Member States 
 
99 
can occur via several instruments, including 
taxation, and progressive taxation of labour 
income in particular. Redistribution through the 
tax-benefit system is the prerogative of Member 
States, which have different perceptions of social 
equity and different collective preferences for 
balancing efficiency versus equality. Therefore, it 
is difficult to come up with prescriptive policy  
recommendations in this complex and sensitive 
area and the identification of clear policy  
  
challenges at national level. However, a Member 
State which faces substantial efficiency challenges 
in the tax-benefit system and at the same time 
achieves an inferior outcome in terms of mitigating 
income inequalities, may have some scope for 
increasing either redistribution or efficiency 
without harming the other dimension. When 
deciding on their redistributive policy, Member 
States also need to ensure that the sustainability of 
public finance is not jeoparised.  
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ACE (Allowance for Corporate Equity) allows for 
a deduction for the return on equity from the 
corporate income tax base (taxable profits). 
Coupled with a deduction for interest payments, it 
would equalise the tax treatment of debt and equity 
finance. 
CBIT (Comprehensive Business Income Tax) 
Interest payments can no longer be deducted from 
corporate profits, and are thus fully taxed at the 
corporate income tax rate, similarly to the return 
on equity. 
Convergence programmes Medium-term 
budgetary and monetary strategies presented by 
Member States that have not yet adopted the euro. 
They are updated annually, according to the 
provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. Prior 
to the third phase of EMU, convergence 
programmes were issued on a voluntary basis and 
used by the Commission in its assessment of the 
progress made in preparing for the euro. See also 
stability programmes. 
Direct taxes Taxes that are levied on income, 
wealth and capital, at the personal or corporate 
level. 
Discretionary fiscal policy Change in the budget 
balance and in its components under government 
control. It is usually measured as the residual of 
the change in the balance after the exclusion of the 
budgetary impact of automatic stabilisers. See also 
fiscal stance. 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) Group of 
senior government officials whose main task is to 
prepare the discussions of the (ECOFIN) Council 
on structural policies. It plays an important role in 
the preparation of the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines. It is also deals with policies related to 
labour markets, methods to calculate cyclically-
adjusted budget balances and ageing populations. 
Effective tax rate The ratio of broad categories of 
tax revenue (labour income, capital income, 
consumption) to their respective tax bases. 
Effectiveness The same concept as efficiency 
except that it links input to outcomes rather than 
outputs. 
Efficiency Can be defined in several ways, either 
as the ratio of outputs to inputs or as the distance 
to a production possibility frontier. Cost efficiency 
measures the link between monetary inputs (funds) 
and outputs; technical efficiency measures the link 
between technical inputs and outputs. Output 
efficiency indicates by how much the output can be 
increased for a given input; input efficiency 
indicates by how much the input can be reduced 
for a given input. 
Environmental taxes These include taxes on 
energy, transport, pollution and resources 
(excluding value added types of taxes because they 
are levied on all products). Energy taxes include 
taxes on energy products used for both transport 
(e.g. petrol and diesel) and stationary purposes 
(e.g. fuel oils, natural gas, coal and electricity). 
Transport taxes include taxes related to the 
ownership and use of motor vehicles. They also 
include taxes on other transport equipment such as 
planes and related transport services such as duties 
on charter or scheduled flights. Pollution taxes 
include taxes on measured or estimated emissions 
to air (except CO2 taxes) and water, on the 
management of waste, and on noise. Resource 
taxes include any taxes linked to extraction or use 
of a natural resource (e.g. extraction of gas and oil, 
licences paid for hunting, fishing and the like). 
Euro-Plus Pact Agreed in spring 2011 by the 17 
Member States of the euro area, joined by 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Romania. The Pact commits signatories to 
economic coordination for competitiveness and 
convergence, also in areas of national competence, 
with concrete goals agreed on and reviewed on a 
yearly basis by Heads of State or Government. It is 
integrated into the European semester and the 
Commission monitors the implementation of the 
commitments. 
ESA95 / ESA79 European accounting standards 
for the reporting of economic data by the Member 
States to the EU. As of 2000, ESA95 replaced the 
earlier ESA79 standard with respect to the 
comparison and analysis of national public finance 
data. 
European semester New governance architecture 
approved by the Member States in September 
2010. It means that the EU and the euro zone will 
coordinate their budgetary and economic policies 
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ex ante, in line with the Europe 2020 strategy, the 
Stability and Growth Pact and the Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure. On the basis of previous 
discussions on the Commission’s Annual Growth 
Survey, each summer the European Council and 
the Council of Ministers provide policy advice 
before Member States finalise their draft budgets. 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) A procedure 
according to which the Commission and the 
Council monitor the development of national 
budget balances and public debt in order to assess 
and/or correct the risk of an excessive deficit in 
each Member State. Its application has been 
further clarified in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
See also stability programmes. 
Implicit tax rates General measure for the 
effective average tax burden on different types of 
economic income or activities, i.e. on labour, 
consumption and capital, as the ratio between 
revenue from the tax type under consideration and 
its (maximum possible) base. 
Implicit tax rate on consumption Ratio between 
the revenue from all consumption taxes and the 
final consumption expenditure of households. 
Implicit tax rate on labour The sum of all direct 
and indirect taxes and social contributions levied 
on employed labour income as a percentage of 
total compensation of employees from national 
accounts. 
Implicit tax rate on capital Ratio between taxes 
on capital and aggregate capital and savings 
income. Specifically, it includes taxes levied on 
the income earned from savings and investments 
by households and corporations as well as taxes, 
related to stocks of capital, stemming from savings 
and investment in previous periods. The 
denominator is an approximation of world-wide 
capital and business income of residents for 
domestic tax purposes 
(Real) implicit tax rate on energy Ratio between 
total energy tax revenues and final energy 
consumption, deflated with the cumulative % 
change in the final demand deflator. 
Fiscal consolidation An improvement in the 
budget balance through measures of discretionary 
fiscal policy, specified either by the amount of the 
improvement or the period over which the 
improvement continues. 
General government As used by the EU in its 
process of budgetary surveillance under the 
Stability and Growth Pact and the excessive deficit 
procedure, the general government sector covers 
national government, regional and local 
government, as well as social security funds. 
Public enterprises are excluded, as are transfers to 
and from the EU Budget. 
Inactivity trap Measure for the disincentive to 
return to employment from inactivity. The 
inactivity trap is also often referred to as the 
participation tax rate. The inactivity trap measures 
the part of additional gross wage that is taxed away 
in the form of increased taxes (personal income tax 
and employee social security contributions (SSC) 
and withdrawn benefits such as unemployment 
benefits, social assistance, and housing benefits in 
the event of an inactive person taking up a job. 
Indirect taxation Taxes that are levied during the 
production stage, and not on the income and 
property arising from economic production 
processes. Prominent examples of indirect taxation 
are value added tax (VAT), excise duties, import 
levies, energy and other environmental taxes. 
Integrated guidelines A general policy instrument 
for coordinating EU-wide and Member States' 
economic structural reforms embedded in the 
Lisbon strategy, whose main aim is to boost 
economic growth and job creation in the EU. 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs 
Partnership between the EU and Member States 
for growth and more and better jobs. Originally 
approved in 2000, the Lisbon Strategy was 
revamped in 2005. On the basis of the Integrated 
Guidelines (merger of the broad economic policy 
guidelines and the employment guidelines, dealing 
with macro-economic, micro-economic and 
employment issues) for the period 2005-2008, 
Member States drew up three-year national reform 
programmes at the end of 2005. They reported on 
the implementation of the national reform 
programmes for the first time in autumn 2006. The 
Commission analyses and summarises these 
reports in an EU Annual Progress Report each year 
in time for the Spring European Council. 
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Low-wage trap Effective marginal tax rate 
defined as the rate at which taxes are increased and 
benefits withdrawn as earnings rise due to an 
increase in work productivity. This kind of trap is 
most likely to occur at relatively low wage levels 
due to the fact that the withdrawal of social 
transfers (mainly social assistance, in-work 
benefits and housing benefits), which are usually 
available only to persons with a low income, adds 
to the marginal rate of income taxes and social 
security contributions. 
Medium-term budgetary framework An 
institutional fiscal device that lets policy-makers 
extend the horizon for fiscal policy-making beyond 
the annual budgetary calendar (typically 3-5 
years). Targets can be adjusted under medium-
term budgetary frameworks (MTBF) either on an 
annual basis (flexible frameworks) or only at the 
end of the MTBF horizon (fixed frameworks). 
Medium-term objective (MTO) Represents a 
budgetary position that safeguards against the risk 
of breaching the 3% of GDP threshold of the 
Treaty and ensures the long-term sustainability of 
public finances. 
One-off and temporary measures Government 
transactions having a transitory budgetary effect 
that does not lead to a sustained change in the 
budgetary position. See also structural balance. 
Policy-mix The overall stance of fiscal and 
monetary policy. The policy-mix may consist of 
various combinations of expansionary and 
restrictive policies, with a given fiscal stance either 
supported or offset by monetary policy. 
Pro-cyclical fiscal policy A fiscal stance which 
amplifies the economic cycle by increasing the 
structural primary deficit during an economic 
upturn, or by decreasing it in a downturn. A 
neutral fiscal policy keeps the cyclically-adjusted 
budget balance unchanged throughout the 
economic cycle but allows the automatic 
stabilisers to work. See also tax-smoothing. 
QUEST The macroeconomic model of the EU 
Member States plus the US and Japan developed 
by the Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs of the European Commission. 
Recently acceded Member States The countries 
that became members of the EU in May 2004 
include Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. Two additional countries, 
Romania and Bulgaria joined in January 2007. 
Social security contributions (SSC) Mandatory 
contributions paid by employers and employees to 
a social insurance scheme to cover pensions, health 
care and other welfare provisions. 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) Approved in 
1997 and reformed in 2005, the SGP clarifies the 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty regarding the 
surveillance of Member States' budgetary policies 
and the monitoring of budget deficits during the 
third phase of the EMU. The SGP consists of two 
Council Regulations setting out legally binding 
provisions to be followed by the European 
Institutions and the Member States and two 
Resolutions of the Amsterdam European Council 
in (June 1997). See also Excessive Deficit 
Procedure. 
Stability programmes Medium-term budgetary 
strategies presented by those Member States that 
have already adopted the euro. They are updated 
annually, according to the provisions of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. See also Convergence 
programmes. 
Statutory tax rate on corporate income Taxation 
of corporate income is not only conducted through 
CIT (corporate income tax), but, in some Member 
States, also through surcharges or even additional 
taxes levied on tax bases that are similar, but often 
not identical, to the CIT. In order to take these 
features into account, the simple CIT rate has been 
adjusted for comparison purposes. If several rates 
exist, only the ‘basic’ (non-targeted) top rate is 
presented; existing surcharges and averages of 
local taxes are added to the standard rate. 
Tax elasticity A parameter measuring the relative 
change in tax revenues with respect to a relative 
change in GDP. Tax elasticity is an input to 
budgetary sensitivity. 
Tax expenditure Public expenditure implemented 
through the tax system by way of a special tax 
concession — such as an exclusion, an exemption, 
an allowance, a credit, a preferential rate or tax 
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deferral — that results in reduced tax liability for 
certain subsets of taxpayers. 
Tax gaps Measure used in the assessment of the 
sustainability of public finances. They measure the 
difference between the current tax ratio and the 
constant tax ratio over a given projection period to 
achieve a predetermined level of debt at the end of 
that projection period. 
Tax smoothing The idea that tax rates should be 
kept stable in order to minimise the distortionary 
effects of taxation, while leaving it up to automatic 
stabilisers to smooth the economic cycle. It is also 
referred to as neutral discretionary fiscal policy. 
See also cyclical component of fiscal policy. 
Tax wedge Difference between the wage costs of 
an average worker for his/her employer and the 
amount of net income that the worker receives in 
return. That difference is represented by taxes, 
including personal income taxes and compulsory 
social security contributions. 
Unemployment trap Measure for the disincentive 
to return to employment from unemployment. It 
measures the part of the additional gross wage that 
  
is taxed away when a person returns to work from 
unemployment. It takes into account the reduction 
in benefits payments following the return to the 
labour market, as well as higher taxes and 
employee social security contributions. 
VAT revenue ratio (VRR) The VRR is defined as 
the ratio between the actual VAT revenue 
collected and the revenue that would theoretically 
be raised if VAT was applied at the standard rate 
to all final consumption. In theory, the closer the 
VAT system of a country is to the ‘pure’ VAT 
regime (i.e. where all consumption is taxed at a 
uniform rate), the closer its VRR is to 1. A low 
VRR can indicate a reduction of the tax base due 
to large exemptions or reduced rates (‘policy gap’) 
or a failure to collect all tax as a result of fraud, for 
instance (‘collection gap’). 
VAT ‘collection gap’ The VAT gap is the 
difference between accrued VAT receipts and the 
theoretical net VAT liability for the economy as a 
whole given the country's VAT system. The 
theoretical net liability is estimated by identifying 
the categories of expenditure that give rise to 
irrecoverable VAT and combining these with 
appropriate VAT rates. 
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Table A.1: Total taxes (including social security contributions) and tax structure, % of GDP, 2000-2010, EU-27 
 
Note: GDP-weighted EU-27 averages. Totals may be affected by rounding. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Structure by type of tax
Indirect taxes 13.7 13.4 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.5 13.1 12.9 13.2
    VAT 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.7 7.0
    Excise duties and consumption taxes 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7
    Other taxes on products (incl. import duties) 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.5
    Other taxes on production 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0
Direct taxes 14.1 13.6 13.1 12.9 12.8 13.2 13.7 13.9 13.8 12.8 12.6
    Personal income 9.8 9.6 9.4 9.2 8.9 9.1 9.2 9.4 9.4 9.3 9.1
    Corporate income 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.0 2.2 2.4
    Other 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2
Social contributions 12.7 12.6 12.5 12.7 12.6 12.5 12.4 12.2 12.5 12.9 12.7
     Employers´ 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.3
     Employees´ 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.8
     Self- and non-employed 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5
Total taxes (including SSC) 40.4 39.5 38.8 38.8 38.7 39.0 39.5 39.4 39.3 38.4 38.4
Structure by economic function
Consumption 11.4 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.0 10.8 10.7 11.0
Labour 20.2 20.1 19.8 19.8 19.5 19.5 19.3 19.2 19.6 20.0 19.6
    Employed 18.6 18.5 18.2 18.2 17.9 17.8 17.7 17.7 18.1 18.4 18.1
          Paid by employers 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.0
          Paid by employees 10.9 10.7 10.5 10.4 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.0 10.2 10.3 10.1
    Non-employed 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5
Capital 8.9 8.4 8.0 8.0 8.2 8.5 9.2 9.3 8.9 7.8 7.8
    Capital and business income 6.1 5.7 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.7 6.3 6.5 6.1 5.2 5.3
           Income of corporations 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.4 3.4 3.1 2.3 2.4
           Income of households 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
           Income of self-employed (incl. SSC) 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0
    Stocks of capital / wealth 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5
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Table A.2: Total taxes (including social security contributions) and tax structure, % of GDP, 2000-2010, EA-17 
 
Note: GDP-weighted EA-17 averages. Totals may be affected by rounding. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Structure by type of tax
Indirect taxes 13.5 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.3 12.9 12.8 12.9
    VAT 7.0 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.9
    Excise duties and consumption taxes 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4
    Other taxes on products (incl. import duties) 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6
    Other taxes on production 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0
Direct taxes 13.0 12.6 12.2 12.0 11.9 12.0 12.6 12.9 12.7 12.0 11.8
    Personal income 9.1 8.9 8.7 8.5 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.7 8.9 8.9 8.7
    Corporate income 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.2 3.3 2.9 2.0 2.2
    Other 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9
Social contributions 14.5 14.3 14.3 14.5 14.3 14.2 14.1 13.9 14.1 14.5 14.3
     Employers´ 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.1 8.0 8.0 8.1 8.3 8.2
     Employees´ 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3
     Self- and non-employed 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9
Total taxes (including SSC) 40.9 40.0 39.5 39.5 39.2 39.4 40.0 40.0 39.6 39.0 38.9
Structure by economic function
Consumption 11.1 10.9 10.8 10.7 10.7 10.8 10.8 10.7 10.5 10.4 10.7
Labour 21.3 21.1 21.0 21.0 20.6 20.5 20.3 20.1 20.6 21.0 20.8
    Employed 19.5 19.3 19.2 19.2 18.8 18.6 18.5 18.5 18.9 19.3 19.1
          Paid by employers 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.9 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.7 8.9 8.9
          Paid by employees 10.7 10.6 10.4 10.3 10.0 9.9 9.9 9.9 10.2 10.3 10.2
    Non-employed 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7
Capital 8.7 8.2 7.8 7.9 8.0 8.3 9.0 9.3 8.6 7.7 7.6
    Capital and business income 6.2 5.8 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.6 6.3 6.6 6.1 5.2 5.2
           Income of corporations 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.4 3.0 2.2 2.3
           Income of households 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7
           Income of self-employed (incl. SSC) 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2
    Stocks of capital / wealth 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.5 2.3
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Table A.3: Development of implicit tax rates, in % 
 
Note: EU and EA averages are adjusted for missing data. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
1995 2000 2010 1995 2000 2010 1995 2000 2010
BE 43.6 43.6 42.5 20.4 21.8 21.4 25.5 29.5 29.5
BG 30.8 38.1 24.4 17.3 18.5 22.8 : : :
CZ 41.4 41.2 39.0 20.9 18.8 21.1 22.4 18.7 16.7
DK 40.2 41.0 34.8 30.5 33.4 31.5 29.9 36.0 :
DE 38.8 39.1 37.4 18.8 19.2 19.8 21.3 27.0 20.7
EE 38.6 37.8 37.0 21.2 19.5 25.6 : 5.8 9.1
IE 29.7 28.5 26.1 24.7 25.5 21.6 : : 14.0
EL : 34.5 31.3 : 16.5 15.8 : : 16.5
ES 31.0 30.5 33.0 14.2 15.8 14.6 : 30.8 :
FR 41.1 41.9 41.0 21.7 21.1 19.3 32.2 37.8 37.2
IT 37.8 41.8 42.6 17.4 17.8 16.8 27.3 29.5 34.9
CY 22.1 21.6 27.0 13.0 12.6 18.8 18.0 24.7 31.1
LV 39.2 36.7 32.5 19.4 18.7 17.3 20.5 11.5 7.4
LT 34.5 41.2 31.7 17.7 18.0 18.2 12.7 7.1 6.8
LU 29.3 29.9 32.0 21.0 23.0 27.3 : : :
HU 42.3 41.4 39.4 29.6 27.2 27.2 14.9 18.5 17.5
MT 20.1 21.8 21.7 14.8 15.6 18.9 : : :
NL 34.8 35.0 36.9 23.3 23.8 27.0 21.0 20.0 12.5
AT 38.5 40.1 40.5 20.6 22.2 21.4 26.6 27.2 24.1
PL 36.8 33.6 30.1 20.7 17.8 20.2 20.9 20.5 20.5
PT 22.3 22.3 23.4 18.1 18.2 17.4 21.5 31.6 30.7
RO 31.6 33.6 27.4 12.6 17.0 18.9 : : :
SI 38.5 37.6 35.0 24.4 23.3 24.1 13.3 17.2 22.5
SK 38.5 36.3 32.0 26.4 21.7 17.7 35.0 22.9 15.9
FI 44.2 44.0 39.3 27.6 28.5 25.2 31.1 38.1 28.4
SE 46.8 46.8 39.0 27.9 26.3 28.1 19.9 42.7 34.9
UK 25.9 25.9 25.7 19.6 18.9 18.4 34.3 43.3 :
EU-27 average
GDP-weighted 36.8 36.7 36.0 19.9 20.0 19.7 : : :
arithmetic 35.3 35.8 33.4 20.8 20.8 21.3 : : :
EA-17 average
GDP-weighted 38.1 38.8 38.1 19.4 19.7 19.2 25.7 29.6 27.5
arithmetic 34.3 34.5 34.0 20.2 20.3 20.7 22.8 25.0 23.7
EU-25 average
GDP-weighted 36.8 36.7 36.1 20.0 20.0 19.7 26.6 32.1 28.8
arithmetic 35.6 35.8 34.0 21.2 21.0 21.4 22.5 24.9 23.3
Implicit tax rate on labour Implicit tax rate on consumption Implicit tax rate on capital
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Table A.4: Statutory tax rates, in % 
 
Note: The top PIT rates reflect the statutory tax rate for the highest income bracket. The rates include surcharges, state and local taxes. Only the 'basic' 
(non-targeted) top CIT rate is presented here. Existing surcharges and averages of local taxes are included. For details of the calculation of the top PIT 
rates and CIT rates see European Commission (2012a). 
Source: Commission services. 
 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012
BE 60.6 60.6 53.7 53.7 53.7 53.7 40.2 40.2 34.0 34.0 34.0 34.0
BG 50.0 40.0 24.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 40.0 32.5 15.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
CZ 43.0 32.0 32.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 41.0 31.0 26.0 19.0 19.0 19.0
DK 65.7 62.9 62.3 55.4 55.4 55.4 34.0 32.0 28.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
DE 57.0 53.8 44.3 47.5 47.5 47.5 56.8 51.6 38.7 29.8 29.8 29.8
EE 26.0 26.0 24.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 26.0 26.0 24.0 21.0 21.0 21.0
IE 48.0 44.0 42.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 40.0 24.0 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5
EL 45.0 45.0 40.0 49.0 49.0 49.0 40.0 40.0 32.0 34.0 30.0 30.0
ES 56.0 48.0 45.0 43.0 45.0 52.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
FR 59.1 59.0 53.5 45.8 46.7 46.8 36.7 37.8 35.0 34.4 34.4 36.1
IT 51.0 45.9 44.1 45.2 47.3 47.3 52.2 41.3 37.3 31.4 31.4 31.4
CY 40.0 40.0 30.0 30.0 30.0 38.5 25.0 29.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
LV 25.0 25.0 25.0 26.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
LT 33.0 33.0 33.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 29.0 24.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
LU 51.3 47.2 39.0 39.0 42.1 41.3 40.9 37.5 30.4 28.6 28.8 28.8
HU 44.0 44.0 38.0 40.6 20.3 20.3 19.6 19.6 17.5 20.6 20.6 20.6
MT 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0
NL 60.0 60.0 52.0 52.0 52.0 52.0 35.0 35.0 31.5 25.5 25.0 25.0
AT 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 34.0 34.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
PL 45.0 40.0 40.0 32.0 32.0 32.0 40.0 30.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0
PT 40.0 40.0 40.0 45.9 50.0 49.0 39.6 35.2 27.5 29.0 29.0 31.5
RO 40.0 40.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 38.0 25.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0
SI 50.0 50.0 50.0 41.0 41.0 41.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
SK 42.0 42.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 40.0 29.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0
FI 62.2 54.0 51.0 49.0 49.2 49.0 25.0 29.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 24.5
SE 61.3 51.5 56.6 56.6 56.6 56.6 28.0 28.0 28.0 26.3 26.3 26.3
UK 40.0 40.0 40.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 33.0 30.0 30.0 28.0 26.0 24.0
EU-27 arithmetic 47.4 44.8 40.0 37.9 37.6 38.1 35.3 31.9 25.5 23.7 23.4 23.5
EA-17 arithmetic 49.0 47.1 41.9 41.6 42.3 43.1 36.8 34.4 28.1 26.2 25.9 26.1
Adjusted top corporate income tax rateTop personal income tax rate
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Table A.5: Energy tax revenues in relation to final energy consumption 
 
Note: Nominal: EUR per tonne of oil equivalent; Real: EUR per tonne of equivalent, deflated with cumulative % change in final demand deflator 
(2000 = 100). 2009 are provisional data. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
2000 2008 2009 2000 2008 2009
BE 96.7 114.9 125.2 BE 96.7 95.6 105.2
BG 39.8 107.6 108.6 BG 39.8 73.7 73.3
CZ 53.4 132.0 130.6 CZ 53.4 77.2 80.7
DK 299.2 317.5 330.9 DK 299.2 275.7 283.2
DE 191.8 203.8 215.4 DE 191.8 181.6 191.8
EE 31.4 104.0 127.5 EE 31.4 71.7 88.7
IE 140.4 174.5 198.3 IE 140.4 134.4 159.7
EL 117.3 126.1 135.5 EL 117.3 98.7 105.4
ES 138.0 147.9 154.2 ES 138.0 113.5 119.7
FR 166.5 173.5 178.8 FR 166.5 148.2 153.6
IT 245.3 232.6 259.4 IT 245.3 189.1 210.9
CY 43.2 137.8 142.1 CY 43.2 111.5 114.8
LV 48.2 92.2 97.1 LV 48.2 67.9 69.6
LT 57.9 101.6 116.4 LT 57.9 75.3 82.6
LU 167.5 210.2 210.1 LU 167.5 176.9 175.0
HU 77.2 121.4 112.6 HU 77.2 76.4 76.2
MT 161.4 176.0 195.5 MT 161.4 157.1 171.4
NL 153.5 224.8 231.9 NL 153.5 188.4 195.3
AT 138.8 166.8 169.5 AT 138.8 143.4 144.9
PL 58.7 127.6 106.8 PL 58.7 91.4 91.9
PT 111.4 173.4 175.3 PT 111.4 138.0 143.0
RO 58.2 80.1 86.1 RO 58.2 54.2 64.7
SI 118.5 167.7 226.8 SI 118.5 135.1 183.5
SK 39.7 100.7 100.7 SK 39.7 51.5 49.6
FI 109.8 124.2 129.1 FI 109.8 110.0 112.5
SE 179.9 220.8 210.0 SE 179.9 221.3 228.3
UK 249.2 220.3 220.9 UK 249.2 244.3 270.2
EU-27 averages EU-27 averages
GDP-weighted 187.0 190.3 198.5 GDP-weighted 187.0 168.4 179.3
base-weighted 170.1 183.0 190.0 base-weighted 170.1 160.0 170.9
EA-17 averages EA-17 averages
GDP-weighted 176.8 186.8 198.3 GDP-weighted 176.8 157.2 167.3
base-weighted 171.0 184.2 195.7 base-weighted 171.0 154.9 165.1
Nominal Real (2000 deflator)
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Table A.6: The composition of tax wedge in 2011, single average income worker 
 
Note: *Data for non-OECD-EU countries (BG, LV, LT, MT and RO) are only available for 2010; ** CY data for 2007. For these countries, changes in 
tax wedge refer to period 2009-2010 (for CY to period 2006-2007). 
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
Country Tax wedge Income tax Employee SSC Employer SSC Tax wedge Income tax Employee SSC Employer SSC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
BE 55.5 21.7 10.8 23.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
BG* 32.5 7.4 11.0 15.5 -1.3 0.1 0.2 -1.6
CZ 42.5 8.9 8.2 25.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0
DK 38.4 28.0 10.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
DE 49.8 15.9 17.4 16.5 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.3
EE 40.1 12.5 2.1 25.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
IE 26.8 13.5 3.6 9.7 0.9 3.8 -2.9 0.0
EL 38.0 3.0 12.8 22.2 -0.2 -0.8 0.3 0.3
ES 39.9 12.0 4.9 23.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
FR 49.4 10.0 9.6 29.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
IT 47.6 16.1 7.2 24.3 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0
CY** 13.9 2.1 5.9 5.9 --- --- --- ---
LV* 44.2 14.9 7.3 19.4 -0.8 -0.8 0.0 0.0
LT* 40.7 10.1 6.9 23.8 -0.9 -5.5 4.6 0.0
LU 36.0 13.3 11.7 11.0 1.7 0.3 0.7 0.6
HU 49.4 13.6 13.6 22.2 2.8 2.4 0.4 0.0
MT* 22.4 8.5 6.9 6.9 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1
NL 37.8 14.5 14.0 9.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.2
AT 48.4 11.9 14.0 22.6 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
PL 34.3 5.9 15.5 12.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
PT 39.0 10.9 8.9 19.2 1.4 1.4 0.0 0.0
RO* 44.3 9.3 12.8 22.3 2.0 -0.2 0.5 1.7
SI 42.5 9.6 19.0 13.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SK 38.9 7.5 10.6 20.8 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
FI 42.7 18.5 5.8 18.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1
SE 42.8 13.6 5.3 23.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
UK 32.5 14.1 8.5 9.9 -0.1 -0.6 0.3 0.2
EU-27 weighted average 43.7 13.7 10.7 19.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
EU-17 weighted average 46.4 13.8 11.2 21.4 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1
Income tax plus employees' and employers' social security 
contributions (as % of labour costs, 2011)
Annual change 2011/10  (in percentage points)
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Table A.7: Standard and reduced VAT rates in the EU 
 
Note:  If two VAT rates were applicable during a year the one being in force for more than six months or introduced on 1 July is indicated in the table. 
Super reduced rates (below 5 %) are shown in brackets. ES: Standard rate and reduced rate were increased as of September 2012 to 21% and 10%, 
respectively. IT: Standard rate was increased in September 2011; CY: Standard rate was increased in March 2012; FI: Reduced 17 % rate was 
decreased to 12 % on 1.10.2009. Standard rate as well as reduced rates were increased by one percentage point on 1.7.2010. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Country VAT rate
Standard 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Reduced 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12
Standard 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Reduced - - - - - - - 7 7 7 7 9 9
Standard 22 22 22 22 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20
Reduced 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 9 9 10 10 14
Standard 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Reduced - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Standard 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 19 19 19 19 19 19
Reduced 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Standard 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 20 20 20 20
Reduced 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 9 9 9 9
Standard 21 20 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21.5 21 21 23
Reduced 12.5 (4.2) 12.5 (4.3) 12.5 (4.3) 13.5 (4.3) 13.5 (4.4) 13.5 (4.8) 13.5 (4.8) 13.5 (4.8) 13.5 (4.8) 13.5 (4.8) 13.5 (4.8) 13.5 (4.8) 13.5/9 (4.8)
Standard 18 18 18 18 18 19 19 19 19 19 23 23 23
Reduced 8 (4) 8 (4) 8 (4) 8 (4) 8 (4) 9 (4.5) 9 (4.5) 9 (4.5) 9 (4.5) 9 (4.5) 5.5/11 6.5/13 6.5/13
Standard 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 18 18 18
Reduced 7 (4) 7 (4) 7 (4) 7 (4) 7 (4) 7 (4) 7 (4) 7 (4) 7 (4) 7 (4) 8 (4) 8 (4) 8 (4)
Standard 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6
Reduced 5.5 (2.1) 5.5 (2.1) 5.5 (2.1) 5.5 (2.1) 5.5 (2.1) 5.5 (2.1) 5.5 (2.1) 5.5 (2.1) 5.5 (2.1) 5.5 (2.1) 5.5 (2.1) 5.5 (2.1) 5.5/7 (2.1)
Standard 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 21
Reduced 10 (4) 10 (4) 10 (4) 10 (4) 10 (4) 10 (4) 10 (4) 10 (4) 10 (4) 10 (4) 10 (4) 10 (4) 10 (4)
Standard 10 10 13 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 17
Reduced 5 5 5 5 5 5 5/8 5/8 5/8 5/8 5/8 5/8 5/8
Standard 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 21 21 22 22
Reduced - - - 9 5 5 5 5 5 10 10 12 12
Standard 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 19 21 21 21
Reduced 5 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9
Standard 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Reduced 6/12 (3) 6/12 (3) 6/12 (3) 6/12 (3) 6/12 (3) 6/12 (3) 6/12 (3) 6/12 (3) 6/12 (3) 6/12 (3) 6/12 (3) 6/12 (3) 6/12 (3)
Standard 25 25 25 25 25 25 20 20 20 25 25 25 27
Reduced 0/12 0/12 0/12 0/12 5/15 5/15 5/15 5 5 5/18 5/18 5/18 5/18
Standard 15 15 15 15 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Reduced 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5/7 5/7
Standard 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Reduced 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Standard 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Reduced 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Standard 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 23 23
Reduced 7 (3) 7 (3) 7 (3) 7 (3) 7 (3) 7 (3) 7 (3) 7 (3) 7 (3) 7 (3) 7 (3) 5/8 5/8
Standard 17 17 19 19 19 21 21 21 20 20 21 23 23
Reduced 5/12 5/12 5/12 5/12 5/12 5/12 5/12 5/12 5/12 5/12 6/13 6/13 6/13
Standard 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 24 24 24
Reduced - - - - 9 9 9 9 9 5/9 5/9 5/9 5/9
Standard 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Reduced 8 8 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
Standard 23 23 23 20 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20
Reduced 10 10 10 14 - - - 10 10 10 6/10 10 10
Standard 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 23 23 23
Reduced 8/17 8/17 8/17 8/17 8/17 8/17 8/17 8/17 8/17 8/17 9/13 9/13 9/13
Standard 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Reduced 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12 6/12
Standard 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 15 18 20 20
Reduced 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
EU-27 Standard 19.2 19.3 19.5 19.5 19.4 19.6 19.4 19.5 19.4 19.8 20.4 20.7 21.0
SK
FI
SE
UK
NL
AT
PL
PT
RO
SI
CY
LV
LT
LU
HU
MT
EE
IE
EL
ES
FR
IT
2012
BE
BG
CZ
DK
DE
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 20112000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
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Table A.8: Measures of tax progressivity 
 
Source: Commission services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Index of Progressivity 
(Single no ch 100% of 
AW)
Index of Progressivity 
(Single no ch 167% of 
AW)
Tax wedge 167% / 
67% (single no ch.)
BE 0.24 0.22 1.22
BG NA NA 1.00
CZ 0.11 0.07 1.15
DK 0.06 0.20 1.21
DE 0.21 -0.14 1.14
EE 0.05 0.03 1.07
IE 0.41 0.29 2.17
EL 0.14 0.14 1.27
ES 0.14 -0.10 1.16
FR 0.04 0.13 1.16
IT 0.12 0.19 1.19
CY NA NA NA
LV NA NA 1.03
LT NA NA 1.08
LU 0.30 0.20 1.50
HU 0.28 0.00 1.21
MT NA NA 1.47
NL 0.15 0.13 1.25
AT 0.24 -0.19 1.18
PL 0.03 0.02 1.05
PT 0.19 0.26 1.34
RO NA N/A 1.05
SI 0.15 0.24 1.23
SK 0.09 0.03 1.16
FI 0.25 0.17 1.31
SE 0.09 0.33 1.25
UK 0.11 0.18 1.27
EU-21/27 0.16 0.11 1.19
EA --- --- 1.18
Unweighted average:
